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**Report on the historical events of each  
country's troubled pasts for further  
analysis**

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## Executive summary

This deliverable focuses on the historical specificities and similarities of the eight case studies as a basic guide for further research within the project's Work Packages. The report provides a guideline to the fundamentals of the conflicts under study. As part of the Task 2.1 (History) and more specifically Activity 2.1.1 (Groundwork), the leader of WP2 worked with the national coordinators of each RePAST case study in order to prioritize which specific events from each country's troubled past will fit the overall aims of the project. RePAST deals with five major historical threads in European history, each present in at least two of the eight case studies examined in total: a) World War II and its legacies (Bosnia, Germany, Greece, Poland); b) the Holocaust (Bosnia, Germany, Greece, Poland); c) authoritarian regimes (Bosnia, Kosovo, Germany, Poland, Greece, Spain); d) Colonialism (Cyprus, Ireland); e) Interethnic Conflicts (Bosnia, Cyprus, Ireland, Kosovo, Spain).

The first part of the report is a brief history of major historical events with information on the historical roots and causes, the time-span, the outcome of the conflicts, and other fundamental historical information. Emphasis is given on who the major actors were and what kind of ethnic, political, social or gender cleavages they represented.

The report then examines the current political, social and cultural relevance of those conflicts and how they inscribe to contemporary politics and national commemorative habits. How has the EU integration process addressed or how does it fail to address those issues? What is the role of gender issues in the politics of the past and how important is the current institutional or financial crisis in terms of dealing with the past?

Lastly, the report provides a basic timeline and bibliography of each case study.

Overall, the present report lays out the historical background on which other RePAST work packages will draw upon and creates a solid basis for further research within the project. It serves as a summary for the national reports to be published in an academic volume in 2021.

## 1. Introduction: History and Collective Memory of Conflicts in European context

### 1.1 The Shadow of the Past

Undoubtedly, the memory of the Second World War was a fundamental ingredient in the reconstruction of postwar European identity, at least its western part – that is, the part that joined the ‘West alliance’ during the Cold War. This western version of World War II memories were a complex and ambiguous composition that mixed the experience of ‘perpetrator’, occupied, and neutral countries, as well as the exceptional British case. The return to the political ‘normality’ of the Cold War was based, to a great extent, on the instrumentalization of the collective memories of the conflict and the re-fashioning of the individual memories of the European citizens. For example, Germany had to be transformed from the absolute enemy into an ally – and the opposite was true for the Soviet Union (Lagrou, 1999). The Europeanisation of war-time memories required a similarity of war time trajectories. In this process, the memories of the resistance movements throughout Europe have been central in the construction of common European experiences and identities. The postwar myth of popular resistance in France, Italy, Belgium and other countries remained dominant across the political spectrum as the main dimension of the Second World War experience. Later on, the concept of victimization emerged, allowing new categories of citizens, as veteran and victim organizations, to demand recognition and compensation of their contribution to the founding of postwar Europe as a democratic and peaceful project. In the 1980s, another significant version of victimhood appeared and shadowed everything else. The experience of the Holocaust and its symbolic dimension became another common European experience and ingredient of the European project by serving as the absolute exemplar of what the European project should never allow to be repeated in the future. The exemplary case of a European model of collective memory was Germany which, at least publicly, could remember any other victims except of its own. Or so we thought (Moses, 2007; Moeller, 1996). It took many decades to realize that the Second World War included much more than these elements – and this is an ongoing process. Questioning self-victimization, demystifying the resistance myths, realizing the sometimes mass character of collaboration as well as the responsibilities of neutral populations, were all formulated and elaborated, not in the historiographical domain but primarily in the cinema, fiction, and the arts; historians, in most cases, had to catch up. At last, they focused on the rapid changes that occurred in the short period of 1939-1945 and moved beyond the political and military levels toward the ambiguous cultural and social dilemmas of everyday life (Rousso, 1991). This meant the detailed examination of the Second World War experience – now through the lens of the many individuals and minority groups that were involved in tens of small wars, ethnic, religious or ideological ones, embedded within the major one. In a way, the historical turn toward the civil wars within World War II, the memories of collaboration, and the minority memories reversed the process of Europeanization of historical production and subverted the noble cause of retrospectively building Europe into the war memories. Indeed, the fragmentation of the European wartime memories, and the multiplicity and ambiguity of wartime experiences, could become the gravestone of the European project, rather than its cornerstone.

The end of the Cold War coincided with the introduction of new analytical categories to describe the experience and memory of the war and its components. The ambitious European project of eastward expansion and the redrawing of the European borders complicated the process of memory construction: ambivalent memories of countries that suffered from double occupations, lost their independence for over 40 years, and suffered under the Soviet regime came to the fore. The memory of World War II under Soviet control often had worked smoothly with local memories in some cases; for instance, the bombing of Dresden was commemorated since the early 1950s in East Germany, since it was the 'capitalist' bombs that destroyed the city. In most cases, however, this process proved to be much more traumatic, a single example among many being the memory of the Red Army invading Eastern central Europe and mistreating populations that later on became 'allies' of the Soviet Union. A striking example, in this respect, is East Germany. As a result, these memories were suppressed, and were often restricted to the private sphere. The anticommunist feelings of large parts of these populations, the different attitude towards the Holocaust experience and its significance, which raised the issue of antisemitism, the comparisons between fascism and communism, were all elements that undermined the politically correct western point of view of the war and challenged the possibility of a common European perspective. This new reality emphasized as well the importance of local experiences in the evaluation and interpretation of high political stakes and led to the realization that the victory over Nazism was part of a different narrative for many new Europeans.

## 1.2 The Present Perspective

Habermas and Derrida (2003) claim that contemporary Europe is the result of the experience of the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century and through the Holocaust. The European core values of freedom, equality, respect for human rights, democracy, tolerance, and solidarity form the backbone of European integration (European Commission & Directorate-General for Communication, 2012; Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 2007). Much effort is made through European policies to create a 'European historical memory' to legitimize the European project and foster the European identity (Prutsch, 2017). As the 11th President of the European Commission stated, 'we have to build bridges linking the past to the future by keeping alive the history of our common roots: a community born from the bold vision of men and women who wanted to build a peaceful, free and united Europe' (Barroso, 2014).

Today, beyond monuments and public celebrations, representations of the past in genres such as cinema, oral tradition, theatrical plays, textbooks, art, comics, memoirs, photography, online spaces show the 'democratization' of the flow of memories, creating a truly novel commemorative universe, where new categories of memory makers, mediators and consumers emerge. Collective memories brought new perspectives into the public sphere and provided new narrative paths to deal with the past. At the same time, however, the emergence of alternate stories in the last decades deconstructed some myths that for a long time constituted the cornerstones of postwar European societies. As these myths are increasingly being contested, so is the idea of European integration. To give some examples, in Poland, current tendencies of nationalism, anti-immigrant

attitudes, Euro-skepticism, populism and anti-modernism have emerged, which are traced back to its unresolved WWII 'traumas,' and even earlier on, to the heritage of serfdom, exploitation and the ghost of the nation's unity. In Greece, the recent economic crisis has resurfaced narratives of the past, giving rise to a rhetoric of a German 're-invasion' to establish an 'economic Occupation' (equally harsh with the Axis one), shaping current EU perceptions and fuelling an anti-EU rhetoric. Some of these narratives even challenge Greece's European orientation in the long run, by taking into account 19th century loaning and bankruptcies. In Germany, the emerging party 'Alternative for Germany' and populist movements such as PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West), use claims such as 'Lügenpresse' (lying press), an expression that dates back to the 19th century and was also used by the Nazi regime to describe the media as being part of a 'Jewish world conspiracy'. The populists' claim that a small political elite used the media to run the country against the 'real' will of the people has been revived by the populist movements and became part of the public debate in Germany recently. 'Alternative for Germany' today advocates the German exit from the Eurozone. In post-colonial countries with divided societies, such as Cyprus and Ireland, EU membership was heralded as an opportunity to cultivate a civic European identity that could transcend former colonial identities as well as inter-ethnic divisions (Peristianis, 1998). However, failure to address the troubled legacy of conflict has intensified anti-immigrant attitudes rather than foster a sense of European integration. In Northern Ireland, for example, hate crimes and anti-EU immigration attitudes are strongly aligned with the youth of former conflict communities (McKee, 2016; Doebler et al., 2016). Although the EU became a central feature of the political landscape in Ireland and Cyprus, it rarely addressed the core issues which underpinned the conflicts and the memories of which resurface in times of crisis (Bourke, 2003; Demetriou, 2005). Furthermore, the division of Cyprus remains an intractable conflict within the EU, causing frictions with disruptive trends. Cyprus' neuralgic position as a bridge between East and West imposes the need for stability, as it is situated in close proximity to the Middle East – a region facing serious issues that put at risk the vital interests of the EU in terms of economy, immigration and combating religious radicalization. In potential candidate countries such as Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina the European integration perspective is currently challenged on many fronts. Kosovo struggles to deal with its past, refusing to demarcate the border with neighbouring Montenegro, opposing the Specialized Chambers of the Criminal Court that will deal with war crimes committed by the former guerrilla of the Kosovo Liberation Army, refusing to 'lustrate' former communist figures and opening archives. Due to its centuries-old deep-rooted societal divisions and conflict, Kosovo fails to see the European perspective as a unifying factor; instead, an anti-European sentiment is growing as the European perspective is considered a top-down condition and the ongoing dialogue is seen as a leverage that favours Serbia only. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the shadow of WWII is cast upon the present, as the unresolved disagreement about which sides had fought 'the Just War' relates to support of nationalist leaders who argue that the EU is an elite-driven project and their nation should rather seek allies elsewhere (e.g. in the Russian Federation). Troubled pasts do not always impede EU integration. In Spain, for instance, memories from the civil war and the Franco dictatorship still affect the attitudes of citizens towards the EU. During the time of transition to democracy, the EC was seen as a movement towards democratization and against the divisions of the past. Even current secessionist movements, such as the one in Catalonia, see

their future in the European Union. This role of the EU in dealing with the conflicts of the past in Spain is what seems to explain the low incidence of Euro-skepticism in Spain, even in times of crisis.

Nevertheless, what all these examples attest to is the fact that difficult historical legacies, far from being settled, make their way into public discourse in various ways. Some of these discourses were always present in the public debate; others are being revived or accentuated, often in surprising ways. Increasingly, they are being entangled with emerging sources of conflict and signs of disintegration, i.e. the European financial crisis, the refugee/migration crisis, and the rise of populism, radicalization and reactionary politics. Concepts like multiculturalism, pluralism and integration run the risk of becoming empty shells, unless we look for these underrepresented memories of these underrepresented or rival groups.

