THE PAST IN TODAY'S POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND VOTING BEHAVIOUR: GREECE AND SPAIN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

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In this paper we want to analyse how the memories about the respective civil wars are still present nowadays in Greece and Spain. Although their transitions to democracy took place during the same period, the past was confronted in a very different way. However, **none of the two models succeeded in settling the political use of the past** as in both cases, those conflicts were politicized later on. We analyse **the different ways in which the political elites dealt with the past both during the transition to democracy and after, and how these are reflected in public opinion today**. By analysing original comparative survey data collected in early 2020[2], we find **differences in how society perceives the conflict nowadays**.

Keywords: Attitudes, Political Parties, Transitional Justice, Historical Memory, Greece, Spain

[1] The authors are listed according to alphabetical order.

[2] These data were collected as part of the H2020 RePast Project "Strengthening European integration through the analysis of conflict discourses: revisiting the past, anticipating the future", which has received funding from the EU's Horizon 2020 programme (grant agreement No. 769252).

Introduction

Greece and Spain share a common aspect of their political history: both countries went through a civil war within a ten-year difference: Spain from 1936 to 1939, and Greece from 1946 to 1949. This time-span difference had important consequences for the later period, and also for how the memory of the conflict was managed at different stages. After a rather different post-war, and after having suffered substantively different dictatorships, both countries experienced a transition to democracy during the seventies. At that time, none of the two societies had gone through a process of reconciliation and very different ways to deal with the memory of the civil war were followed in each case (Fytili 2016, 2017). The fact that different models of transitional justice were applied in each case is not unrelated with the fact that the Cold War was still not over. In the absence of a hegemonic model of transitional justice, the different ways to handle the conflicts of the past had to do with the specificities of the history and the power politics of each country (Teitel, 2003). In this paper we want to analyse the different ways in which the political elites dealt with the past and how these are reflected in public opinion today.

The different nature of the conflicts: the civil wars and their aftermath

The international context, the degree of violence, the nature of the cleavages, and the relationship with pre-existing conflicts, are aspects that clearly differentiate the civil wars in Spain and Greece. One of the most important ones is the different international context (Casanova, 2019). The Spanish civil war ended on the 1st of April 1939 and Hitler invaded Poland on the 1st of September that same year, signing the beginning of the Second World War. The Greek civil war, on its part, has been considered "the last act of World War II" and, at the same time, it is one of the first conflicts of the Cold War (Nachmani, 1990; Olkhovsky, 1991). The differences between these two periods cannot be underestimated. During the Spanish Civil War, what was at stake was the fight against fascism, which joined many different groups (from anarchists to Socialists, Communists, liberals, or Christian democrats), while in Greece, the sides confronted the Communists, on one side, to a range of groups of different ideologies from the center to the right. In Spain, the USSR was the only country that sent support to the Republicans. However, in Greece, the UK first, and the US later, intervened against the possibility of a communist dictatorship. In sum, the Spanish conflict, although an international one, was foreign to the dynamics of the Second World War and the subsequent Cold War, the Greek conflict was deeply enmeshed in both.

Another difference between the two wars is that, although both had a social class component, in the case of the Spanish civil war other cleavages (religious, nationalist,

the form of state, ideological)[3] (Juliá, 1999). All these divisions led to higher levels of violence in Spain than in Greece. The number of those who died during the Spanish civil war is estimated around 500,000 (Preston 2012). In Greece, it is estimated that more than 50,000 combatants died in the conflict.

In terms of the relationship with other (previous) conflicts, the Greek civil war presents the peculiarity that it follows, with no solution of continuity, the period of German Occupation. In fact, it is very closely linked to that period. For many historians (Clogg, 2002:137), the beginning of the Greek civil war takes place in 1946 as a consequence of failed attempts to build a stable government after the withdrawal of the Germans. As was shown by a survey some years ago, the two periods are sometimes confused by public opinion. There is a second element that has contributed to blur (and, at times, to politically manipulate) the memory and identification of Greeks with the fault lines of the civil war. This is the existence of a "grey zone" formed by those who had been on the side of the Resistance during the German Occupation but did not follow the EAM during the civil war (Nikolakopoulos, 2012:9). These were also "excluded" (idem) during the postwar period (see below), and were represented by the centre party during the 60s. We can therefore say that the cleavages of the Occupation period did not coincide (somehow cross-cut) those of the civil war, while in Spain there was a clear overlap and reinforcement of the different divisions between the two main sides of the conflict.

