Strengthening European
integration through the
analysis of conflict discourses

repast

Revisiting the Past, Anticipating the Future

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Typology of political discourses about the troubled past and their relationship to the EU

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Executive summary

This report provides an overview of ongoing work related to Task 5.1, with a specific focus on Activity 5.1.1 (Content analysis of the discourses of different political actors during crucial moments related to EU accession/membership). Overall, the aim of Task 5.1 is to study how discourses (frames, narratives etc.) of Troubled Pasts (TP) structure the position of political parties on European integration. Its focus is on elite actors, namely political parties, and the discourses/frames/narratives they use regarding their troubled past and European integration. Task 5.1 has a longitudinal component with two time frames, hereafter referred to as *t1* (Activity 5.1.1) and *t2* (Activity 5.1.2 - Analysis of the changes in the discourses of political actors between 2010 and 2016) – scheduled to take place in the following months (December 2018- January 2019). Whereas *t1* relates to events during crucial moments of EU accession/membership, the focus of *t2* is on the post-2010 period that has seen Europe afflicted by various economic and political crises. This deliverable deals exclusively with the research undertaken thus far on events during *t1* (Activity 5.1.1) and provides an overview of the ongoing research and preliminary findings related to this endeavor. The report begins by reviewing the general aims and objectives of Activity 5.1.1 and its relation to the academic literature on historical cleavages of political conflict and party positions on the EU. The main aspects of research design are then presented. This includes the justification for event selection for each of the case studies covered, the description of the data collection process and the structure of the dataset that has been generated. A short overview of the cases then follows in which some of the main lines of argumentation that emerged are identified. By way of conclusion, the final section connects the present work of Activity 5.1.1 relating to event *t1* with the ongoing research related to event *t2*, i.e., Activity 5.1.2, which takes place in the post-2010 setting.

1. Introduction

Task 5.1 seeks to uncover how narratives of Troubled Pasts structure party positions on European integration across a number of country cases. It is based on an analysis of party manifestos and speeches/declarations in parliamentary debates and political statements during electoral campaigns in critical periods in which the issue of past conflicts was reactivated. The selection of key trigger events informing the data collection has been guided by the results of the historical analysis in WP2. Overall, the ongoing research will lead to a typology of discourses based on the construction of Europe/the EU as a mechanism for either mitigating/overcoming Troubled Pasts or as a mechanism for preserving and/or further extenuating specific traumas. Our working assumption is that the use of Troubled Pasts can act as a facilitating factor for EU integration (i.e., the EU as a means to overcome divisions of the past), but that the arrow of causality can also point in the opposite direction with the very idea of the EU inflaming past traumas and generating principled opposition to the EU as an emerging polity. In either case, we expect that the specific mechanism will be mediated by the discourses of political elites and by the political and economic context in which they operate. Elucidating these dynamics is the overall aim of Task 5.1.

The present report is structured upon five main sections. The first section provides a theorization of how past conflicts and troubled pasts can influence the position of parties on European integration. This theorization -which draws mainly on cleavage theory- is the core framework that guides the theoretical as well as empirical analysis in Task 5.1 and provides the typology that will help us categorise the positions of political parties in our selected cases. The following section explains the rationale for selecting the crucial electoral/political events for each case and the reasons for their selection. In the next section, the methodological approach is outlined with special emphasis on data collection as well as the constraints and limitations encountered. In the fourth section of this report, we present the preliminary findings by focusing on some of the main lines of argumentation that were uncovered for event *t1* in each of the cases. The last section makes a connection with the *t2* events for each case. However, since the research on *t2* is still ongoing work –and will be finalised by the end of January 2018- we only highlight some of the broader patterns.

2. Theorising Troubled Pasts and Party Positions on European Integration

The goals of Task 5.1 have a direct linkage with a broader academic literature that focuses on how parties across Europe position themselves on the issue of European integration. Although some of this work can be traced back to the early 1990s, with the growing politicization of the EU in recent years the literature has grown exponentially. A recent,

influential strand has concerned itself with the rise of Euroscepticism[1]. At a broad level a distinction can be made between the literature that draws its theoretical sustenance from the field of comparative politics[2] and another strand that is more closely connected to European integration studies[3]. While the former has broader concerns connected to the structure and genesis of political competition, which may or may not include an overt European dimension, the European integration literature has a more specific focus on EU institutions and how Euroscepticism affects the broader integration process. Despite these different concerns, there are many ways in which both literatures are converging in the context of growing EU politicisation.

Given the nature of the research questions that are addressed in RePAST, and in particular the concerns of WP5, our focus is on examining the discursive mechanisms underpinning political parties' positions on the EU and especially the reasons why some political parties adopt Eurosceptic positions. Szcerbiak and Taggart (2017)[4] identify two schools of thought that provide explanations as to why parties in Europe become Eurosceptic or not. The first follows a top-down strategic approach to party competition. Thus, adopting Euroscepticism is the result of strategic choices and tactics that are due to what Sitter (2001)[5] calls the 'politics of opposition'. In other words, parties adopt a Eurosceptic stance depending on whether such a position will maximise their electoral success at a given juncture. According to this logic, Eurosceptic positioning is the result of political competition rather than a deeply embedded party ideological position[6].