## 2. Historical Background of Conflicts

### 2.1 Bosnia-Herzegovina

On April 10, 1941, Slavko Kvaternik proclaimed the creation of the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna država Hrvatska – NDH), fascist puppet state installed by Hitler and Mussolini, following the German invasion and occupation of The Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The NDH consisted of the territories of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and parts of Serbia, and was ruled by the Ustasha, Croatian Catholic nationalists and Bosnian Muslims. The NDH, headed by Ante Pavelić, proved to be one of the bloodiest battlefields of the war and of the Holocaust. On August 14, 1941, in a speech in Vukovar Pavelić said 'the NDH must be cleansed of Serbs and Jews' (Savich, 2013). As a result, the Serbs living in this Nazi puppet state have been among the most persecuted ethnic group. The NDH adopted the Nuremberg racial laws and began the incarceration of Jews, who were forced to wear a yellow band with the letter 'Ž' (židovi – Jews) (Abramski-Bligh, 1990). On September 25, 1941, under the decree-law, the creation of work camps for undesirable and dangerous persons was authorized, which was the basis for the establishment of the Jasenovac concentration camp in Croatia.

With the assistance of Haj Amin el Hussein, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, and Reichsfuehrer SS Heinrich Himmler, the Bosnian Muslim leadership undertook the systematic extermination of the Jewish, non-Muslim and non-Croat population of BiH (Schechtman, 1965). The reason behind Nazi fascist support of Islam was to increase the split among the peoples in BiH and further attenuate the Orthodox, Catholic and Muslim population. The goal of Bosnian Muslim leadership was to achieve the autonomy and independence of BiH under the Muslim rule. Over 100.000 Bosnian Muslims were available to fight, and they were a part of different military formations (Ustasha, Home Guards and the Croatian Army). Yahil (1990) highlighted that the Bosnian Muslims even sent their people to fight on the Russian front as part of the Nazi German forces. Two Bosnian Muslim Waffen SS Divisions were created by 1944 (Handžardivision and Kama division) in order to address the "Jewish Question" (Redžić, 1987; Bender and Taylor, 1969). However, it has to be noted that thousands of Bosnian Muslims, along with Croats and Serbs, resisted collaborating with the Ustasha

and the Nazis; BiH and its people 'gave' the anti-Fascist coalition formed around the Yugoslav Communists the base, from which the series of offensives against the Nazis and their collaborators were organized. It is questionable whether Hitler and his allies would have been defeated in 1945 without the fervent resistance of this Bosnian-Herzegovinian guerilla.

From August 13 1942, 5.500 Jews from the NDH were transported to Auschwitz from NDH concentration camps at Tenje and Logobard and from Zagreb and Sarajevo (Paris, 1961). The largest concentration camp in BiH was the Kruščica camp (Travnik), which was established in April 1941, where many of Bosnian Jews were killed. The NDH had a total population of 40,000 Jews, mostly concentrated in Zagreb (cca. 11,000) and Sarajevo (10,500) (Levin, 1968). Of the 10.500 Jews, which lived in Sarajevo before the war, only about 800 survived the Holocaust. Most Bosnian Jews did not survive the initial wave of killings, and the survivors joined the guerrilla movements or escaped to the Italian Zone (Dedijer, 1992; Freidenreich, 1972, pp. 871–872).

During the Second World War, an inter-ethnic war between Bosnian Muslims, Serbs and Croats took place in BiH, as one part collaborated with the occupiers, and the other with partisans/communists. Gagnon Jr (2004, p. 32) pointed out that both Ustasha and Chetnik groups perpetuated ethnically-based atrocities during the Second World War. At the same time, those massacres represented an unsettled trauma in the period after the war, when those ethnic groups lived under the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Đureinović (2018, p. 111) argued that the Second World War was the founding event and the main source of legitimacy for post-war SFRY, framed as 'the common struggle against the occupiers and the domestic traitors'. The communist regime under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito successfully suppressed nationalisms in the republics of Yugoslavia, but it was by no means able to prevent the bloody wars between 1991–1995.

In 1992, Bosniak Muslim and Croatian nationalists in BiH formed a tactical alliance to override Bosnian Serbs in a referendum on independence. However, the Bosnian Serbs boycotted the referendum, because it was known in advance that the majoritarian population of Bosniaks, in agreement with Bosnian Croats, would vote for the independence of BiH from Yugoslavia. The war in BiH officially began in April 1992, when Serb para-military forces and the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) started shelling Sarajevo after the declaration of independence of BiH.

The formations of the Serbian autonomous regions within BiH, fuelled by violence against all non-Serbs, created the basis for the establishment of the Republika Srpska in mid-1992. Its establishment immediately began representing one of the biggest obstacles for the future reconciliation. Furthermore, in July 1992, a Croatian nationalist party HDZ established the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna. This was a signal of the complexity of the war, as both Serbia and Croatia had plans to conquer and divide BiH.

In the midst of the war (in 1993), the alliances changed, especially in Herzegovina, where Bosniak Muslims and Serbs jointly turned against the Croats. In the northwestern Bosnia a conflict broke out between the opposing Muslim armies, and in central Bosnia and Herzegovina the Croats and the Serbs continued to fight together against the Bosniak Muslims (Glenny, 2003). On the symbolic level, the end of the 'co-existence' represented the destruction of the Old Bridge in Mostar. Due to

the fighting on several fronts, the United Nations (UN) also reacted with the creation of safe havens in Sarajevo, Goražde and Srebrenica. The latter was sieged under the command of the Serbian general of Army of the Republika Srpska Ratko Mladić two years later (July 1995), which led to the worst genocidal incident after the Second World War in Europe; some 8,000 men and boys were separated from their families and executed in Srebrenica. The Dayton Peace Agreement was signed on December 14 1995, only after a second massacre took place in Sarajevo (Bildt, 1998, p. 392). Although the peace agreement ended the war, it de jure reduced the hope for reconciliation and enabled ethno-politics, perpetuated by the nationalist leaders of all three ethnic groups.

Major figures of the conflict were:

*Bosniaks*

Alija Izetbegović, a lawyer, author and a philosopher, was Bosnia and Herzegovina's first president who led the country to independence in 1992 in a move that triggered a three-and-a-half year war between Muslims, Serbs and Croats. In April 1984, Izetbegović and 12 other Bosniak activists were sentenced to 12 years for 'hostile activity inspired by Bosnian nationalism, and Islamic propaganda'.

Naser Orićis, a former Bosnian military officer who commanded Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina forces in Srebrenica enclave during the war; he was born in Srebrenica. His grandfather had fought with the Ustasha during the Second World War.

*Bosnian Serbs*

Radovan Karadžić served as the first President of Republika Srpska from 1992 to 1996. His father was a Chetnik and was imprisoned by the post-war communist regime for much of Karadžić's childhood. He spent 14 years on the run before he was arrested in Belgrade in 2008. His trial before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) started in October 2009. He told the court that atrocities committed by Bosnian Serbs were 'staged' by the Muslim side and said that the Srebrenica massacre was a 'myth'.

Ratko Mladić was a Bosnian Serb military leader charged over the Sarajevo siege and the Srebrenica genocide. His father was a member of the Yugoslav Partisans. Mladić joined the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, remaining a member until the party disintegrated in 1990 (Block, 1995). After the war, he has been hiding for 16 years. He was arrested in Serbia in 2012 (SBS, 2013).

Biljana Plavšić was the first female member of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1990-1992). The highest ranking official of the former Yugoslavia to have acknowledged responsibility for atrocities committed in the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s was granted early release in 2009 and settled in Belgrade (SBS, 2013). Biljana Plavšić, a professor of biology, was a Fulbright Scholar. She claimed that the ethnic cleansing carried out against non-Serbs during the war was a 'natural phenomenon' (Mann, 2004, p. 389), that Bosnian Serbs are ethnically superior to Bosnian Muslims, and that she and other Serbian nationalists were unable to negotiate with the Bosnian Muslims due to genetics (Shatzmiller, 2002, p. 58).

Radislav Krstić was a Bosnian Serb general who directed the attack against Srebrenica. He is currently serving a 35-year sentence for the genocide in July 1995 (SBS, 2013).

#### *Bosnian Croats*

Mate Boban was a Bosnian Croat wartime leader and president of the Croat separatist starlet of Herceg-Bosna. He was ousted in 1994 under the pressure of the US when the Muslim-Croat Federation was created (SBS, 2013). In 1991, he became a President of Herzeg-Bosnia, and said that he wanted an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina, a joint state of three nations in which, like others, Croats will be sovereign (Mrduljas, 2009, p. 865). In May 2013, the ICTY found that Boban took part in the joint criminal enterprise against the non-Croat population of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

#### *Other actors*

Franjo Tuđman was a Croatian politician and historian. In his youth, Tuđman fought in the Second World War as a member of the Partisans. His political career started in 1989 when he founded the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ). He became the first President of Croatia and served as president from 1990 until his death in 1999. He led Croatia during its War of independence (1991-1995). A ceasefire was signed in 1992, but the war had spread into BiH – also as a result of Tuđman's appetite for parts of BiH – where Croats fought in an alliance with Bosniaks. Their cooperation fell apart in late 1992 and Tuđman's government sided with Herzeg-Bosnia during the Croat-Bosniak War. This tactical move jeopardized international support for Croatia.

Slobodan Milošević was a Yugoslav and Serbian politician and the President of Serbia from 1989 to 1997 and President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1997 to 2000. He also led the Socialist Party of Serbia. Milošević emerged in 1987 as a force in Serbian politics after he declared support for Serbs in the Serbian autonomous province of Kosovo. He negotiated the Dayton Agreement on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs that ended the war in BiH in 1995. He played a key role in supporting Bosnian Serb rebels during the Bosnian war (SBS, 2013).

## 2.2 Cyprus

The island of Cyprus, under Ottoman rule since 1571, came under British control with the Cyprus Convention of 1878. Crucially, this agreement took place during a historical period that marked both the apogee of European nationalism (mainly within its romantic connotations) and European imperialism. In this context, on the one hand, Cyprus would become part of the vast British Empire, and, on the other, it would be an essential part of what the Greek world (Hellenism according to the vocabulary of the period) called *Megali Idea* (the Great Idea). Cyprus was part of a wider political movement that sought to liberate and unify all Greeks that lived under Ottoman rule. Since the epicenter of the Greek world, the Greek state, had been formed since 1832, the Greek Cypriots, who formed the majority of the population in the island, called for enosis, which meant the union of the island with the 'mother state' of Greece. On 10 March 1925, Britain formally declared Cyprus a Crown Colony. In 1931, renewed calls for enosis from the Greek Cypriots led to the first massive

and popular uprising that was violently suppressed by the British. From then on, enosis became the main objective for the Greek Cypriot community.