The differences do not limit themselves to the civil war, but to the postwar period. In the case of Spain, the civil war led to the establishment of a forty-year long dictatorship that kept an "uncivil peace" that oppressed the defeated (Casanova, 2019). The civil war was the founding myth par excellence of Francoism and, as such, had an overwhelming and obsessive presence throughout most of its existence (Aguilar, 2002). In Greece, the postwar state (1950-1967) functioned officially and procedurally as a democratic regime. But it simultaneously encouraged the persecution of leftists, who were considered national outcasts and treated as second-class citizens (Panourgia, 2009) and anti-communism was enshrined as a central factor of the dominant ideology. Nikolakopoulos (2001) has very eloquently defined this period as a 'cachectic democracy' which would set the bases for the later dictatorship (1967-1974).

Internationally, Spain went through a period of absolute isolation during the 40s. The 50s put an end to international isolation in line with the new logic of the Cold War and Franco's well-known anti-communism. During this decade, Spain was admitted in several international organizations and diplomatic relations with the US were reestablished. Greece, on the other hand, was considered a member of the "free world" under US guardianship from the out start of the postwar regime, being the first country

[3] The Spanish civil war was also a war between Catholics and anticlericals, a war of conflicting nationalisms, a war between republican democracy and military dictatorship, between revolution and counter-revolution.

to receive help from the Marshall Plan in 1947, as the US took over Britain in its involvement in the Greek civil war.

The characteristics of the two dictatorships differ as well in many aspects. Both Linz and Poulantzas considered the dictatorships of Greece and Spain as substantially different from those of Germany and Italy (Miley, 2011:44). Poulantzas (1976) defined those of Greece, Portugal and Spain as "military dictatorships". However, the military element is probably a more defining characteristic of the Greek dictatorship. In fact, in Bermeo's (1995) critical article with applying O'Donnell's classification of "bureaucratic-authoritarianism" to the Greek case points at the lack of support from other social groups: "the Greek military had not acted in concert with the Greek bourgeoisie or with any political parties of the right, or with any significant civilian support. The Greek junta started and ended its rule with no legitimacy and with only the narrowest base of support, even within fervently pro-capitalist circles". Voulgaris has characterized the Colonel's dictatorship as a non-hierarchical military dictatorship (2008: 61).

On the other hand, Linz's classification of the Franco's regime (1973) as an authoritarian (vs. totalitarian) regime is well known. One of the basic elements of this definition is "pluralism". Regardless of the criticisms that Linz's proposal has received (Miley, 2011: 36-41), it seems undeniable that the coalition of an important (changing) sector of the bourgeoisie, with the support of the Church and the Army, meant a much more extended support amongst the elites to the dictatorship in Spain than in Greece. But Linz's focus was on the mode of administration and the political aspects, and not on the social bases of support. If we switch our attention to how much social support the regime had, it is unavoidable to refer to "sociological Francoism". This term, although no always used in a consistent manner (Rubin, 2018: 224, note 5), indicates the existence of passive support for the regime in society at the time, which continues until nowadays in a form of nostalgia. Very often it is based, mainly, in the years of the economic boom, and does not take into account the harsh repression and economic conditions during the first phase. The different degree of support that the two dictatorships obtained has to do both with the different nature of their allies and with their different duration. While Franco's dictatorship in Spain lasted for almost forty years (1939-1977), the Colonels' dictatorship in Greece lasted only 7 years (1967-1974).

Two different transitions: collapse vs negotiation

The transitions to democracy in Greece and Spain during the 70s have been considered as part of the Third Wave of democracies. However, the ways in which the demise of the dictatorships took place were very different, and so were the processes of transition to democracy, in consonance with the power politics in each case. The Greek dictatorship collapsed, while the Spanish one suffered a crisis of historical obsolescence after so many years in power (Fishman, 1990). In Greece, the dictatorship reached a

sudden end after the Colonels attempted a *coup d'état* in Cyprus and Turkey intervened in July 1974. This led to a full loss of legitimization of the dictators and a total lack of leverage over the process of transition. In Spain, as a well-known expression goes, "Franco died in his bed" in November 1975, but his regime did not collapse. On the contrary, his successors held a good degree of control of the subsequent process of transition leading to gradual change and a 'negotiated' transition (Tusell, 2005: 278). Some authors have claimed that the role of the opposition in the changes was quite limited, especially before the elections of June 1977 (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2014).