The alternative approach has a rich tradition in comparative politics that goes back to seminal work by Lipset and Rokkan (1967)[7] on cleavage theory. This approach has a more structural, sociological explanation of political conflict. At its core is the idea that political parties' positions on the issue of European integration emanate from deeply embedded societal cleavages, which can be thought of as enduring historical conflicts. According to Lipset and Rokkan (1967)[8] these historical political conflicts, such as centre-periphery

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[1] Leruth, B., Startin, N. & Usherwood, S. (2017). *The Routledge Handbook of Euroscepticism*. London: Routledge.

[2] Mair, P. (2007). Political opposition and the European Union 1. *Government and Oopposition*, 42(1), 1–17.

[3] Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2009). A postfunctionalist theory of European integration: From permissive consensus to constraining dissensus. *British Journal of Political Science*, 39(1), 1–23.

[4] Szcerbiak, A. & Taggart, P. (2017). Contemporary Research on Euroscepticism. In B. Leruth, N. Startin and S. Usherwood (eds), *The Routledge Handbook of Euroscepticism* (pp. 11–21). London: Routledge.

[5] Sitter, N. (2001). The politics of opposition and European integration in Scandinavia: is Euro-scepticism a Government–Opposition dynamic?. *West European Politics*, *24*, 22–39.

[6] Taggart, P. (1998). A touchstone of dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western European party systems. *European Journal of Political Research*, *33*, 363–388.

[7] Lipset, S. & Rokkan, S. (1967). *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*. New York: Free Press.

[8] *Ibid*.

competition, the class divide or religious conflicts, can remain persistent over time constituting so-called 'frozen cleavages'. Since political parties are organisations with historically grounded values and ideological trajectories that guide their positions, as new issues emerge, such as for example the issue of the European integration, party positions will tend to be structured by those pre-existing historical predispositions[9].

Although current conflicts and crises can produce new cleavages, the tendency is for these conflicts to be absorbed and assimilated within existing ideological schemes. This bottom-up conception of political conflict and party competition closely follows the guiding rationale of Task 5.1, whose conceptual point of departure is the structuring effects of Troubled Past lineages. Nonetheless, there is also scope to probe the conditions under which more strategic, opportunistic party mobilisation occurs. To capture the potential for changing party positions we draw from recent work on party positioning on European integration[10]. Party alignment on European integration can be conceived on an ordinal scale ranging from an outright rejectionist position to a maximalist position on European integration. Drawing on Flood and Soborski (2017)[11] we present an ordered scale with an intermediate position on European integration as depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 1 Categories of ideological party alignments on EU integration

The maximalist position pushes for integration as far and as fast as is feasible, while a reformist stance endorses the advance of integration, subject to remedying the deficiencies of what has already been achieved. A gradualist position accepts a degree of integration as long as it is slow and piecemeal. The Neutral category can be conceived of in similar ways to the middle position in Likert scale -neither in favour nor against a proposition, which in the current example relates to European integration. As the middle category is crossed the sentiment towards European integration becomes decidedly more negative. It ranges from the minimalist position that accepts the status quo but wants to limit further integration as

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[9] Marks, G. & Wilson, C. J. (2000). The past in the present: a cleavage theory of party response to European integration", *British Journal of Political Science*, *30*, 433–459; Hooghe, L., Marks, G. & Wilson, C. J. (2002), Does Left/Right structure party positions on European integration?, *Comparative Political Studies*, *35*, 965–989.

[10] Flood, C. & Soborski, R. (2017). Euroscepticism as Ideology. In B. Leruth, N. Startin & S. Usherwood (eds), *The Routledge Handbook of Euroscepticism* (pp. 36–47). London: Routledge.

[11] *Ibid*.

far as possible, to the revisionist position that wants a return to an earlier state. At the extreme is the rejectionist position of outright refusal of integration, coupled with opposition to the polity itself.

While taking into account the historical cleavages that structure political parties' positions and discourses, the research also takes into account movement on the party alignment scale. In this sense, in addition to the durability of historical ideological and programmatic values, what is also of interest are those instances where parties have crossed the neutral point and changed side. The conceptualisation and working typology is intended to be able to capture such movement.

3. Case Selection

We begin with the description of event selection for *t1* across the eight cases. Table 1 provides the summary information. Since the focus of Task 5.1 is on political parties and their discourses as reflected in official material such as party manifestos, speeches etc., most of the cases in Table 1 selected an electoral event during a salient period in which Troubled Past is present. There are a number of further qualifications that need to be made regarding the choice of events. RePAST's focus is on crucial events involving Troubled Past discourses that take place around the time of accession or EU membership. The first thing to note is that two cases, Bosnia and Kosovo, are not EU members. Indeed, the two countries are not even candidate states at the present moment. However, they are potential candidate states as reflected by the signed agreements and ongoing negotiations with the EU, which are part and parcel of the process of joining the EU.