The 1950s proved decisive for the future of the island. Bids for enosis that culminated in the EOKA guerilla struggle, led to fierce reactions from the British as well as the Turkish side (the Turkish Republic and the Turkish Cypriot community). As a result, with London-Zurich Agreements (1959) the independent Republic of Cyprus was established in 1960. The Greek Cypriot side, despite signing the agreements of independence, proved unwilling to comply with the realities of independence. With Makarios' 'Thirteen Amendments' in 1963 Greek-Cypriots questioned important segments of the Constitution of the new state. As a result, inter-communal violence erupted in the island during the 1960s, which culminated in the Turkish invasion of the island in July and August 1974. The invasion, except for the geographical division of the island, resulted to the displacement of more than 215.000 Greek Cypriots. On the other hand, it should be underlined that almost 61.500 Turkish Cypriots had been gradually displaced since the 1950s and the guerilla warfare between EOKA and TMT (Turkish Resistance Organization), the pro-partition paramilitary organization formed in 1958 as an organization to counter EOKA. The guerilla fight between the two paramilitary organizations had intensified Greece's and Turkey's (the two 'motherlands') involvement in the island and had led to the culmination of nationalism in the island.

From 1974 until today negotiations for the solution of the Cyprus Issue reach, constantly, a dead end. As negotiations continue, the Cyprus Issue is affected by an ever-increasing unstable global and peripheral environment (especially in the Middle East) and an international economic recession that has lasted for almost ten years (and still drags on). In this context, energy issues intermingle with the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) problem (an issue of utmost importance for a country's national sovereignty) and complicate, even further, current discussions for a viable solution in Cyprus.

The Cyprus Issue, as an international problem, involves various international actors, whose importance, though, varied through time. In general terms, the major actors are five: 1) Great Britain/UK, 2) Turkey, 3) Greece, 4) the Greek Cypriot community and 5) the Turkish Cypriot community. During the Cold War and post-Cold War years, the United States played (and continue to play) a decisive role in the shaping and evolution of the Cyprus Issue.

#### *The Greek Cypriot community and Greece*

Greek Cypriots are the largest ethnic group in Cyprus. During the British rule period (1878-1959), the Greek Cypriot community identified itself with the wider Hellenic world and adopted a stance of romantic nationalism. The basic political objective of the community throughout those years was enosis with Greece, which automatically meant the end of British rule. In historical terms, the Greek Cypriot community was going through a process of belated nationalism that had its roots in the 19th century. Thus, Greek Cypriots believed that their struggle against British rule and enosis was just in ethical terms: since they constituted the majority of the population on the island, they had the right for self-determination which, in addition, had been part of the UN Atlantic Charter since 1941. The Turkish invasion in 1974 exacerbated this feeling of ethical right (and injustice) on the Greek Cypriot side.

On the other hand, it should be underlined that the Turkish invasion also complicated things within the Greek Cypriot community; above all, in the significant question of ethnic identity. Many Greek Cypriots see themselves as Greek first and foremost, placing little if any emphasis on a Cypriot identity. Others, especially on the Left, prefer to stress their Cypriot identity.

#### *The Turkish Cypriot community and Turkey*

Compared to the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriot community is considerably smaller. Furthermore, Turkish nationalism within the Turkish Cypriot community was formed much later compared to Greek-Cypriot nationalism. This is explained by the fact that Turkish nationalism was developed much later, with the Kemalist movement in the beginning of the 1920s. Great impetus to Turkish nationalism within the Turkish Cypriot community was given by the intensity of Greek nationalism and pressing demands for enosis by the Greek Cypriot community. In addition, the Greek-Cypriot bid for enosis, especially during the 1950s, pushed the Turkish Cypriot community decisively in the side of the Turkish state, which acted as a guarantor against the Greek Cypriot animosity and political practice. Thus, the basic target of the Turkish Cypriot community was partition of the island (Taksim). During the period 1963-1968 Turkish Cypriots were forced, due to Greek Cypriot aggressiveness, to live in enclaves, protected by UN forces. The Turkish invasion of 1974, which resulted to the Turkish Cypriots' 'transfer' to the northern part of the island, was greeted by the Turkish Cypriot community as a 'journey to freedom'. Throughout the period of the Cyprus Issue the aim of the Turkish Cypriot community was/is twofold: to prevent enosis of the island and Greece and to protect its interests and security. However, large numbers of Turkish Cypriots felt deeply dissatisfied by the fact that after the Turkish invasion, Turkey had absolute political and military control over the Turkish Cypriot community while large numbers of Turkish people, mainly from Anatolia, were 'transferred' to the occupied areas of the northern part of the island. In this context, Turkish Cypriots were aware that the Republic of Cyprus was the only state that was officially recognized by the international community, even after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which is only recognized by Turkey, remains economically isolated and depends exclusively on Turkey. In terms of national identities, as is the case with Greek Cypriots, there are a range of views within the Turkish Cypriot community. Some Turkish Cypriots regard themselves as Turks living in Cyprus. Others see themselves as primarily Cypriot.

#### *Britain*

As part of the mighty British Empire, Cyprus served British strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and symbolized its great power status within the international system. Hence, until the 1950s the British refused to withdraw from the island, since such a move would symbolize its dramatic decline as a great power (Britain had withdrawn from India and in 1956 was humiliated in the Suez Crisis). Until now, Britain retains its concrete interests in Cyprus, since British armed forces are stationed in two sovereign base areas in Akrotiri and Dhekelia.

### 2.3 Germany

In the framework of the RePAST project, the focus lies on Germany's 20th century past, i.e. the rise of National Socialism, World War II and the Holocaust on the one hand, and the division of Germany after WWII, the emergence of the GDR out of the Soviet zone of occupation and the German reunification on the other hand.

Adolf Hitler's seizure of power in 1933 marked the beginning of a remilitarization of the German society and the implementation of an anti-Semitic and racial ideology, eventually paving the way to WWII and the Holocaust. The Second World War began in September 1939, when Germany invaded Poland, followed by a military offensive against France and the Benelux countries, the 'Battle of Britain' in 1940, the invasion of the Soviet Union, the Balkans and Greece in 1941. After the Stalingrad defeat, Germany proclaimed 'total war' in 1943. The landing of American, Canadian and other Allied troops in Normandy in 1944, increased bombings and the advance of Red Army troops on the Eastern front marked the beginning of the end of war, leading to Germany's capitulation on May 8, 1945. Millions of civilians and soldiers died in WWII, including six million Jews and thousands of members of other 'non-Aryan races' who were deported and killed in Nazi concentration camps, murdered in countless massacres all over Europe or died as forced laborers in subhuman conditions.

After the end of war, Germany was divided into Soviet, American, British and French zones of occupation, and the former Reichshauptstadt Berlin was divided into four sectors respectively. Growing conflict of interests between the victorious powers led to the beginning of the Cold War in 1947. The division of Germany was confirmed by the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1949. While West Germany was integrated into the military alliance of NATO, and became a founding member of ECSC, the predecessor of the European Union, the GDR joined the Warsaw Treaty organization and was integrated into the Eastern Bloc. The construction of the Wall in 1961 cemented the status quo. The political thaw of the early 1970s brought significant changes when the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany signed the Basic Treaty with the GDR in December 1972 regulating the relations between both German states which led to the constitutional recognition of the GDR by the FRG and other Western states. The 1980s proved to be a turning point and the beginning of the rapid decline of the socialist camp, starting with the upheaval in Poland in 1981, the increasing indebtedness of the GDR and the extensive borrowing from the FRG in 1983 and 1984, the election of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 up to the street protests in East Germany in 1989 and eventually the fall of the Wall on 9 November the same year. On October 3, 1990 the GDR became part of the Federal Republic of Germany.

On a national level, Adolf Hitler's inner circle included people like Joseph Goebbels, Herman Göring, Heinrich Himmler, or Max Amann who were the most powerful men in the Third Reich. Most of them were in charge of one or several of the various NSDAP-affiliated organizations and ministries, such as the SS (Schutzstaffel), the SA (Sturmabteilung), the Gestapo (Secret State Police), or the Reich Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, as well as the Wehrmacht, the armed forces of Nazi Germany, that consisted of the Heer (army), the Kriegsmarine (navy) and the

Luftwaffe (air force). Other important institutional actors aiming at implementing the Nazi ideology throughout the German society included the DAF (German Labour Front), the Hitler Youth, and the League of German Girls. German resistance to Nazism was limited to a number of individuals and groups, such as Georg Elser, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, the Weiße Rose, Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg and other members of the 20 July plot, or the Rote Kapelle. After WWII, the question of German guilt and the involvement of individual and collective actors in Nazi crimes have been the subject of countless debates and controversies. Most of the major Nazi perpetrators were either dead, convicted in the Nuremberg and other trials, lived out the rest of their life unpunished or managed to disappear and changed their identity, also with the help of the foreign intelligence agency of the Federal Republic BND. The question of responsibility of the ordinary population, and their direct and indirect involvement in the Holocaust, proved equally problematic. The roles Germans attributed to themselves in war and Holocaust atrocities alternated, oscillating between the four poles of self-victimization, passive follower behavior, psychological repression and full-fledged responsibility. Also, the role of the Allied forces became a recurring subject of discussions. For many Germans, May 8 was experienced as a day of defeat rather than liberation. War incidents like the bombing of Dresden in February 1945 nurtured accusations on the German side of Allied war crimes.

The period after 1949 was specifically marked by the Cold War and East-West divide. In the first two decades, the Federal Republic of Germany was under conservative rule, with Konrad Adenauer (1949-1963), Ludwig Erhard (1963-1966) and Kurt Georg Kiesinger (1966-1969), all Christian Democrats, as chancellors. Kiesinger had to hold together a coalition with the Social Democrats who took over the chancellery from 1969 to 1982, with Willy Brandt (1969-1974) and Helmut Schmidt (1974-1982) as head of governments, followed by the CDU/FPD coalition under chancellor Helmut Kohl (1982-1998). While German politics of the 1960s were marked by mutual antagonism, the 1970s heralded an era of rapprochement between both German states in the wake of Willy Brandt's 'Neue Ostpolitik' (new eastern policy). On the other side of the Iron Curtain, the communist leaders established a new political system that was characterized by its duality of party and state apparatuses and strongly influenced by the Soviet model. In 1971, Erich Honecker succeeded Walter Ulbricht (1950-1971), who had been ousted from power with Moscow's consent, as new Secretary-General of the Central committee of the SED. While there had been a couple of acts of public resistance to the SED regime in GDR history, e.g. the Uprising of 1953 or the public self-immolation of the Lutheran pastor Oskar Brüsewitz, resistance in an organized fashion mainly occurred during the years of the economic crisis in the late 1980s, originating from the church and peace movement. After the wall came down, several former GDR Politburo members, high-ranking political and military officials and soldiers were convicted for shootings at the German border.