So, the transition to democracy in Greece can be considered an intermediate case between those of Spain and Portugal in relation to the degree of break with the outgoing regime (Fishman, 1990: 432). In comparison with Spain, the Greek case presents clearer elements of rupture with the dictatorship. To begin with, the source of the legality of the process was the re-establishment of the democratic Constitution of 1952 with the exception of the articles relating the political system. In addition, the abolition of the monarchy, the purging of the most important leaders of the military junta and the legalization of the communist party without opposition from the army are other elements of rupture of the Greek transition. Those coexisted with elements of continuity with the post-civil war regime (1949-1967) such as political parties and a clear hegemony of the right that excluded most of the left from both the 'national unity' government and the debate on the new constitution.

In the case of Spain, the elements of continuity were more evident. After Franco's death, a process of transformation began that was carried out through Franco's institutions (Juliá, 1999: 218). In fact, the 1976 Political Reform law that marked the beginning of that transformation and led to the holding of the 1977 general elections was approved by the Francoist Cortes. Also, the monarchy was restored under a king chosen by Franco as his personal successor. These elements of continuity were combined with rupturist decisions such as the legalization of the communist party.

Opposite transitional justice models

In both cases, the transition meant "the end of the civil war" after many years of silence over the conflict (Nikolakopoulos, 2012:10; Aguilar, 2002). Neither in Spain nor in Greece had there been opportunities for reconciliation due to the long dictatorship in the first, and the exclusionary democracy followed by a dictatorship in the second. Instead the authorities referred to recovery, meaning redemption after due punishment (Preston, 1989; Voglis, 2002). Thus, during the foundational moments of the new democratic regimes, this was an issue that had to be addressed in both countries. The decisions about how to deal with the legacies of divisions of the past differed radically in the two cases. Kornetis has even pointed at this as the "fundamental transitional difference" between the two countries (2019:72).

In the early years of the transition, reconciliation in the Greek case was based on condemnation of the dictatorship rather than on overcoming the trauma of the civil war (Nikolakopoulos, 2012: 169). The Junta played the role of the common, non-divisive, enemy to all the political parties. Given the characteristics of the regime (lack of allies, of social support and of institutionalization), and its demise (collapse), it is not surprising that both the right and the left openly condemned it. Justice was also applied through the celebration of three trials against the dictators and some of the most notorious torturers (Alivizatos and Diamandouros, 1997). The logic, notwithstanding, behind these purges as well as the partial purge of the state mechanisms was to condemn only the leaders and not the mid-rank officers, keeping the punishment within well-defined limits (Sakellaropoulos, 2013: 20). Contrarily, in Spain no trials took place. Most of the elites in the right and centre-right parties had a direct link with the previous regime (Giménez, 2014: 263-266). The dictatorship also counted on a higher level of residual legitimacy in society. Instead of trials, an Amnesty Law was passed in Parliament with the support of all parties that secured the release of all political prisoners of the left, but also implied the impossibility to condemn Francoist repressors in the future (Fishman, 1990: 430; Giménez, 2014).

Why was in Greece made possible to adopt transitional justice measures and not in Spain? Barahona de Brito and her co-authors have pointed at a series of factors affecting this decision, among them the most important being the correlation of forces between the elite that resisted change from the old regime and groups favoring democratization. Other factors include the availability of resources and the degree to which the new elite was committed to notions of retroactive justice, the degree to which there are social groups or civil society organizations pressing for it, the opposition of the groups favored by the old regime as well as the institutions contaminated by it, the nature and extension of repression against opposition forces, the degree of social complicity and the time that has gone by since the worst period of abuse, the contagion-learning effect or 'know-how' gathered from the accumulated experience of previous transitions and the impact of the international context (2001: 303-312).

As regards the civil war and the postwar period, the Greek right proudly claimed to be the victors of the civil war and presented the comeback of democracy as the continuation of the post-war period. At the same time, they tried to delegitimize the left by refusing to recognize their fundamental role during the German occupation (1941-44), and accusing the communist party instead of being 'antinational' for trying to take power through violence since 1943. The left opposition on contrary claimed the symbolic national inclusion of the left through the recognition of its role in the Resistance.