Table 1 Case and Event selection for t1

Country	Year	Event
Bosnia	2016	Republika Srpska National Day referendum
Cyprus	2004	Annan Plan referendum
Germany	1990	All-German federal elections
Greece	1981	Parliamentary elections
N. Ireland	1975	United Kingdom EEC referendum
Kosovo	2015	Stabilization and Association Agreement
Poland	2003	EU Accession referendum
Spain	1977	Amnesty Law

Both Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter referred to as Bosnia) and Kosovo have signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU. The SAA is an important milestone on the way towards securing the status of a candidate state. In the case of **Kosovo**, the signing of the SAA is the object of study for *t1*. The signing of the agreement represents a crucial, new phase in Kosovo's relationship with the EU. The event's importance for the future of the country, and the fact that it acquired media attention and triggered party reactions that raised Troubled Past discourses, render it an appropriate event for further study in this country aspiring to join the EU.

In the case of **Bosnia** the equivalent SAA was signed two years before Kosovo, in 2014. In the meantime, an event took place in 2016 that reinvigorated Troubled Past conflict in a vivid way. A unilateral referendum was held by one of the constituent units of Bosnia – Republika Srpska— to commemorate the date when the Bosnian Serb republic was declared in 1992. It is well known that such referendums can be trigger events that escalate conflict in divided societies, especially in the Balkan region. Not surprisingly, the staging of the popular vote in violation of a constitutional Court ruling generated strong party reactions and international condemnation while highlighting the fragility of inter-ethnic relations. It is an apt case for further study of Troubled Past discourses in relation to the matter of European integration.

The next case that represents a deviation of sorts in which a *t1* event occurs around the time of EU membership is the **German** case. The latter is a founding member of what has now become the EU. The EU's foundational moment in the 1950s was the outcome of successive treaties in the 1950s that paved the way for the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community and then the European Economic Community. Taking place against the backdrop of post-World War II reconciliation and recovery, the foundational moment was a highpoint in international state craft and geopolitics. At the time Germany was, of course, divided by the Iron Curtain ensuring that West Germany would constitute one of the core motors of integration alongside France. Rather than focus on the foundational moment in which the full impact of European integration was unknown, our *t1* event incorporates the seismic geo-political events that brought down the Iron Curtain in 1989 and led to the re-unification of Germany. In one swift swoop Eastern Germany was fully incorporated into the EU without any accession procedure. The all-German federal elections of 1990 mark the watershed moment and offer an insight into the debates and consequences of hastily taken decisions that still impact on the structure of political conflict in Germany today.

There is a close connection for the remaining cases in Table 1 in terms of the selection of event *t1* and membership of the EU. As with the case of Germany, accession to the EU for the remaining cases was a relatively straightforward matter in terms of the domestic political dynamics at play. In the case of Greece and Spain, the route to EC accession opened up following collapse of the military Junta in 1974 and the death of General Franco a year later. In both countries accession to the EU was promptly ratified in terms of the domestic legislative process –albeit with a significant rejection on the part of one of the major Greek

political parties (PASOK). Thus, in the case of **Greece** we focus on the parliamentary elections that take place in the same year that Greece joins the EC in 1981. The Greek parliament had already ratified the Accession Treaty in 1979 despite opposition from the Socialist left and the Communists. They did not have a blocking minority in terms of parliamentary seat share and so the ratification was passed. This all changed in 1981 when PASOK achieved a landslide victory campaigning, among other things, on a potential withdrawal referendum. This is a crucial electoral event for Greece's party system formation and its relations with the EU and, more generally, its international geo-political orientation.

In **Spain**, the 1978 constitution –the foundational settlement that paved the way for Spain's transition to democracy– contained a simplified route to EC accession that obviated the need for legitimation via a referendum. Furthermore, the latter was unnecessary with both elite and public opinion overwhelmingly in favour of accession. Thus, in the case of Spain we have opted to study an event for *t1* that ranks among the most important in terms of Troubled Past and historical memory, the Amnesty Law of 1977. The process leading up to this parliamentary vote triggered political debate and conflict about the nature and form of reconciliation since political parties had direct links with repression and crimes committed in the past (in this case, the Spanish Civil War and the policies of the Francoist regime).

Joining the EU was a foregone conclusion for another country, **Poland**, that was part of the post-1989 democratisation wave. It was the biggest Central and Eastern European Country (CEEC) to join the EU in what, to date, remains the most ambitious Enlargement round of the EU. In the case of Poland, our *t1* event is rather straightforward to select. As with all other CEECs that joined the EU during the 2004 enlargement round, Poland legitimated its accession to the EU via a referendum. Despite overwhelming support across the mainstream parties, there were pockets of dissent which are of great interest for understanding contemporary dynamics within Polish right wing parties and their increasingly uneasy relationship with the EU.