## [2.4 Greece](#)

The adventure of the Greek 1940s began with the Greek-Italian War in 1940. The German invasion in the spring 1941 gave way to a regime of triple occupation (German, Italian, Bulgarian – with three respective zones of territorial control). The Greeks reacted in a variety of ways, including armed resistance. Despite the variety of resistance groups in terms of their structure and goals, the

Resistance process came to associate the struggle for national liberation with the pursuit of post-war social change. The period between April 1941, when the Nazis invaded Greece, until their pullout in October 1944, is referred to, in Greek, with a single word: the Occupation.

As elsewhere, this was a period of rapid social and political changes. After the war, few things were the same. The main factor that explains this new reality was EAM. The Greek National Liberation Front (EAM) was a pro-communist resistance organization. Until the summer of 1944 EAM, and its military wing ELAS (Greek Popular Liberation Army), dominated the Greek countryside, fought simultaneously against the Axis forces, their Greek collaborators, and the non-communist resistance organizations, introduced radical social and political measures, and managed to control the largest part of Greek countryside, outside a few urban areas.

After the Germans left, the internal Greek conflicts escalated. The mutual distrust and the determination of all sides to gain power, be it by political or military means, gave way to a series of civil conflicts. The open civil strife of the 1946-1949 period between the government's National Army and the communist Democratic Army ended with the defeat of the Greek communists and their Slav-Macedonian allies (SNOF, NOF) and their retreat into the newly established Eastern bloc. The combination of the communist defeat and the advent of the Cold War helped establish a severely anticommunist regime in the country which lasted, under various forms, until 1974, when the seven year Colonels' dictatorship collapsed. The legalization of the Greek Communist Party and the rise in power of the Socialist party PASOK for eight consecutive years (1981-1989) marked the conclusion of the transition process and was considered as the definitive end of the 'long' civil war and the concomitant division of Greek society.

The normalization of Greece's political life and the important step in legalizing the activities of the communist party in 1974 (a measure taken by a right-wing government) were major and long waited steps in the representation of the 1940s in a more balanced way. Yet, they were nothing comparing to what followed. For the first time ever, in 1981, a political party with clearly leftist rhetoric (aiming largely at the revision of the history of the 1940s) and socialist practices, PASOK, came to power. The outcome was a real revolution: the flow of political refugees (who had been living in Eastern bloc for many decades) to Greece accelerated; in 1982 PASOK renounced the right-wing civil war official ceremonies and labeled them, quite successfully, as 'ceremonies of hatred'. The resistance against the Axis forces was labeled as 'united' (thus, the internal civil conflict was ignored) and 'national-liberation'. The new popular demand – for a great majority of Greeks – was 'reconciliation' and 'oblivion'. Yet all these measures did not involve Slav-Macedonian political refugees or their war-time legacy. PASOK went one step further in 1984, legally recognizing the contribution of the 'national resistance' and providing pensions to the veterans of all resistance organizations. The right-wing party of Nea Dimokratia disagreed with this reconciliatory gesture and absented itself from voting on the specific law. A few months before elections of 1985, Andreas Papandreou, the Socialist leader, gave a public promise that after the elections the government would burn the millions of police files relevant to alleged or real communists. These records, beyond their practical importance, symbolized the divisions in Greek society that created a network of treason and mistrust; even between neighbors. Despite being elected, Papandreou did not keep his promise.

In the mid-1980s, the conservative party of Nea Dimokratia, in order to seize power, decided to reduce the level of anticommunist rhetoric in Greece. Only five years after the recognition of the resistance by PASOK and the denial of Nea Dimokratia in 1989 the universe – almost literally – was turned upside down. The political conjunction brought Nea Dimokratia into joint government with the Communist Party of Greece. This awkward co-existence was the political end of the Civil War in Greece and, in turn, the end of its remembrance.

The new government took two major decisions: to vote on a law about the 'raising of the consequences of the Civil War' and to destroy the 16 million civilian police files (the same files Socialists had failed to destroy despite their promise). Both actions were permanent demands of the Greek Left and prove, in practice, the success of the socialist rhetoric in the 1980s. It was the final defeat of the right-wing anti-communist rhetoric, ironically, in the year that the communist regimes all over Eastern Europe were collapsing one after the other. In Greece, 'winners' and 'losers' of the civil war, together in power, voted against the previously unquestioned beliefs of the Greek Right.

This incident was a breakthrough on all levels of politics and memory. It gave a new boost to the publishing of memoirs and enforced oblivion about the Right-wing version of the Civil War as a prerequisite for reconciliation. Quite symbolically, the government chose to approve the legislation and to destroy the police files on the 40th anniversary of the end of the Civil War ending, on the 29th of August 1989. Indeed, the political importance of anti-communism was reduced to a minimum and the history of the 1940s was expelled from the public political discourse with the exception of the Slav-Macedonian factor, which was upgraded to a 'threat' after the independence of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Moving to a different kind of troubled past, the Holocaust in Greece involved multiple actors. Despite the lack of credible statistics, a generally acknowledged number of the pre-war Greek Jewish population is between 72,000-77,000, the Jews from Dodecanese included, albeit as Italian citizens. Some 50,000 of them resided in Thessaloniki. In 1945, only about 10,000 Jews remained, representing a survival rate of about 13-17%, the lowest in the Balkans and among the lowest in Europe.

Current RePast research addresses three long-neglected topics: 1) Jewish-Christian relations before and during the Holocaust; 2) the reestablishment of Jewish life in Greece after the Holocaust, including the restitution of the Jewish property; 3) historical memory and oblivion in dealing with a difficult past and present of the Jewish-Gentile relations.

The question of responsibility, apart from the Nazis, for the tragic fate of the Greek Jews haunts the subject. Why were Jewish people in Greece exterminated at higher rates than in most other European countries? What was the role of the local population, the Axis collaborators, and the Jewish community itself in this process of extermination? Was Greek society characterized by admirable solidarity towards its Jewish population as many like to suppose?

The uneven distribution of Jewish communities in Greece renders generalization difficult. The Thessaloniki community held more than two-thirds of the total Jewish population and its annihilation represented the devastating three-quarters of Greek-Jewish victims. While many

communities in Greece were rescued in higher rates than European averages, the dire story of Thessaloniki, where no more than five families remained hidden in the city during the Occupation, sets the tone. The issue of antisemitism has also attracted increased interest, with some scholars stressing that it was ubiquitous in Greek society. This recent trend interprets the extermination of the Greek Jews through the antisemitic sentiments of the Greek population, part of which turned to Nazis as the *deus ex machina* who would facilitate the settling of old scores. What was the nature of Greek prewar and wartime antisemitism? Is it fair to say that antisemitism more accurately characterized Greek behavior towards Jews? Some authors stress the poignant traditional Judeophobia mixed with ethnic tension between Asian Minor refugees and Jewish working-class population. This view stresses the religious, social, and economic tension between Christians and Jews and its expression in direct antisemitic actions in interwar and wartime period. Others connect the ambivalence of Christian responses (varying from solidarity to open hostility) with the repercussions of a nationalist agenda. In this view, Greek Jews threatened the aspirational homogenous nation-state, the Greek state's primary aim.

As a southeastern European country, Greece represents a middle ground between what schematically could be called the 'western type' and the 'eastern type' of Jewish Holocaust experiences. Local responses varied in each Greek city but instances of direct mass violence against Jewish fellow citizens were limited and, mostly, incited or directed by the German occupiers.

However, Thessaloniki Jews were deported with virtually no local resistance due to the prioritizing, as far as the Christian authorities were concerned, of Bulgarian territorial threats or, even worse, the local administration's free riding on the opportunity to profiteer from valuable Jewish assets. The destruction of the Jewish cemetery is the typical example of how the local authorities capitalized on the prospect of the Jewish catastrophe early in the Occupation. Apart from the obvious real estate opportunities, the destruction offered to the municipality and the main beneficiary, Aristotle University, enrichment through donations or selling of the precious marbles and bricks. Beneficiaries of the huge amount of this 'construction material' included all leading institutions of the city, the Red Cross, various churches, the municipality, schools, and hospitals.

Most of the cities with Jewish communities adapted quickly to the Jewish absence after the deportations. This adaptation meant that the returning survivors were regarded as strangers and unwanted contenders of properties that no longer belonged to them as far as the locals were concerned. The Union of the Jewish Properties Managers, that is, the people who acquired Jewish stores and apartments from Nazi authorities, with many collaborators among their ranks, numbered more than 3,000 members in 1945. Its main purpose was to lobby to the government not to implement the new law that promised the immediate return of Jewish properties to their rightful owners; a law never fully implemented. Overall, the postwar reality constituted a hostile environment for returning Jews; migration to Palestine became a priority even for communities with higher rates of survival. Zakynthos (Zante) is characteristic in that respect. Despite the local solidarity that rescued the entire community, the vast majority of Zante Jews gradually migrated to Palestine and other destinations. In Veroia, some 155 (about 25% of the prewar community) were rescued mainly by the Resistance. Within 15 years fewer than five families still lived there.

## 2.5 Ireland

The Northern Irish conflict has its historical origins in the colonisation of Ireland by the British State and the Protestant plantations in the 16th century. This initial period of colonisation was reinforced by the suppression of Catholics in the 1700 and 1800s. Between 1880 and 1914 a movement to create a Home Rule parliament in Ireland, within the British Union was led by the Irish Parliamentary Party. Between 1910 and 1914 Ulster Unionists who were against home rule, predominantly operating in the North East of Ireland, armed themselves in preparation for civil war in the case that home rule was granted. After World War I a war for independence was led in the south of Ireland by Sinn Fein and the Irish Republican Army. In 1921 the Anglo Irish Treaty was signed by Sinn Fein (which resulted in a split within its ranks and civil war) and Ireland was partitioned, with 26 counties in Ireland winning independence and 6 remaining in Britain as the new state of Northern Ireland.