In Spain, after Franco's death, the left and right represented radically different attitudes towards the past based on the division between winners and losers of the civil war. The Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD) and Popular Alliance (AP, renamed PP in 1989) were the dominant right and centre-right parties during the early transition period, and particularly the latter one, the principal political inheritor of the winning side of the civil

war (Humlebaek, 2010: 418) while the left historical parties PCE, PSOE and nationalists parties from Catalonia and Basque Country were the inheritors of the defeated. However, the belief that the only way to ensure a peaceful transition to democracy was to set aside the past and look to the future, led to the agreement not to instrumentalize the past (Aguilar, 2002). The combination of the need of reconciliation and fear of repeating violence led political parties and main actors to search consensus far from carrying out any abrupt change that could be interpreted as revolutionary (Humlebaek, 2010: 414). The emphasis was on overcoming the divided past of the civil war by forgetting and not on condemning the dictatorship. Nevertheless, the cleavages of the civil war were still obvious as evidenced by the remarkable continuation of the geographical dispersion of the vote between the left and the right in the elections in the first democratic years (Linz and Montero, 1999: 9).

Different timings in post-transitional justice

Also, the post-transitional justice measures followed a different pattern, which was somehow consistent with the different modes of transition to democracy. The polarization about the past that characterized the early moments of the Greek transition continued during the eighties, as the identity of all the parties was built almost entirely on the memories of those conflicts (Kalyvas, 1997; Close, 2004; Siani-Davies and Katsikas, 2009). The parties and the governments confirmed their partisan historical narrative and identity, and used the conflictive memories as a political weapon, provoking a strong polarization in the political system. However, in 1989, the Law 1863/1989 that annulled the repercussions of the civil war and ordered the incineration of the police files on left-wingers. From this moment on, politicians decided to put an end to the partisan use of the conflictive past and to leave the conflict in the hands of historians. The polarization over the issue that characterized the previous decade no longer made sense after the formation of an ecumenical government together formed by ND, a coalition of communist parties (SYNaspismos), and PASOK in 1989. In other words, the intentions were similar to those in Spain during the transition – to remove the past from the political arena-, but the timing and the way to achieve it was different.

From 1989 onwards, the debates on the historical memory of the Greek civil war were relegated to the academic, journalistic and cultural world, rather than to the world of politics. The only exception was the orthodox Communist Party (KKE) which, from 1996, began to refer to the civil war as the 'crucial moment of class struggle in Greece in the 20th century' (Fytili, 2016). This increase in the historiographic and social interest can be clearly perceived as of 1999, coinciding with the 50th anniversary of the end of the civil war (Avgeridis, 2017). That interest adopted confrontational tones during an exchange of articles in the newspaper *Ta Nea*, which reached its climax in 2004 and continued until 2010. The initiative came from a group of historians and political

scientists known as the 'new wave', who claimed that the Greek historiography of the 1940s until then suffered from a clear left-wing ideological bias and lacked scientific rigor (Kalyvas and Maratzidis 2004). But the social interest in the traumatic past during the post-transition period has also become evident through an increase in cultural manifestations, especially in cinema (Kornetis, 2014).

The issue, however, reappeared in the political sphere in 2012. In the midst of the economic crisis, the political elites of the right, as well as a large part of the right and centre-right media reintroduced references to the period of the civil war in an attempt to counteract the rise of SYRIZA. According to that narrative, the longest period since the transition had been dominated by the left (since 1974 PASOK had been in power 21 years and ND 17), time during which it had managed to impose its hegemony at both the political, social and historiographical levels. For the right, this was not only responsible for the economic situation, but also for the rise of neo-fascism. Another strategy was the assimilation of SYRIZA and Golden Dawn and their consequent characterization and condemnation as totalitarian parties. In spite of that, in 2013 the ND government participated together with the neo-Nazi party in the commemoration of the victory in the civil war in Grammos, a commemoration that, recovering the most anti-communist spirit, celebrated the victory of 'democracy and freedom' over communist totalitarianism.[4]