Another country that joined the EU during its big bang enlargement in the early 2000s is **Cyprus**. Unlike Malta, the other Mediterranean island that joined the EU at the same time, Cyprus was not part of the domino wave of accession referendums that were held to endorse EU membership. Instead, the divided island of Cyprus held a referendum on re-unification –the so-called Annan Plan, a week before its formal accession to the EU. Membership of the EU had already been secured irrespective of the outcome of the UN-sponsored Annan Plan referendum. This *t1* event neatly brings to the fore the salience of the Troubled Past and its intersection with the European integration process.

The remaining case of **Northern Ireland** is also another example of a *t1* event that takes place at around the time of accession and in the form of a referendum. In fact, the referendum event takes place after Northern Ireland as an integral part of the UK accedes to the EEC. However, unlike Ireland whose constitutional amendment procedures required a referendum on EEC accession, the UK's ratification of its accession to the EEC required only a parliamentary majority in favour of a regular act of parliament (the European Communities Act 1972). This was insufficient to quell a crisis within the opposition party at

the time, the Labour party. However, once the party gained power, it used the referendum device to resolve an internal party dispute. The EEC membership referendum of 1975 resulted in a popular vote in Northern Ireland on the topic of Europe during one of its most conflictual periods. That referendum event sheds light on contemporary conflicts in which the Troubled Past has re-emerged –this time as a consequence of the Brexit referendum.

4. Data and methods

In this section we provide a short overview of the data and methodology for investigating how political parties' discourses of the Troubled Past (TP) structure the position of political parties on European Integration. For activity 5.1.1, an extensive data collection exercise was implemented to retrieve political party positions and uncover general lines of argumentation related to the issue area of interest. In terms of the selection of political parties, we opted for the broadest inclusion criteria – essentially to include as many parties as possible across the widest political spectrum. This ensures that all major parties that gained parliamentary representation are included as well as minor ones. The parties selected for inclusion in *t1* are presented in the Annex.

While the focus is on the elite actors, i.e. the political parties, the main unit of analysis is the statements used by political parties. Such data is typically contained in a document such as a manifesto or speech. However, a document –especially, for example, a manifesto– is likely to contain multiple units (statements) on the issue area of interest. It is the aggregation and analysis of the statements that allows the researcher to derive party positions with a view to uncovering the dominant frames and political discourses. The end result is a hierarchical data structure.

The nested data structure is depicted in Figure 2. The collection of statements is used to derive a dominant frame or political discourse, which are contained in clusters of documents. In some case, such as a verbatim speech, the document will reflect the position of an individual that belongs to a party. This can be of particular interest when parties are split on an issue. Alternatively, the document could reflect the party position, as is the case in a party manifesto. The aforementioned data is then clustered by time, belonging to either *t1* or the *t2* event, which in turn is related to the country case as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2 Hierarchical data structure

The data collection exercise has not been immune to problems regarding data availability. For some of the earlier events, e.g. the 1975 EEC membership referendum or the 1977 Amnesty Law in Spain, some data availability issues were encountered. This was less of a problem for more recent events. As with the selection of parties, the general criterion for document selection was to –where possible– select a broad range of preferably primary material to explore the recurrent lines of argumentation used. In practice the material included party manifestos, speeches, press releases, published interviews with prominent politicians, party statements, parliamentary debates, and general campaign material such as posters. In many cases, a lot of material could be retrieved through online sources; in other cases –especially older events– library collections and archives were consulted.

In sum, the approach has been to identify the main discursive events (campaigns, debates, speeches, manifestos, etc.,) surrounding a particular *t1* event and then store this data according to the structure described in Figure 2, with a view to meeting certain criteria such as inclusion of the main political parties as well as parties representing the spectrum of the ideological divide. From this collection a qualitative content analysis is performed to identify the relevant extracts that relate to the Troubled Pasts, especially in the context of European integration. By identifying the recurrent lines of argumentation used by political actors, especially over the two time periods, we can uncover the dominant political discourses used by parties to substantiate their positioning on matters related to European integration and code these accordingly into typological schemes.

5. A Comparative Overview of the Main Lines of Argumentation for event *t1*

In this section we present further information on event *t1* and some of the main lines of argumentation that were uncovered across the parties. In terms of final typologies, the research is still ongoing since the categories will need to be refined and connected to the broader currents related to the events being analysed in *t2*. We therefore only present some of the preliminary findings at this stage by looking at each country unit in alphabetical order.

In **Bosnia** the *t1* event, the unilateral referendum staged by the President of the Republika Srpska, had the potential to escalate conflict by undermining the institutional order in Bosnia. The conflict surrounding the referendum generated a variety of lines of argumentation, including condemnation of the unconstitutional act which was deemed to threaten cohesion and the territorial integrity of Bosnia. The referendum was also deemed to be in direct violation of the Dayton Agreement, as well as the Stabilisation Agreement – the latter of direct relevance to Bosnia's European integration ambitions. At the same time, the event was used by some politicians to pursue the idea of creating a third (Croatian) entity in Bosnia. Indeed, the biggest Bosnian Croat political party (HDZBiH) wrote in their political manifesto that the existing constitutional solution (Dayton Agreement) is the biggest obstacle to the European integration of Bosnia. For the biggest Bosniak party, SDA, no anti-Dayton action should be tolerated given that this was the unique European path for Bosnia, and to which there was no alternative. For the referendum promoters in Republika Srpska the act was an assertion of political identity. Indeed, some even mentioned it as a precursor to an eventual secession by the Republika Srpska from Bosnia.