The Northern Irish state was a segregated state which discriminated against its Catholic, Irish minority. Discrimination provoked periods of civil unrest which were met by state and unionist military suppression and violence between 1921 and 1968. In 1968 the Civil Rights Movement across the North, ignited a political conflict between the social democratic and socialist Republican civil rights movement and an authoritarian right-wing unionist administration supported by the neo-colonial UK. Peaceful civil rights marches were suppressed and the British Army and internment without trial were introduced. Following this a bloody conflict erupted between two main actors; the paramilitary Irish Republican Army on one side and on the other Unionist Parties, Orange Order, Police and Unionist paramilitaries, the Ulster Defense Force and Ulster Volunteer Force supported by the British state.

Conflict in the 1970s saw both urban and rural warfare. Civil Rights demands continued and were expanded to include prisoner rights. By 1981 protests by Republican prisoners escalated to hunger strikes as Republican prisoners demanded political status within Northern Irish prisons. The demand for recognition for political status was repeatedly rejected by the British Government and in the end 11 hunger strikers died. Hundreds of thousands joined marches in support of the prisoners and the Republican movement. Sinn Fein emerged at this point as a major political representative of Irish Republicanism which began to move towards a parliamentary strategy. In the late 1980s and early 1990s the IRA carried out a bombing campaign of English cities in retaliation for the treatment of Republicans in the North by British State and Security Forces. In Northern Ireland, Unionist Paramilitaries massacred Catholic civilians under the guise of targeting the IRA. Many of the murders carried out by Unionist Paramilitaries were found to be done in collusion with British State Security Forces

In the Southern Irish state engagement with the conflict was more limited. When the civil rights movement erupted in the 60's, the public in the Republic of Ireland were sympathetic and elements of the Fianna Fail government of the time proposed supporting both the civil rights movement and the IRA against the Unionists and British State. Despite this the Irish State grew hostile as a whole to Republicanism, bringing in a broadcasting ban in the 1970s and detaining IRA members operating in the South. In response to on-going conflict in the 90's the Irish Government engaged

with the British State, Northern Political parties to negotiate for peace. In the 1990s following the Good Friday Agreement a degree of peacebuilding and cross border engagement grew and in the 2000s, Sinn Fein in particular grew as an all Ireland Republican political party, with a degree of economic and social integration occurring.

A ceasefire in 1994 between paramilitary groups was followed by the 1998 Good Friday Agreement although some conflict continued from branches of the IRA that did not agree with the terms of the agreement. Similarly, there were continued political disputes over this time, particularly in reference to policing in Northern Ireland which was resolved in 2006 by the St Andrews Agreement which re-established a devolved government through the power-sharing Northern Ireland Assembly. Between 1968 and 1994, over 3,500 people died and over 35,000 were injured in Northern Ireland as a direct result of the fighting.

The Good Friday Agreement and St Andrew's Agreement created conditions for a negotiated peace which retained a segregated and economically deprived statelet. Education and Housing remains segregated, and a high percentage of the poorest urban areas in the EU remained in Northern Ireland. In addition, severe post-trauma, mental health and other scars of the conflict remain, compounded by the continued operation of paramilitaries and lack of accountability in state institutions. The Northern Irish parliament is deeply dysfunctional. The state relies heavily on funding from London and the parliament was suspended from January 2017 to January 2019. The British government was unable to restore the Northern Ireland parliament and struggled to resolve the issue of the Irish border in negotiating the British exit from the European Union.

In Northern Ireland, there are different communities and actors in the conflict. These are discussed below.

*Unionists* identify as British and seek to keep Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom. Unionists typically represent the Protestant religion and have dominated Northern Irish politics since the foundation of the state. Unionism is represented by the Ulster Unionist Party and the Democratic Unionist Party.

*Loyalists* are paramilitaries seeking to defend Northern Ireland's British status. The Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) was founded in 1912 and was revived in the 1960s. The Ulster Defence Association (UDA) was formed in 1971 and became the largest loyalist paramilitary group in Northern Ireland. Both groups ended their campaigns in 2007.

*Royal Ulster Constabulary* (RUC) was the police force of Northern Ireland until 2001. Strongly associated with Unionism, it was frequently accused of discriminating against Catholics and of colluding with loyalist paramilitaries. Some 319 members of the RUC were killed and almost 9,000 were injured during the conflict.

*The British Military* was first deployed in Northern Ireland in 1969. It operated a counter insurgency operation along with British intelligence services and as been accused of collusion in the murder of civilians, including lawyers and journalists during The Troubles.

*The Government of the United Kingdom* ruled the island of Ireland until 1922 and since then ruled the six counties of Northern Ireland. In 1972, the UK government dissolved the Northern Irish parliament and ruled Northern Ireland from London.

In the Republic of Ireland, the different political actors represent mostly different political positions.

*Nationalists* identify as Irish and are primarily of the Catholic religion. As a minority in the Northern Irish state, they suffered discrimination. Nationalists believe the island of Ireland should be one country. Nationalism is represented by Sinn Fein and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). Sinn Fein is historically associated with violent opposition to British rule while the SDLP is associated with non-violence and civil rights campaigns.

*Republicans* generally refer to those who support the use of violence to overthrow British rule in Ireland. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) was originally formed in 1913 to fight for Irish independence from Britain. A 'Provisional' IRA was revived in the 1960s and became the predominant paramilitary organisation fighting against British rule in Northern Ireland. The IRA decommissioned its weapons in 2005. Some dissident organisations, such as the Real IRA, reject the 1998 Peace Agreement.

*The Government* of the Republic of Ireland historically claimed a right to the territory of Northern Ireland. Various Irish governments worked with British governments on peace negotiations. However, many Unionists opposed the involvement of the Irish government. As part of the Good Friday Agreement (1998), the Republic of Ireland renounced its historical claim to Northern Ireland.

## [2.6 Kosovo](#)

During the World War II, many Kosovo Albanians joined the partisan forces against the Nazi occupation in hope that they will be able to unite with Albania after the WWII. Kosovo was between Yugoslavia and Albania and mostly populated by Albanians. The Conference of Bujan where Albanian and Yugoslav partisans met to discuss the future of Kosovo and agreed that Kosovo wants to join with Albania. The Yugoslav members of the conference recognized Kosovo's right to self-determination after the war which meant joining Albania. When Germany occupied Albania and Kosovo, some of the Kosovo Albanians thought that this is the chance to unite with Albania.

In 1945 in Drenica region, partisans who refused to go to eastern front gathered around a local partisan commander, Shaban Polluzha, who wanted to defend the villages from Serbian partisan looting initially. Polluzha, initially a partisan commander, was accused of disobedience by his former comrades and around 12,000 of his men were hunted through the mountains in late 1945, to be shot at sight. Similarly, in the Southeastern part of Kosovo, in Gjilan region, an action of similar scale took place.

This led to high anger and distrust in partisan forces in the whole Kosovo. Most of the population in Kosovo interpreted this as determination from communists to reduce Albanian population and keep the region calm which pretty much is what happened until the 1968 demonstrations of

Kosovo Albanians for “equality and freedom”. In 1974 Kosovo was granted major autonomy, allowing it to have not only its own administration and assembly, but also a substantial constitutional, legislative, judicial autonomy and veto power. According to many, the ‘golden age’ of Yugoslav communism which enabled some economic development is seen with nostalgia in Kosovo, although there is a huge political debate about dealing with the communist past, starting from re-evaluating the role of partisans during and after the WWII and former communist functionaries.

Although the golden age of Yugoslavia was on its peak, Kosovo remained the most underdeveloped region in the country. The period of 1966 to 1968 was brewing demonstrations and calls for self-determination of Kosovar Albanians. The University of Prishtina was only opened in 1970. Some 11 years later, students of the University of Prishtina gathered and demonstrated for ‘Freedom, Equality and Democracy’ and also demanded Kosovo to be a Federative Republic within Yugoslavia. The demonstrations of 1981 were motivated by the illegal organizations in the country and in the diaspora. Demonstrations were suppressed by force and violent means and Kosovo remained part of the Yugoslavia until 1989 when Milosevic announced the annexation of Kosovo, from being an autonomous region within Yugoslavia to it being an integral part of Serbia by 1990.

On July 2 1990, the Albanian members of the Provincial Assembly voted to declare Kosovo a Republic within the Yugoslav Federation which resulted in the Serbian government responding with dissolving the Assembly and the government of Kosovo, removing any remaining autonomy in an unconstitutional move. The Serbian government then passed another law on ‘labor relations’ which led to expelling all Albanian workers (estimated around 120,000) in state owned enterprises.

In this situation, the Kosovo Democratic League (LDK) was formed in 1989 by intellectuals gathered around the League of Kosovo Writers. It called for national boycott of all ‘violently imposed institutions’ including the elections organized by Serbian state as well as the population census. LDK managed to organize Kosovar elections and the author Ibrahim Rugova was elected the President of Kosovo. Under his leadership, Kosovo’s problem became known for peaceful resistance and non-violence, although the first armed groups had already started to appear as of 1993 through another political organization, LPK (People’s Movement of Kosovo), which was mainly organized through the diaspora in Europe. During the 1990s, Kosovo Albanians were living in a completely parallel system that included parallel schools, university and healthcare. No media was allowed apart from a LDK pamphlet “Bujku” and in 1997 the first independent newspaper Koha Ditore was established.

From 1996 to 1998, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) started liberating little pockets of villages from where they organized the resistance while the peaceful movement supporters still remained in the cities. In March 1998, the Serbian police attacked the region (Prekaz) of the KLA commander Adem Jashari, killing most of the villagers in a fight that lasted three days where hundreds were displaced and more than 50 members of the same family were killed. This led to more Albanians supporting the KLA who were trying to defend villages. About a year of conflict continued along with shuttle diplomacy between the EU, the US, Kosovo representatives and Serbian Government. A year later, the Serbian police attacked the village of Racak while the massacre was condemned by the Head of the OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovo, declaring it war crime and crime against humanity.

On March 21, 1999, NATO started a 78-day war against Yugoslavia. During this campaign led by NATO forces, the Serbian army and other paramilitary units committed many crimes, as documented by the HRW in the report 'Under Orders'.