In Spain the pact of silence was based on the desire that the future wouldn't become prey of the controversial and traumatic past (Labanyi 2007: 89-116). Indeed, the memory of the past was not instrumentalized for partisan purposes until the 1993 and 1996 elections (Decobert, 2011). In 2000 the Association for the Recuperation of the Historical Memory (ARMH) was created and started to dig common graves in which the corpses of thousands of disappeared during the civil war and the first phase of the dictatorship still lied unidentified (Ferrándiz, 2006). A series of factors can help us understand this resurgence of memory in the public discourse and the social demand for the recovery of memory: the change in the electoral strategy of PSOE, the generational shift, the turn to the right (some have talked about neo-Francoist ideology) in the Popular Party after 2000, which was accompanied by practices such as the granting of state subsidies to the Francisco Franco National Foundation, or the beatifications of the dead of the national front by the Catholic Church. The ''Pinochet case' (1998) and the "Scilingo case" (2005), also worked as a catalyst for the legal process based on universal jurisdiction led later by the Spanish judge Baltasar Garzón against the crimes committed by the Francoist regime (2008), whose failure led indirectly to the process against the Francoist crimes initiated by the Argentine Judge Servini (2010). The pressure by Amnesty International and the UN on the Spanish State

[4] A joint participation that, however, was not without conflict. "Tension in Grammos, where members of Golden Dawn insulted ND deputies", *Ta Nea*: 01-09-2013.

to proceed with different actions also seem to have been influential during the last years.

It was during the first mandate of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero in 2004-2008 when the most systematic initiatives were carried out, culminating in the enactment of the Law on Historical Memory in 2007 (Law 57/2007). This process was interrupted when the PP won the elections in 2011 and interrupted the funding for the measures foreseen in the law, with the excuse of the financial crisis.

Although based on different political choices, and conditioned by a different historical background, both in Greece and in Spain there have been attempts to "overcome" the past divisions of the civil war. The Greek way being one of open political confrontation, first, and later reconciliation through oblivion; the Spanish one being based on a one-time agreement by all political forces to look to the future, and forget about the past in what referred to political competition and judicial decisions. After a period of tiredness (in Greece during the 90s) and silence (in Spain during the 80s and 90s), with the turn of the century the past reappeared in the public sphere in both countries.

The political use of the past in the current party systems

What is the situation nowadays? How present is the memory of the civil war in politics in Greece and Spain today? Has it been affected by the changes in the party system that took place in both countries in 2015? Since 2018 PSOE has promoted increasingly ambitious initiatives regarding the historical memory, even though they still do not satisfy all the demands of parties such as ERC or Podemos, the associations for the recuperation of historical memory, or the demands expressed by the UN special rapporteur. Most of these demands, for example, the abolition of the Amnesty Law passed in 1977. The Secretary-General of the PSOE and President of the Government, Pedro Sánchez, committed himself during the November 2019 elections to give a new impulse to the Law of Historical Memory and despite the obstacles proceeded a few weeks before the elections to the exhumation of the remains of Franco from the Valley of the Fallen. Also, it has recently presented to Parliament a proposal that contains an extension of the 2007 law. PP, on the opposite, maintains a rather stable position towards the issue all over the years, and a low profile, which consists in avoiding the issue altogether. The main argument of the PP against adopting any measures regarding the past is the idea of not reopening old wounds and respecting the pact of silence agreed during the transition. In the context of fierce competition for the votes of the extreme right with the new radical right party, Vox, the PP has been more hesitant than in previous times as whether to lead a "cultural war" about the past, but it seems to be going back to its traditional low-profile position. Ciudadanos in most cases is allying with the posture of PP, but tends to avoid references to the issue and look to the future. VOX, on the other hand, has a very clear position on the subject: 'We are the voice of

those who had parents on the national side and resist having to condemn what their families did'. The opposition towards the exhumation of Franco became an element of Vox's election campaign as the party sought to grab votes from the PP.

In Greece, the past re-emerged within the context of the current crisis and the accession to power of SYRIZA in 2015, as well as with the *rise* of one of the most extremist right-wing political parties in Europe, *Golden Dawn.* In the imagination of many of the Greek citizens it seemed that the crisis of the country provided the opportunity for a rematch in history. Indicatively enough, the Greek Minister of Health, M. Voridis (member of ND representing its more radical right wing), during the campaign for the elections of January of 2015, declared that 'Our generation won't hand over the country into the hands of the Left. What our grandfathers defended bravely with the guns we will defend with our vote'. When SYRIZA won the elections, it made no references to the civil war but tried to elevate the Resistance as its main political reference by references such as "Free Athens" or through the creation of teaching materials for secondary education. These attempts have been questioned by right-wing individuals who, through legal proceedings, are questioning aspects of the historical memory of that time. Recently, the current government of ND condecorated a right-wing heroine for her role in the Resistance against the German Occupation (not the civil war) during the COVID crisis in an attempt to claim also a share in the Resistance.