In the case of **Cyprus**, the Annan plan referendum in 2004 was the most significant attempt and historic opportunity for the resolution of the Cypriot dispute. The referendum triggered a large debate about the Cyprus problem resolution among both political parties and Cypriot citizens, which involved not only Cyprus' problematic past but also Cyprus' relation to the EU and its position in it. Among the main lines of argumentation that emerged some had a direct relation to European integration. An example is the argument that accession would confer advantages over Turkey in future negotiations –given that Cyprus would have a veto on its membership bid. Or that Cyprus' accession would provide security against Turkey. This must be seen in the context that Cyprus (more specifically the Republic of Cyprus, i.e. the Greek side) had already secured membership irrespective of the referendum outcome. Thus, important lines of argumentation emerged in which a better deal could be struck since the Annan Plan was said to have met all the Turkish-Cypriot demands while leaving those of Greek Cypriots to be dealt in the future. Among the main pro-reunification arguments, we note the classic arguments about the risks of isolation following the rejection of such a painstakingly negotiated compromise as well as the possibility that such an historic opportunity for reconciliation may not emerge again.

Greece did not hold a referendum on EC accession. Instead the Accession Treaty was swiftly ratified by the Greek parliament in June 1979, albeit with considerable opposition to membership from the main opposition party, the socialist party –PASOK, which was very negatively oriented towards the EC. Nonetheless, their parliamentary seat share was insufficient to muster a blocking minority and Greece joined the European Community in 1981, the same year in which PASOK gained power with a landslide victory in the parliamentary elections. One of the main issues on the party's electoral agenda was Greece's withdrawal from the EU following a referendum that PASOK would have called. For the main right wing party -ND- and its key figures who adopted a pro-EC stance, Greece's membership of the EC was justified in terms of the opportunities it offered for welfare and the economy as well as providing security in a dangerous geopolitical context. EC membership would transform the country into a modern, dynamic EC-member state. For the charismatic leader of PASOK, the EC was a liberal threat to workers' welfare and entailed a transfer of power to Brussels with an accompanying loss of national sovereignty. More generally, the anti-western rhetoric situated the EC as a servant to US economic and geo-political interests. The 1981 elections constituted a major political event, not only for Greece's political system and party-system formation but also for Greece's international orientation and EU relations.

The reunification of **Germany** in October 1990 also meant that the GDR acceded to the European Community. In this sense, the GDR has been the only European country since the EEC's foundation that did not have to go through admission processes while GDR citizens had to accept two new 'identities' –an all-German identity under the leadership of West Germans and an EU identity. In the course of the 1990s it became evident that East-West differences would not quickly disappear and that the integration above all of differing understandings of history would not be 'achieved' in the immediate future. In the contemporary period, this is even more relevant. During the national debate at the time all the political parties under investigation shared the main commemorative narratives of Germany's troubled past (a past that should never be forgotten) and clearly showed a pro-European attitude (a reunified Germany is only possible within a strong and united Europe as well as an awareness and acceptance of the reservations from neighbouring countries against Germany's unification). Europe was seen as the only solution, a lesson learned from Germany's troubled past. Yet there were warnings that are strikingly pertinent from today's perspective. These include concerns from the SPD/Green party of the difficulties of a rapid integration process given that East Germany's economy was not ready to compete on the world market as well as concerns over the adoption of the West-German Constitution to reunified Germany. Given that Germany is still struggling with the consequences of the rapid unification process pushed through by the Christian-liberal coalition in 1990, these concerns have proven quite justified.

In the case of **Northern Ireland**, the EEC Referendum of 1975 occurred in a period of major conflict. Governmental structures would dramatically shift between 1968 –which brought to an end a 46-year period of rule by the UUP– and 1975, the year in which a constitutional convention and the EEC referendum were both held. In 1972 Unionist rule was replaced by

direct Rule from Britain. Attempts to end political and civil discrimination and introduce power sharing under the Sunningdale Agreement and a cross border institution (the Council of Ireland) collapsed after a two-week Ulster Workers Council strike in 1974. Elections were held for a constitutional convention to review the process of governorship in Northern Ireland and the Unionists opposed to power sharing won a majority in the 1975 convention, effectively bringing to an end any hopes of power sharing.