KLA during this time managed to control a low percentage of territory through a guerrilla warfare strategy. This led to a large mobilization of especially youth of Kosovo into the KLA but also a major support from the diaspora via pouring money in the foundation called 'Vendlindja Therret' (Homeland Calling). In June 1999, NATO and the Serbian Army signed the Technical Military Agreement in Kumanovo in Macedonia, calling for the complete withdrawal of Serbian military from Kosovo. KLA was demilitarized and demobilized later during that month. During the first years after the war, Kosovo was administered under the United Nation Security Council Resolution 1244, and the UN established the UNMIK mission responsible for rebuilding Kosovo, including institutions in society. The Provisional Institutions of Self-Governance were established. After June 1999, according to HRW, 479 people, most of them Serbs, had gone missing. The KLA Leadership created a political party with KLA political representative Hashim Thaci as its leader who won several elections. After several failed attempts of international negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia, the Kosovo Parliament signed a declaration of independence in February 2008. Kosovo is currently recognized as a state by more than 110 states including most of the EU countries (excluding Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Slovakia and Romania). In 2015, the Kosovo Assembly adopted the Kosovo Constitution and the Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor's Office with a specific mandate and jurisdiction, namely over certain crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes under Kosovo law which allegedly occurred between 1 January 1998 and 31 December 2000. Major Actors in Kosovo conflict were:

*The Serbian State:* As authority, the Serbian state played a very important role in the conflict development and transformation. Leaders such Milosevic, Milutinovic, Sainovic, Jovanovic and others have been directly involved in political and strategic decisions during the conflict. Most of them were later accused of war crimes by the ICTY.

*Kosovo:* Kosovo's parallel structures and 'state' during the 1990s is also the other most important actor in conflict development. Willing to negotiate and having a non-violent approach to the conflict, the Kosovo team won the hearts and minds of decision-making centers in US and EU. Ibrahim Rugova, Fehmi Agani, Bujar Bukoshi and others were major players.

*KLA:* The Kosovo Liberation Army came into the scene in mid-1990s to grow in popularity and decision-making capacity. In 1998, the representative of KLA, Hashim Thaci, led the Kosovo delegation in the international conference for Kosovo in Rambouillet, France, where the Kosovo delegation agreed to the proposal of Kosovo being part of Yugoslavia with the right to self-determination at a later stage mediated by the Quint states and United States, which was not signed by the Serbian part. This led to NATO intervention in Yugoslavia.

*LDK* is the non-violent movement in Kosovo. Kosovo's Democratic League is founded by Ibrahim Rugova and is the first Albanian political party in Yugoslavia.

*PDK* is the political party that emerged from the demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army. It was founded by Hashim Thaçi, now President of Kosovo.

*Vetevendosje!* Is the Self-Determination movement which transformed from civil society into political party. Known for anti-UNMIK and anti-EULEX demonstrations, Vetevendosje won the majority in the last elections in October 2019. Founded by Albin Kurti, Vetevendosje now leads the Kosovo Government.

The *EU* played a very important role in the 1990s and post-war Kosovo. The EU currently has the largest mission in its history in Kosovo, called EULEX. Additionally, all negotiations and dialogue to normalize Kosovo-Serbia relations has been mediated by the European Commission in Brussels.

*USA* is another key player in Kosovo conflict. From the 1990s, the US has supported solutions for the Kosovo problem. US representatives played a crucial role in convincing KLA to demilitarize and demobilize in 1999 and are playing an important role in negotiations of the normalization process in Kosovo in the post war era. Due to the NATO intervention in Kosovo, there is a strong bilateral relationship between Kosovo and USA.

*UN (MIK)* is the UN Mission in Kosovo. It plays an important role despite its limited presence in Kosovo. By the UNSCR 1244, UNMIK is effectively in charge of Kosovo. Kosovo institutions are represented in UNSCR through UNMIK.

*The Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor's Office* are part of the judicial system of Kosovo. The Chambers are attached to each level of the Kosovo court system. They were established by a Constitutional Amendment and a Law adopted by the Kosovo Assembly to conduct trials for allegations stemming from the 2011 Council of Europe report, which alleges serious violations of international law.

Non-Statutory groups are also part of the important key players to peace and reconciliation in Kosovo. Northern Kosovo is hardly controlled by the Kosovo Government, leaving that in the hands of non-statutory groups that are often supported by the Serbian state to destabilize the region. Lately, there were attacks and killing of politicians who disobey that line of stand (for example Oliver Ivanovic who was a moderate Kosovo Serb leader).

*Adem Demaci* was a political prisoner in Yugoslavia. He is known to have stayed in Yugoslav prisons longer than Nelson Mandela in South Africa. He became symbol of resistance for Kosovar Albanians and served also as Kosovo Liberation Army representative in Prishtina until 1999.

*Slobodan Milosevic* (See Bosnia)

*Ibrahim Rugova* was the non-violent movement leader in Kosovo. He served as President of Kosovo from 1992 to his death in 2006. He opposed violent solution for Kosovo and did not support the Kosovo Liberation Army.

*Hashim Thaci* was a student activist who became Political Director of the Kosovo Liberation Army and eventually led Kosovo delegation in the Peace Conference for Kosovo in Rambouillet in 1998, which led to the Albanian side signing the deal that was refused by Serbia. This conference led to NATO intervention in Kosovo.

*Albin Kurti* was a student movement leader who turned into political prisoner during the war in Kosovo and political activist after the war. He led the 'Self-Determination' as civil society movement until the 2019 Elections, which they won. He is the current Prime Minister of Kosovo.

## 2.7 Poland

The Second Republic of Poland was established in 1918. In many respects, however, the state that followed did not reach the high expectations of its beginnings; the attempts to implant democracy failed. The polarization between right- and left-wing factions, and general ineffectiveness of the parliament led in 1926 to military coup and the authoritarian rule which lasted until 1936 (the idea behind it being that Poland would become a leader of the Eastern European nations).

About a third of the total population of the Second Republic were members of minorities, including 5-6 mln Ukrainians, over 3 mln Jews, 1,5 mln Belarusians, and some 800,000 Germans. It is important to note that the Jewish population was relatively autonomous. It is at this time that the rise of patriotic engagement was oftentimes accompanied by the increase of nationalism and hostility against minorities, especially with growing anti-Semitism. There were several pogroms and legal regulations of anti-Semitic character such as *numerus clausus* introduced at several universities (only 10% of students could be the Jews) and segregation (Jewish students were allowed to sit only in certain benches in the classroom).

Poland was invaded by Nazi Germany on 1 September and by the Soviet Union on 17 September 1939. Both powers divided and annexed the whole country. Under the two occupations, Polish citizens suffered enormous human and material losses. It is estimated that about 5.7 million Polish citizens died as a result of the German occupation and about 150,000 Polish citizens died as a result of the Soviet occupation.

Persecution of the Jews by the Nazi occupation government, particularly in the urban areas, began immediately after the commencement of the occupation (depriving the Jews of their property, moving them into ghettos [approximately 400] and subjecting them to forced labor in factories and camps). About 90% of Polish Jews (close to three million people) were exterminated in Nazi extermination and death camps (including Auschwitz, Bełżec, Sobibór and Treblinka among others) during the so-called Operation Reinhard. Auschwitz-Birkenau remains the symbol of the genocidal politics of the Nazi, as well as of the martyrology of other groups such as Roma, Polish, and gay, among others. About 250,000 Jews escaped German-occupied Poland and went mostly to the Soviet Union. Hundreds of thousands of Polish Jews were killed directly or indirectly (denounced) by ethnic Poles. There were also some efforts to help the Jews both on the part of organizations (such as *Żegota*) and individuals. Polish citizens were granted the highest number of Righteous Among the Nations awards by the Yad Vashem Institute. However, their response was often late and hampered by anti-Semitic sentiments and attitudes of Polish society.

Soon after the invasions of the Germans and the Russians, resistance movement began organizing in Poland, including network of organizations of the Polish Underground State, known as the Home Army, as well as peasant, right-wing, leftist, Jewish and Soviet partisan organizations. Among the

failed anti-German uprisings were the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising (1943) and the Warsaw Uprising (1944).

The first, being the largest revolt by the Jews during World War II, lasted nearly a month and was officially suppressed on 16 May 1943 with the demolition of the Great Synagogue of Warsaw. The Warsaw Uprising in 1944 was fought for 63 days with little outside support. It was the single largest revolt by European resistance movement during World War II. The goal was to liberate Warsaw and grant sovereignty to the Polish state before the Soviet-supported power would have done it. It is estimated that around 16,000 fighters lost their lives and nearly 200,000 civilians were killed during the uprising and the remaining ones expelled. Over 80% of the city was wiped out. The belief that the Uprising failed because of deliberate non-involvement of the Soviet Union whose army remained on the eastern suburbs of the city and ceased any activity, contributed to anti-Soviet sentiments in Poland. It is believed that the memory of the Uprising and the resistance against the state censorship inspired the Solidarity movement in 1980s. Academic, historical research into the Warsaw Uprising flourished after 1989, due to the abolition of censorship and access to the state archives.

Cleansings and massacres of Polish civilians were perpetrated, especially in western Ukraine from 1943. Polish historians claim that in 1943-45 Ukrainian nationalists (UPA) murdered in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia about 100,000 Poles. These acts of violence met revenge from the Poles, and Ukrainian casualties are estimated between 10,000 and 12,000.

The Katyń massacre was a series of mass executions of Polish intellectual and military elites, including soldiers, pilots, university professors, physicians, writers, journalists, politicians, carried out by the Soviet secret police (NKVD) in April and May 1940. Though the killings took place at several places, the massacre is named after the Katyn Forest, where some of the mass graves were first discovered (about 22,000 killed). For many years after the end of the war the question of responsibility (Nazi or Soviet) for the crime was controversial on both sides of the Iron Curtain. State censorship in the Polish People's Republic blocked or severely punished any references to Katyń (whether in the media or in academia). Only in 1989-1991 did the Soviet side admit that the massacre was ordered by Stalin (and performed by the NKVD), and the mass burial sites were revealed.

At the Yalta conference the Allies agreed that the Soviet Union would incorporate the lands east of the Curzon Line, and Poland would be compensated with the German territories east of the Oder–Neisse line, parts of Pomerania, Silesia and East Prussia. Several million Germans were forced to relocate to the West. These territories were populated by the people repatriated from the eastern regions (then the Soviet Union) and from other regions of Poland. In Wrocław, in 1948, the exhibition of Regained Territories opened. It was a great propaganda event aimed at confirming that the western and northern lands were integral part of the new state.

Postwar Poland was a state of reduced sovereignty; in the aftermath of the Holocaust as well as the expulsion of Germans and resettlement of Ukrainians, it became an ethnically homogeneous nation-state without significant minorities. The new government solidified its political power over the next two years, while the communist Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) gained firm control

over the state politics, which remained under the Soviet influence. Many former Home Army members and others involved in the resistance were persecuted by courts and either executed or deported.

The structure of the Polish postwar economy included development of industry and collectivization of agriculture. These in turn were accompanied by social transformation, as many peasants migrated into cities and became the working class while the country experienced rapid urbanization. The state guaranteed universal free health care, free and compulsory school education for all, and established new public universities. It controlled the arts, by introducing the doctrine of socialist realism (1949) and performing acts of censorship and persecuted the catholic church.