Citizen attitudes about the past in 2020: hypothesis and data

It is clear that decisions made by elites shape the collective memory of their community, but what are the public opinion attitudes in these countries towards the past? In this article we will pose two questions. The first one is: Have the policies of the memory in each country crystallized into specific attitudes of citizenship? This is related to the representations of the past that society shares and the success of elites in creating collective memory. The second one deals with the existence of different visions of the past in each of these countries according to party preferences, that is: are there differences between citizens' attitudes towards the past depending on the party they vote for?

Specifically, we expect citizens in Greece and Spain will have different attitudes towards the past both because of their different models of transition and because of the politicisation and identities of the political parties. We expect that there will be greater politicisation from parties whose identity is based on a divisive past. It is the case of Spain in which, the left and right in Spain represent radically different attitudes towards the past based on the division into the winners and losers of the civil war. And although this legacy was more pronounced after Franco's death and has become more nuanced over the years, it is still present in today's political parties. Following this idea, our expectation is that there will be a greater division in the attitudes towards the past in

Spain than in Greece and this will be reflected clearly in the differences between the voters of political parties and between those who feel personal sympathy with the sides of the conflict.

We aim at filling this gap by analysing original comparative survey data, gathered in early 2020 as part of the H2020 RePast Project "Strengthening European integration through the analysis of conflict discourses: revisiting the past, anticipating the future", which has received funding from the EU's Horizon 2020 programme (grant agreement No. 769252). This is a new and original survey with representative samples of countries with a traumatic past (Greece and Spain which are analysed in this paper and also Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cyprus, Germany, Ireland, Kosovo, and Poland) in order to shed light on attitudes toward conflicts of the past in each case study and in a comparative way. For each country, a representative sample of the population of citizens aged 18 or over has been selected: 1000 respondents in Spain and 1005 in Greece. The data collection has been carried out through both, online (CAWI) and telephone (CATI) surveys, seeking to achieve better access to certain groups of the population (e.i. young people and those over 50) and taking into account that it could be a sensitive issue for most of respondents. The field work took place between March 6 and April 11, 2020 in the case of Greece and between March 6 and April 8, 2020 in the case of Spain.

Citizen attitudes about the past in 2020: results in Greece and Spain

As we said before, in this paper we focus on the troubled past of Greece and Spain, particularly, in the civil war that both countries experienced in a close period of time (1946-1949 in Greece and 1936-1939 in Spain). Since we think that the sides of the conflict and the political preferences of individual will be key in the attitudes towards the past of individuals in these two countries, we show our results by these two variables.

Before moving on to the results, it is interesting to note how in Greece there is a balance between those who show their sympathy for the left or the right (25% vs 24%), while in Spain a larger percentage is closer to the Republicans (45% vs 19%)[5]. In addition, we find a relationship between individuals' partisan preferences and their sympathy or closeness to the sides of the conflict[6]. In Greece, those who vote for Communist party feel close mostly to the left whereas those supporters of Syriza or MeRA25 also sympathize with the left but also with options such as any of the sides or different of the sides. Voters of New Democracy feel more sympathy to the right and those supporters if Movement for Change shows its heterogeneous composition with its closeness to both sides of the conflict as well as to any of them. In the case of Spain,

[5] See table 1 in Appendix.
[6] See tables 2 and 3 in Appendix.

voters of Podemos and, to a lesser extent, those of PSOE shows its sympathy for the Republicans. On the contrary, supporters of Vox clearly and less those of the Partido Popular (PP) show their closeness to the nationals in the conflict. Ciudadanos' voters point out that they do not sympathize with any side of the conflict.

With regard to the level of attention to the conflict from schools and politicians[7], as we can see in figures 1 and 2 in Greece there is a greater perception that less attention has been paid to civil war than in Spain and it is shown both between different sides of the conflict and between different polities parties' voters. And following our expectations, we can see how the results in Spain show a greater division in the opinion that schools and politicians devote too little attention to civil by personal sympathy with the sides of the conflict and partisan preferences.

Figure 1. Too little attention to conflict from schools and politicians by personal sympathy with sides of the conflict (%)



Source: Own elaboration based on Repast survey

[7] In your opinion, do the following devote too little, about right, or too much attention to civil war? Although the question asked also for traditional media, people in social media and associations, we just show the results for schools and politicians.