The issue of European integration evidently affects inter-ethnic perceptions of the existing conflict, i.e. to what extent European integration helps defend or strengthen the position of one group in the conflict over the other and how European integration affects the governorship of Northern Ireland in terms of the role played by the British and the Republic of Ireland. Evidently, continued membership of the then EEC was likely to lead to the eventual abolition of the border in Northern Ireland. The economic arguments in favour are the classic ones used in support of the EU, such as increased prosperity, economic security and jobs, set against the risks of isolation. The No arguments are also familiar in terms of a loss of sovereignty. However, in Northern Ireland it is interesting to note that both extremes of the conflict divide were negative towards European integration for very different reasons. While for the right wing Unionists the EEC was associated with Catholicism and seen as a back door union with the Irish republic, for the Republican parties the EEC was seen as a capitalist union prioritising the needs of businesses and doing little in terms of workers' rights. In this context Sinn Fein called for abstention rather than a clear No. Given the above, it is perhaps not surprising that the very marginal Yes vote that was delivered in Northern Ireland constituted the weakest endorsement of European integration of all four regions of the UK.

Representing a new phase of political relations between **Kosovo** and the EU, the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) is the first legal agreement between the two entities and provides a framework for Kosovo's ambition to achieve full EU membership. One of the core issues of contention is the relations between Kosovo and Serbia as set out in one of the chapters of the agreement. In particular Title II on political dialogue relates to the 1998-1999 conflict between Kosovo and Serbia and raises the issue of the Troubled Past directly. The SAA deepened the split between the main governing parties and the opposition due to its pro-European stance in favour of a final peace agreement/resolution with Serbia to resolve Troubled Past traumas. The main opposition focused their narrative on the status of Kosovo and it not being treated as a proper state in negotiations, which generated a lot of popular support. The main opposition party adopts a Eurosceptic, anti-Serbia narrative in which resolution can only come after Serbia apologizes for the war crimes it committed in Kosovo while also taking the position that Kosovo needs to join Albania.

For **Poland**, integration with the EU was one of the main long-term objectives of Polish foreign policy following the transition from state socialism to democracy during the years 1989-1990. The main political parties treated membership as one of the core political and economic objectives. The accession referendum was supposed to legitimate this re-

orientation of Poland and signal Poland's commitment to Western values. Nonetheless, EU accession would pose significant constraints on this new democracy, which had just regained its sovereignty after centuries of partitions, occupations and political tutelage. Not surprisingly there was significant dissent from some parties, namely Catholic conservative and agrarian-populist parties as well as nationalist parties, which saw membership as an existential threat to the nation and used narratives replete with references to the historical ambitions of Germany. A strong emphasis was put on the nation's Catholic culture, which was threatened by liberalism and the Western cultural relativism. Furthermore, the post-communists supporting European integration were characterized as politicians with servile attitudes – first they were servile towards Moscow, now they were about to do the same in relations with the EU. The mainstream parties adopted a very different line ranging from moderate support framed in terms of national interests through to more enthusiastic support for the EU and a 'return to the West' heralding new possibilities for democratic development and closer cooperation with major European powers such as France and Germany.

In the case of **Spain** for event t*1* the linkage with European integration is rather absent. This is not without good reason. Spain's accession to the EC was not the subject of political contestation and there was unanimous parliamentary agreement on joining, not to mention overwhelming public support. While support for the EU was unquestioned, historical memory and political reconciliation were much more conflictual topics. The 1977 Amnesty Law sought to break with the legacies of the past and the previous four decades of authoritarian government by implementing a policy of reconciliation that would 'let bygones be bygones', a pact of forgetting as it became known. The Franco regime, which understood the civil war as a religious Crusade, had established a systemic repressive mechanism after the war, which profoundly affected any kind of political opposition be it through imprisonment or summary execution through to fake trials. The new law not only pardoned the losers of the war against Franco but also forgave all the crimes committed by the repressors that maintained the regime. It is perhaps surprising then that parties, including the Left and far Left parties as well as the regional parties, which had suffered the most repression under the regime, actually supported the Amnesty. They framed it as a necessary step towards overcoming the turbulent past while laying the foundations for building a new democratic polity. There were also strategic considerations at play given that the army elite was still composed of Francoist supporters and it was necessary for this nascent democracy to avoid overtly antagonizing the military establishment –indeed, within a couple of years the military threat materialized during the failed coup attempt of 1981. For prominent politicians from the right wing party, the post-Francoist party called the Alianza Popular, the Amnesty Law was a big mistake that would trigger social and public disorder. They maintained a line of argumentation based on the respect for authority and the rule of law. The Amnesty Law represented a deviation from legal norms and what was needed to secure the foundations for the new democracy was a stricter application of the law. This should be seen in the context of ongoing violence –on the day the law was passed an ETA terrorist attack killed three persons.

6. Combining *t1* and *t2*: Prospects for Longitudinal Analysis

The focus of this concluding section is to revisit the potential for the diachronic objectives of Task 5.1, which is to map the evolution of Troubled Past discourses in relation to European integration. This involves comparing the main lines of argumentation that emerged at *t1* with contemporary events in the crises era of European integration post-2010. The research related to this later *t2* period is presently ongoing. Nonetheless, certain patterns are already discernable with regard to the persistence and relevance of Troubled Past discourses and how they structure party conflict in the contemporary setting on matters of European integration.