After Stalin's death in 1953, the so-called political 'thaw' begun which allowed for a more liberal faction of the Polish communists gaining power. However, in 1956 in reaction to cuts in wages and changed working conditions, workers in Poznań went on strike which turned into a huge protest and street fights and later caused some major changes in the Party. 1956 also saw a major emigration wave of the Jewish population from Poland (mostly to Palestine/Israel) of c. 50,000 people.

In 1965 the Polish bishops of the Roman Catholic Church sent the Pastoral Letter to their German counterparts, expressing forgiveness and apologies in the context of WWII history. As such the letter was perceived by the communist authorities as a threat and they reacted with anti-German and anti-Catholic campaigning.

In March 1968, student demonstrations at Warsaw University broke and were followed by an anti-intellectual and anti-Semitic ('anti-Zionist') campaign, and purges at the universities and in the party. About 15,000 rather secular and assimilated Poles of Jewish origin lost employment and were forced to leave the country. Many students were expelled from universities, many professors lost their jobs. In August 1968, the Polish army took part in the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. In December 1970 mass demonstrations against the price rises broke out in the northern coastal cities including Gdańsk and Gdynia and spread to other cities of Poland. More strikes followed in 1971. As result, food prices were kept artificially low until 1976 when they raised by an average of 60%. It caused an immediate and nationwide wave of violent demonstrations, including these at the Ursus Factory and in Radom. In reaction to the arrests, mistreatment and dismissals of workers involved in strikes, a group of intellectuals founded the Workers' Defense Committee (KOR). In 1978 Karol Wojtyła, the archbishop of Kraków, was elected pope John Paul II and a year later he came on a tour to Poland gathering over 10 million people at his masses which were seen as manifestation not only of religious but also political feelings. Following another rise of prices a major strike broke out in Gdańsk and spread to other coastal cities bringing economy to a halt.

In the aftermath of the strike, the national gathering of independent union representatives took place and the trade union 'Solidarity' was founded with Lech Wałęsa as its leader. In December 1981, claiming that Poland was on the verge of economic and civil breakdown, and in danger of Soviet intervention, the martial law was declared, and Solidarity was suspended while most of its

leaders detained. What followed was a growing economic crisis and increasing political instability. During the hardships of 1980s, with the growing and more prominent oppositional movements, the government allowed for re-legalization of Solidarity and involving its leaders in formal talks, known as the 'Round Table Talks'. A systemic transformation was enabled by the elections of June 4, 1989 with the victory of Solidarity (now the Citizens' Committee) followed by the formation of the first non-communist government in the Soviet Bloc with Tadeusz Mazowiecki as prime minister.

In order to deal with hyperinflation, the new government decided for an economic 'shock therapy,' neoliberal restructuration and introduction of market economy: many state owned enterprises were privatized. The negative effects of the reform were the economic recession, growing unemployment and social inequalities. Finally, the Polish industry collapsed, and labor unions were marginalized. On the other hand, the reform brought inflation under control, stabilized currency and opened up the market for some significant foreign investments. In 1990 Lech Wałęsa won the presidential elections. The communist Polish United Workers' Party was dissolved at the beginning of 1990 and most of its property was turned over to the state.

## [2.8 Spain](#)

The main conflicts of the past that are still present in the collective memories of Spain are the civil war (1936-1939) and Franco's dictatorship (1939-1977).

The Spanish Civil War resulted from the overlapping of ideological, social, religious and regional preexisting conflicts. The Republican faction (led by the legitimate Republican government and Army, and supported by the militias of other leftist and anarchist political parties, trade unions, the International Brigades, and the Soviet Union), fought against the rebellious Nationalists (supported by the fascist German and Italian armies), after these attempted a coup d'état in July 1936. This division mirrored the political divisions of the Second Republic, proclaimed in 1931, until the war exploded: in general terms, Republicans were supported by urban workers, agricultural laborers, educated secular middle-class; and Nationalists were supported by the military, landowners, businessmen and Catholics. The division also concerned the center-periphery cleavage, with the Republicans being more sensitive to demands for decentralization and the Nationalists in favor of a strong and unified nation-state. More than 350,000 Spaniards (some talk about 500,000) died in the fighting. Many 'disappeared' as a consequence of extrajudicial executions.

These multiple cleavages and conflicts that fractured the Spanish society were deepened even further during the almost 40-year period of dictatorship. The defeated were displaced, tortured, imprisoned, sent to concentration camps, obliged to forced labor, executed, or went to exile. Spain remained neutral throughout the Second World War, although the Franco's sympathies clearly lied with the Axis powers. During the 1940s, Francoist Spain was isolated. These were the so-called years of 'autarchy'. Spain was not allowed as member of the United Nations and many countries cut diplomatic relations. But as the Cold War deepened, the US gradually improved relations with Spain, extending loans in return for military bases. Spain was admitted to the UN in 1955 and the World Bank in 1958, and other European countries opened up to the Franco government. In the

late 1950s Spain's manufacturing and tourism industries took off (the 'economic miracle') through liberalisation of state controls over the next two decades.

The consequences and collective memory of these conflicts had to be dealt with during the transition to democracy (1977-1981). The Spanish transition to democracy has been praised as a paradigmatic case of a 'transition through transaction' or a 'consensual transition' and, according to the official narrative, considered as a 'model' of political change. The process of liberalization was orchestrated by a sector of the Francoist elites. Thus the transition to democracy was to a large extent the fruit of negotiations and agreements between the old Francoist elites and those who favored a democracy from the opposition, under a situation that was still controlled by the former. The resulting institutional arrangements were reflected in the 1978 Constitution.

The official narrative assigned the two sides of the civil war the same responsibility for the past crimes. Amongst the elites a 'pact of silence' or 'pact of forgetting' about the past was agreed, and the decision to look to the future instead was adopted. In 1977 a general amnesty was passed that applied to crimes committed on both sides during both the civil war and the dictatorship. As a consequence, the victims of the Republican side during the civil war and of the Francoist repression were not rehabilitated and crimes against them were not prosecuted. The Second Republic was associated with the tragic experience of the Civil War.

Another conflict with historical roots that affects contemporary Spain is the desire of self-determination of a part of the Catalan society. At present, the situation in the Basque Country is not as polarized by far, but it was in the recent past, and it could be reactivated.

Since the 15th century, some regions of Spain had resisted the formation of the Spanish state. The conflicts opposing different regions (mainly, although not only, the Basque Country and Catalonia) to the central state were very intense during the 19th century. During the same period, Spain lost most of its colonies. The loss of Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines ('The Disaster of 1898') became the symbolic reference for a 'national crisis' which led to a revival of peripheral nationalisms, as well as to the 'regenerationist' movement. Nationalist demands found some recognition during the Second Republic (1931-1939). After the defeat of Republicans during the civil war any sign of nationalist identity was totally suppressed under Franco's dictatorship. During the transition to democracy Spain was defined as a 'Estado de las Autonomías', where power was devolved to the regions. The 17 regions of Spain have their own 'Constitution', but there has been a constant debate as to which is their relationship to the central state. This is the issue behind the existence of regional party systems where different parties demand a greater degree of self-government than what they have now, both on the left and the right of the ideological spectrum. For many years – already since the dictatorship – the most extreme example of nationalist demands was the Basque terrorist group ETA. The terrorist group has just declared its dissolution in May 2018. Since 2010 demands for independence in Catalonia were revitalized. Until then, independence had been supported by a minority of the Catalan society. The most violent confrontation between the Catalonian government and the central government of Spain took place in September and October 2017. As a result, several Catalonian politicians are now in jail, and several others – including the previous President of Catalonia – are in exile, to avoid being imprisoned as well.

### 3. Current Relevance of Conflicts

#### 3.1 Bosnia-Herzegovina

By the end 1995, when the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) ended, more than 100,000 people had been killed; almost a million more had been injured and displaced. Although there are a few other 'troubled pasts' nowadays reappearing in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian society (persecution of Jews during WW2; totalitarian past and the unresolved "national questions" in Yugoslavia etc.), none of the conflicts is as relevant for the current understanding of modern BiH as the latest Bosnian war (1992-1995).

With three main ethnic groups in BiH - Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats – it is often said that three different (nationalistic) narratives exist in BiH. A supra-ethnic, all-Bosnian narrative, which aims at going beyond the ethno-political interpretations of the past, also exists, but it is not widely popular. One of the most burning issues related to the politics of memory is the question if the internationally-endorsed establishment of Republika Srpska – one of the two main political entities of BiH – was an act of genocide against Bosniaks (as many Bosniaks and quite a significant part of international community claim), or rather, a self-defence measure taken by Bosnian Serbs to survive. To this is linked also the question of the mass atrocities in Srebrenica, which is, with around 8,000 people killed, perhaps the most known symbol of the war. Namely, the majority of Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats on the one side, and the Bosnian Serbs on the other, do not agree whether the Srebrenica victims were a direct consequence of a military act, or rather a well-organized and pre-planned act of genocide against Bosniaks. Several national(istically-oriented) political groups nowadays build their agendas on one of these narratives. The stickiness of the three narratives is, as highlighted by Sokol (2014, p. 109), also possible due to the legal reality of BiH – there are only two laws on the state level that address the issue of memorialization (Law on Missing Persons and Criteria for School Names and Symbols).

Inability to come to terms after the war between the main conflicting groups – each of them emphasizing predominantly their 'historic truths' and narratives – nowadays influences also the question of legitimacy of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian political system. Namely, in the last few years, the calls for the secession of Republika Srpska from BiH increased, with a few political and legal actions already taken into this direction. Milorad Dodik, the most influential Bosnian Serb politician in the last decade, who held several important posts, occasionally threatens with the secession of Republika Srpska from BiH and has taken certain steps in this direction (e.g. organizing the referendum on secession). These attempts are deemed unconstitutional by the majority of Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats, and also by the Constitutional Court of BiH in 2015, which declared that establishing the Day of Republika Srpska as an official holiday in this political entity is unconstitutional.