Figure 2. Too little attention to conflict from schools and politicians by political parties' voters (%)



Source: Own elaboration based on Repast survey

In both countries it is noted that schools have devoted the least attention to this issue in comparison to politicians. This is in keeping with what we have found in interviews with young people in Spain: the civil war and the Franco regime are subjects dealt with in little depth in the education system. In this vein, some works (Hernández, 2014; Díez Gutiérrez, 2014) have shown deficiencies in the students' textbooks on topics of historical memory due to their lack of depth, especially those relating to the repression of Franco. In Greece, in light of these results, it seems that there is also a general perception that this issue should be addressed to a greater extent in schools.

We find that those closer to the left side in Greece and those to Republicans in Spain show a higher perception that education is given little attention to civil war. Regarding party preferences, in the case of Greek parties, only New Democracy would stand out for showing the lowest percentages (14 points less in comparison with the Communist party or Movement for Change), while in Spain we find greater differences between the left-wing (PSOE and Podemos) and right-wing ideological spectrum (Ciudadanos and PP) and Vox with percentages similar to those on the left.

It is remarkable the fact that in Greece there are no major differences with respect to the opinion of the attention given to this issue from schools and politicians while in Spain, as we can see in the figures, politicians are not considered to pay as little attention to this issue as schools do (only Podemos think so). It seems that those who are sympathetic to nationals or are supporters of PP believe that politicians devote not too little attention to civil war. In recent years, the past has been an issue to distinguish the positions of the different parties, which has grown with VOX and the move of the

PP away from the centre-right political spectrum. This has led to increase the consideration that the past is a highly politicized issue in Spain and it might explain these results.

We could think that the consequences of transitional agreement by all political forces to look to the future and forget about the past ignoring the memory of the vanquished has led to the survival and resurgence of the divisions of the past in recent years in Spain highlighting the need for reconciliation at least for those that feel inherit of the defeated, it is, those sympathetic to the republicans or voters of Podemos or PSOE. In contrast, as we describe in previous sections, in Greece were adopted transitional justice measures and the model of the transition to democracy was differed radically which lead us to think that maybe the need of reconciliation is not so necessary as in Spain.

Figure 3. Need of reconciliation by personal sympathy with sides of the conflict (%)



Source: Own elaboration based on Repast survey

Figure 4. Need of reconciliation by political parties' voters (%)



Source: Own elaboration based on Repast survey

Nevertheless, when we ask about the need of reconciliation[8] the results are not what, a priori we would expect as we can see in figures 3 and 4: A large majority of Greeks (around 90% with the exception of those voters of the communist party with 73%) believe that reconciliation is necessary nowadays regarding civil war whereas Spaniards show less need for reconciliation and who think so to a greater extent, as we expected, are those sympathizers with the Republicans and the parties that have been considered inheritors of them, PSOE and Podemos.

Although the past reappeared in the public sphere in both countries in recent years, in Spain we observe a greater division based on party preferences (coinciding with the left-wing ideological spectrum versus the right-wing) while in Greece there is a greater consensus on the need for reconciliation with the exception of the Communist party. In the following figures we analysed the meaning attributed to such reconciliation[9], and our expectation is to find here also differences between the voters of the different Greek parties following their public discourses on this issue.

[8] In your opinion, does Greece/Spain need reconciliation nowadays regarding civil war? Yes/No
[9] And, thinking about civil war, which of the following statements provide the best meaning of "reconciliation" to you?

Figure 5. Meaning of reconciliation by personal sympathy with sides of the conflict (%)



Source: Own elaboration based on Repast survey

In figure 5, again we observe how in Spain the differences between those who sympathize with the sides in the conflict are greater than those observed in Greece. In both countries people agree on choosing the statement "forgetting the past and moving on" as the first meaning of reconciliation with the exception of those sympathetic to republicans that understand it mostly as "reparations to those who have suffered past injustices". In both countries the sympathisers with civil war losers understand reconciliation more as reparations to the victims compared to the winners, but in Spain it is the first option for them and in Greece they choose forgetting the past firstly.