Before proceeding it is important to note that two of the case studies, Kosovo and Bosnia, do not lend themselves to the longitudinal mapping exercise applied to the remaining six EU member states (or region in the case of Northern Ireland). Kosovo and Bosnia are still in the process of negotiating their objective to achieve candidate status with a view to EU membership. Furthermore, the periods under study for these two cases are part of the contemporary post-2010 crises setting for the EU. In other words, these cases can be analysed in close relation to *t2* events for the remaining six cases.

The prospects for combining the analysis of events in *t1* and *t2* in manner which yields new insight is promising. This is also facilitated by the increased availability of data on political actors' positions and rhetoric as we enter the contemporary period surrounding the *t2* events. In many respects, the linkages with European integration are much more tangible in the crisis period. For virtually all cases under consideration, the debate about Europe is distinctly more contested. Thus, in Cyprus the events surrounding its unprecedented bailout in 2013, which involved a bailing in of depositors, have altered the political climate. If Eurobarometer results are interpreted at face value, it has become one of the most Eurosceptic countries in the EU. The implementation of the Troika-sanctioned austerity measures has re-invigorated an economic conflict cleavage that cross-cuts the traditional, historical conflict over the Cyprus question. New far right parties have gained representation and the political climate has become decidedly more polarized.

A similar scenario –albeit one that is even more polarized– describes the contemporary scene in Greece. While Greece may have avoided the membership referendum in the late 1970s, that device became the favoured tool for breaking an impasse with the EU when a popular vote was held on the Greek bailout conditions in 2015. This time round PASOK did not advocate the use of the referendum to withdraw from the EU as in the early 1980s. Instead it took among the most pro-EU lines during a long week in which the world's media focused their attention on the referendum campaign in Greece. A year later, in 2016, one of the most talked about EU related referendums to date delivered the people's negative verdict on the UK's continued membership of the EU. It is still unclear what the consequences of the Brexit vote will be in terms of the UK's future relations with the EU – the referendum did not answer that question. What is clear, however, is that the Northern Ireland question has been dramatically re-opened. While the more extreme parties on the

Unionist side of the conflict remained more or less faithful to their negative positions on the EU in 1975, i.e. opposing continued membership, this time round the Republican side, namely Sinn Fein, advocated continued membership. The year after Brexit, another referendum managed to rekindle the old ghosts of Spain's authoritarian past when Catalonia held its unilateral referendum on independence in 2017. Apart from the violence that accompanied the vote, one intriguing aspect is how the discourses of the past event studied at *t1* were repeated –namely, respect for authority and the rule of law to prevent social disorder.

Largely as a result of the way in which they tend to channel debate into polarised binary positions, the three referendums offer unique laboratories for probing shifting parameters of Troubled Past discourses and their connection with party conflict in the contemporary setting. The two remaining cases focus on recent electoral events in Germany and Poland that offer insight into the legacies of the past. Albeit in very different ways, recent conflicts have some of their roots in post-communist transitions that have left scars. In Germany, the post-war settlement is being challenged by a new upstart party, the AfD, which was created in 2013 in reaction to Germany's response to the Eurozone crisis. While the party's early support came from prominent economists, it has since morphed into a far right party with a nativist ideology and a crusade against migrants. Interestingly, the AfD is gaining its primary support from the former states of Eastern Germany where, in some cases, it received the highest vote share across all parties. In Poland, the elections of 2015 have transformed the country's relations with the EU in a dramatic way. The PiS, which had a moderate but qualified position on EU membership in the early 2000s, has taken a more conflictual stance with the EU on a host of issues related to the reforms of the country's political institutions.

All in all, this cursory overview of some of the *t2* events -which are still the subject of ongoing research- highlight the dramatic way in which Troubled Pasts discourses have a direct connection to the present phase in which European integration is a much more hotly contested subject. Drawing on some of the findings from *t1* it is already possible to discern patterns whereby political discourses follow a deeply embedded ideological lineage -much as cleavage theory would predict- and others where discourses have shifted, betraying a more opportunistic strategic positioning on the part of political actors. Teasing out these patterns is the main objective in bringing together the analysis of discourses across the two time periods.

ANNEX

List of political parties and their attributes per country

Country	Party	Representation in Parliament	Party vote share
Bosnia	Democratic People's Alliance (Demokratski Narodni Savez – DNS)	Yes	10.2%
Bosnia	Croatian Democratic Union 1990 (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica 1990 – HDZ1990)	No	
Bosnia	Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica Bosne i Hercegovine – HDZBiH)	Yes	14.2%
Bosnia	Our Party (Naša stranka – NS)	Yes	4.9%
Bosnia	Party of Democratic Progress (Partija demokratskog progresa – PDP)	Yes	12.6%
Bosnia	Union for a Better Future of BiH (Savez za bolju budućnost BiH – SBB)	Yes	6.8%
Bosnia	Party of Democratic Action (Stranka demokratske akcije – SDA)	Yes	25.48%
Bosnia	Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Socijaldemokratska partija BiH – SDPBiH)	Yes	14.2%
Bosnia	Serb Democratic Party (Srpska demokratska stranka – SDS)	Yes	24.3%
Bosnia	Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (Savez nezavisnih socijaldemokrata – SNSD)	Yes	39.1%
Cyprus	AKEL	Yes	34.7%
Cyprus	DISY	Yes	34%
Cyprus	DHKO	Yes	18.4%
Cyprus	EDEK	Yes	6.5%
Cyprus	Neoi orizontes	Yes	3%
Cyprus	Enomenoi dimokrates	Yes	2.6%
Cyprus	Agonistiko Dimokratiko kinima	Yes	2.1%
Cyprus	Movement of Ecologists - Citizens' Cooperation	Yes	2%
Greece	Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK)	Yes	48.1%
Greece	New Democracy	Yes	35.9%

Country	Party	Representation in Parliament	Party vote share
Greece	Communist Party of Greece (KKE Exterior)	Yes	10.9%
Greece	Communist Party of Greece (KKE Interior)	No	1.3%
Germany	CDU/CSU Union (Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) and Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU))	Yes	43.8 %
Germany	SPD (Social Democrats)	Yes	33.6 %
Germany	FDP (Free Democratic Party)	Yes	11.0 %
Germany	Listenvereinigung Bündnis 90/Grüne-BürgerInnenbewegungen (East)*	Yes	1.2 %
Germany	BÜNDNIS 90 / DIE GRÜNEN (West)	No	3.8 %
Germany	PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism)	Yes	2.4 %
Germany	Republikaner (The Republicans)	No	2.1%
Northern Ireland	Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)	Yes	25.8%
Northern Ireland	Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)	Yes	14.8%
Northern Ireland	Vanguard Ulster Unionist Party (VUPP)	Yes	12.7%
Northern Ireland	Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP)	Yes	23.7%
Northern Ireland	Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI)	Yes	9.8%
Northern Ireland	Unionist Party of Northern Ireland (UPNI)	Yes	7.7%
Northern Ireland	Republican Clubs (Rep. C.)	Yes	2.2%
Northern Ireland	Northern Ireland Labour Party	Yes	1.4%
Northern Ireland	Sinn Fein	Abstain	Abstain
Northern Ireland	Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP)	Abstain	Abstain
Northern Ireland	Peoples Democracy	Abstain	Abstain

Country	Party	Representation in Parliament	Party vote share
Kosovo	Kosovo Democratic Party - PDK	Yes	22%
Kosovo	Kosovo Democratic League- LDK	Yes	25%
Kosovo	Alliance for Future of Kosovo – AAK	Yes	12%
Kosovo	Alliance New Kosovo – AKR	Yes	
Kosovo	Fjala		
Kosovo	Gradjanska Iniciativa Gorana- GiG	Yes (6+ Group)	6%
Kosovo	Levizja Vetevendosje- LVV	Yes	19%
Kosovo	Levizja per Bashkim- LB	Yes	
Kosovo	Nisma	Yes	8%
Kosovo	Partia e Drejtesise- PD	No	
Kosovo	PDU	No	
Kosovo	PLE	No	
Kosovo	PSD	Yes	12%
Kosovo	Democristian Albanian party – PSHDK	Yes with LDK	
Kosovo	Republican Party – PR	No	
Kosovo	PK	No	
Poland	SLD-UP (coalition)	Yes	41,04%
Poland	Platforma Obywatelska	Yes	12,68%
Poland	Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej	Yes	10,20%
Poland	Prawo i Sprawiedliwość	Yes	9,50%
Poland	Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe	Yes	8,98%
Poland	Liga Polskich Rodzin	Yes	7,87%
Poland	Ruch Katolicko-Narodowy	Yes	(entered parliament on LPR's lists)
Spain	UCD (Unión de Centro Democrático)	Yes	34.4%
Spain	PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español)	Yes	29.32%

Country	Party	Representation in Parliament	Party vote share
Spain	PCE (Partido Comunista de España)	Yes	9.33%
Spain	AP (Alianza Popular)	Yes	8.21%
Spain	PDC (Pacte Democràtic per Catalunya)	Yes	2.81%
Spain	PNV (Partido Nacionalista Vasco)	Yes	1.62%
Spain	PSP-US (Partido Socialista Popular-Unidad Socialista)	Yes	4.46%
Spain	UC-DCC (Unió del Centre i la Democràcia Cristiana de Catalunya)	Yes	0.94%
Spain	EC (Esquerra de Catalunya)	Yes	0.79%
Spain	EE (Euskadiko Ezkerra)	Yes	0.34%
Spain	CAIC (Candidatura Aragonesa Independiente de Centro)	Yes	0.20%
Spain	CIC (Candidatura Independiente de Centro)	Yes	0.16%

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