Figure 6. Meaning of reconciliation by political parties' voters (%)



Source: Own elaboration based on Repast survey

Regarding the meaning of reconciliation by party preferences, figure 6 shows a greater heterogeneity in responses in countries. It seems that Spanish citizens are divided between those who consider that the best option is forgetting the past in order not to reopen wounds, idea associated with the right-wing ideological spectrum (PP and Vox) and the idea of reparations to victims which is supported by the left (Podemos and PSOE). In Spain, during the first years of the transition, the way of interpreting reconciliation led the left to ask for equal rights, leaving reparation aside. In recent years they have demanded reparations for the victims of the civil war and Francoism largely driven by the development of transitional justice or the generational replacement. Ciudadanos' voters are more divided on the meaning of reconciliation. Although the majority option is forgetting the past, they also think of "forgiveness among different sides" and reparations for the victims, which it is expected since they do not show a very clear opinion on the subject. It is also remarkable that the option of forgiveness is chosen more by right-wing voters while commitment to dialogue is chosen more by left-wing voters.

In Greece, we find the greatest contrasts between those supporters of New Democracy, who are most in favour of forgetting the past, and Communist party's voters, who associate reconciliation with reparations for the victims to a greater extent. Those closer to Syriza also show their preferences towards reparations to the victims (ranking in second place after the communist party choosing this meaning) but, the most chosen option among their voters is forgetting the past followed by forgiveness between different sides. Movement for Change's voters (a formation that includes PASOK) understand reconciliation as forgetting the past but also as forgiveness. And supporters of MeRa25 are those who show a more mixed view of reconciliation without a clear option.

Conclusion

This article sets out to explore the extent to policies of memory can crystallize into specific attitudes of citizens towards the past and the success of elites in creating collective memory in Greece and Spain. Although their transitions to democracy took place during the same period, the political elites dealt with the past in a different way and these conflicts were politicized later on. We analyse original comparative survey data collected in early 2020 as part of the H2020 RePast Project "Strengthening European integration through the analysis of conflict discourses: revisiting the past, anticipating the future" finding differences in how society perceives the conflict nowadays.

Our findings show the importance of party identities in shaping citizens' attitudes towards the past. This can be clearly seen in the Spanish case in which the left-wing and right-wing spectrum represent the two predominant discourses on the past: on the one

hand, the claim of the left to talk about the past and make reparations to the victims of the conflict. On the other hand, the position of the right that defends keeping the transition agreement of not instrumentalize the past and forgetting it moving to the future. However, although the differences are greater in the case of Spain, in Greece we also see how the fact that citizens feel close to one party or another will be a key element of attitudes towards the past such as the meaning of reconciliation.

This has important implications, since it shows that, although policies of memory can crystallize into specific attitudes of citizens towards the past, political parties and their discourses on the conflict will be key in shaping citizens' attitudes towards their country's conflictive past as our results show in the case of Spain and to a lesser extent in Greece.

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APPENDIX

Table 1. Personal sympathy with the sides of the conflict

	Greece		Spain	
	%	N	%	N
Mostly with the Left	**25,0**	230		
Mostly with the Right	**24,3**	223		
Mostly with the Republicans			**44,8**	411
Mostly with the Nationals			**19,1**	175
Different relatives sympathized with different sides	21,0	193	8,1	74
Did not sympathize with any of the sides	29,6	272	28,0	257

Source: Own elaboration based on Repast survey

Table 2. Personal sympathy with the sides of the conflict by political parties in Greece

	New Democracy	Syriza	Communist Party of Greece	Movement for Change	MeRA25
Mostly with the Left	4,9	**52,0**	**87,5**	25,0	**44,7**
	14	105	35	12	17
Mostly with the Right	**55,1**	5,9	0,0	8,3	0,0
	158	12	0	4	0
I partially sympathized with different sides	17,1	22,3	5,0	**35,4**	10,5
	49	45	2	17	4
I do not sympathize with any of the sides	23,0	19,8	7,5	**31,3**	44,7
	66	40	3	15	17

Source: Own elaboration based on Repast survey

Table 3. Personal sympathy with the sides of the conflict by political parties in Spain

	PSOE	PP	VOX	Podemos	Ciudadanos
Mostly with the Republicans	**65,1**	5,1	0,0	**89,1**	11,9
	157	6	0	90	8
Mostly with the Nationals	10,0	**54,2**	**74,2**	0,0	20,9
	24	64	46	0	14
I partially sympathized with different sides	5,4	9,3	3,2	3,0	25,4
	13	11	2	3	17
I do not sympathize with any of the sides	19,5	31,4	22,6	7,9	**41,8**
	47	37	14	8	28

Source: Own elaboration based on Repast survey