From this stems also the question – and disagreement – how the future legal system of BiH should look like. Namely, the majority of people identifying themselves with one of the three main ethnic groups believe that the current political system, set in stone with the Dayton Agreement in 1995, is not just: the majoritarian Bosniaks want to eliminate the entities; the Bosnian Serbs believe that an autonomy of Republika Srpska is a precondition for the survival of Bosnian Serbs in BiH, and so a basic condition for coexistence between ethnic groups in BiH. The Bosnian Croats – the smallest of the three ethnic groups – want their own political entity, which will, as they believe, enable them to participate equally in the decision-making procedures (Lešek, 2016, p. 120). However, there are quite a few people who do not subscribe to this ethno-political narratives, inter-ethnic cleavages and identify them as Bosnians, allegedly showing their civic (supra-ethnic) identity. This civic or supra-ethnic identity is important as it is strongly supported by the EU and the US. Similar can be argued for the Office of the High Representative, the international body charged with supervision of the country (Latal, 2019). However, the High Representative, which could theoretically use the so-called executive “Bonn powers” and dismiss public officials, failed to exercise this power, and has, as argued by Latal (2019), directly contributed to BiH’s current muddle.

The identity-questions (who/what does it mean to be a Bosniak, Bosnian Serb or a Bosnian Croat) and who participated in the war on ‘the right side’ is linked also to economic and social benefits. Namely, BiH remains a society, where basic social and human needs for many people are not met, which gives fertile grounds for resurfacing of the conflict (Burton, 1990, p. 147). Being a member of armed forces during the war on one of the three sides nowadays give people certain benefits (employment opportunities, social status, direct financial transfers etc.), which is a fact that cannot be neglected, esp. in a rather poor country in a dire economic situation.

The second armed conflict that has to be mentioned and ‘intervenes’ - usually directly “through” the Bosnian war (1992-1995) - in the current political life of BiH is World War II. The strongest political figure of Republika Srpska Milorad Dodik often challenges Bakir Izetbegović, who for years served as a president of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and is perceived as one of the strongest Bosnian politician and an arduous fighter for ‘the Bosniak cause’. Namely, Dodik claims that Alija Izetbegović, the first president of BiH and Bakir’s father, served as a member of the Handžar division, a notorious SS military unit directly under the military command of Nazi regime, responsible for many atrocities throughout BiH during World War II (Delo, 2018). How is all this relevant today? The chetniks, who collaborated with the Nazis in World War II and killed many Muslims and Bosnian Croats, are among many Bosnian Serbs nowadays no longer deemed as the traitors of the nation, which was the case in Yugoslavia, but rather as the fighters for ‘the Serbian cause’ in BiH (similar trends are happening with praising the Ustasha in some parts of Bosnian Croat community). Using chetnik insignia, uniforms etc. is not an exception anymore in many towns in Republika Srpska, and also happens with school kids.

This, unsurprisingly, sparks harsh reactions by the Bosniaks, which entrenches the divisions among the peoples. In this regard, we can highlight the words of Čusto (2018, p. 128), who said that in BiH, there is a growing need to redefine and establish a new relationship towards the World War II. She emphasized that the victimization rhetoric of all three of the largest communities, especially their political leaders, exclusively focuses only on their own national victims, and paves the way towards

the homogenization of their respective national groups, without any attempt to create an atmosphere of appreciation of 'the Other'.

Even though that the literature on EU's engagement in (post-)conflict Southeast Europe emphasizes the EU's inadequate role during the Bosnian war, the outcomes of this limited engagement importantly influenced the socio-political and socio-economic framework of post-Dayton BiH. This relevance goes beyond the EU's role in Dayton Agreement, which paved the way towards the creation of Federation of BiH and Republika Srpska, as BiH quickly became exposed to the Copenhagen criteria (1993) and Stabilization and Association Process (1999) (Juncos, 2018). The latter became increasingly relevant already in 2004, when the EU Commissioner for foreign affairs Chris Patten informed the BiH's authorities that they have to reform the police sector in line with the principles laid down by Paddy Ashdown, the former High Representative (Tolksdorf, 2013). Those principles – political non-interference, technical standards above entity 'borders' and the need for legal and budgetary authorities on the state level – were quickly contested by the authorities in Republika Srpska. The rhetoric of Republika Srpska officials was based on the lack of EU standards when talking about national police structures and sufficed for signing the Mostar's Declaration (28 October 2007). This Declaration, which was based on the (non)reform in accordance with the BiH's Constitution (Dayton Agreement), was enough for EU who then signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with BiH in June 2008.

While the EU's initiatives had limited impact on BiH's socio-political structure, we should mention the initiatives on the EU level through the work of the European Parliament, which is becoming an important actor in constructing the EU memory framework. In line with this, the 2005 and 2009 Declaration on Srebrenica and 2015 Srebrenica commemoration Resolution became an important referential framework for recognizing the mass atrocities that are today understood as the 'symbols of the Bosnian war' (Milošević and Touquet, pp. 384–387). The latter, which fits the Bosniak narrative, is also vivid through the surveys conducted by the Directorate for European Integration in 2019, where the support towards the process of European integration in the Federation of BiH was 86.5%, while the support in Republika Srpska stood at 58.9% (Directorate for European Integration, 2019). Finally, we should mention that 32.6% of BiH's citizens in 2019 supported the membership due to the fact that EU symbolizes "peace and political stability".

### 3.2 Cyprus

The Cyprus Issue and its relevance to EU integration is the key for the future of the island. Despite efforts to reach a viable solution to the Cyprus Issue, especially after the Republic of Cyprus' accession to the European Union, the island of Cyprus remains divided, not only in geopolitical and political, but also in cultural terms. Bitterness and hostility between the two communities, rooted in past experiences, is still one of the most fundamental issues and a great hindrance to any solution. This ongoing situation creates two basic problems for EU integration:

a) Preservation of this status on the island of Cyprus could create a political precedent, based on ethnic differences/disputes, for other regions of the European Union to preserve, or even enhance,

their 'divided' status (for example divisive tensions in Spain or various parts of the Balkans), at a period when integration within the European Union is mostly needed.

b) The Cyprus Issue poses a major obstacle in Turkey's relations with the European Union. With the admission of South Cyprus into the EU as a member, an unresolved problem between Turkish Cypriots in the north and Greek Cypriots in the south transformed into a problem between Turkey and the EU. Turkey started its accession negotiations with the EU in 2005 but it is faced by constant blockages by the Republic of Cyprus, as long as the Cyprus Issue remains unresolved.

The rejection of the Annan Plan (2004) by the Greek Cypriot community had deep consequences between and within the two communities. In the Greek Cypriot side, two opposite camps were created between 'pro-Annan' and 'anti-Annan' supporters that still highlight debates within the community. In addition, important segments of the Turkish Cypriot community believe that if any solution is to be argued, a first step should be the international recognition of their current status, because unless the international community accepts the equality of Turkish Cypriots people with Greek Cypriots, the Greek Cypriot side will never have any incentive of compromising with the Turkish Cypriot people. Thus, the role of the international actors in the future of the island concerning the Cyprus Conflict will always be of paramount importance.

The past, history, and most importantly, public historical memories and discourses have shaped the Cyprus dispute. In fact, in the case of Cyprus, reconciliation means facing the past. In terms of history, historiography and memory the period 1963-1974, that is from Makarios' 'Thirteen Points' that questioned the status of the newly formed Cyprus Republic to the 1974 intervention/invasion, is at the centre of debates and feelings of victimhood and rejection by both Turkish and Greek Cypriots that are transcended and reinterpreted on current needs and necessities. Depending on the ethnic perspective, which means selections and interpretations of certain events within the period 1963-1974, each community views itself as the only victim of the conflict. Victimhood goes hand in hand with a feeling of justice, in the sense that past injustices that had befallen each community should, in the present, be redeemed. The justice/injustice dualism that has its roots in opposing conceptions of the past is, most probably, the gravest hindrance for reconciliation on the island. The most indicative, and tragic, example of this characteristic of the conflict is the problem of forensic excavations in Cyprus regarding missing persons from the intervention/invasion of 1974, a deeply emotional experience for each ethnic community that brings forward past memories and resumes public conflictual debates. In this context, the grave, and practical, property issue, which has to do with claims of dispossessed persons of both ethnic communities, as a result of the 1974 military conflict, except for the legal problems that it raises, brings also forward memories and historical discourses of recent past. Historical narratives and discourses raise the issue of the ways history should be viewed and approached by both communities. In this perspective, it is a common assumption that the most important burden regarding reconciliation lies on teaching history in primary and secondary education. Until now important endeavors that have been taken on this issue by both communities have proven fruitless.

Historical discourse has also proven of utmost importance in creating political and ideological cleavages within the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. The most important feature in this realm is that political cleavages have not been formed out of a certain historical period but

rather they “accumulate” in accordance with diplomatic/international developments regarding the Cyprus dispute. For example, there are dualisms, that are very often publicly expressed in “Manichean” ways, within the Greek Cypriot communities: people are either pro or against Greece and its diplomatic and national role in the Cyprus dispute, are pro or against the Annan Plan, pro or against the European Union, pro or against Turkish Cypriots etc. These kinds of cleavages are also evident within the Turkish Cypriot community. It is important that despite the fact that some ideological and political identifications can be discerned, the most obvious between the Left-Right duality, still it is important to note that those political and party cleavages split vertically the ideological/political spectrum within the two ethnic communities.

Furthermore, the Cyprus Republic’s accession to the European Union in May 2004 had minimal impact on the parameters of a solution. Despite common assumptions, especially in the Greek Cypriot side, that accession to the EU would pave the way for radical changes, its effects have been modest. Apart from changes in the ways economic issues are tackled, the ideas under discussions still appear much the same as they were before the Republic of Cyprus joined the EU. The main contested issues such as governance, property, territory and security remain relatively unchanged, mainly due to the EU’s inability to govern the internal political structures of its member states. On the other hand, the influence of the EU can be exerted in more subtle ways. For example, any decision to limit the freedom of settlement will need to have EU endorsement since freedom of movement (the right to live and work throughout EU member states) is a fundamental principle of the EU.

Last, gender does not seem to be highlighted and thematised in the Cyprus Issue. Despite the fact that there were some attempts by grassroots feminist organizations to influence political and cultural developments, their impact was rather marginal. In this context, this research will aim to investigate, among other things, the reasons behind this marginalization of gender politics in the Cyprus Issue.

### 3.3 Germany

Interestingly enough, the two German states after 1949 followed totally different approaches in the process of their ‘mastering of the past’ (Vergangenheitsbewältigung). The beginning of 1950s marked a period of collective silence in the Federal Republic on Germany’s WWII and Holocaust legacy. While many Germans wanted to draw a line under the crimes of the Nazi past – for this reason the initial period of silence was in the interest of many –, they also perceived themselves as victims of a lost war. The climate changed only slowly towards the end of the 1950s, triggered by public swastika graffiti and anti-Semitic outbursts in Germany. New guidelines for dealing with the Holocaust in school history lessons were issued, the memorial site policy was reconsidered and the statute of limitations for genocide crimes was lifted. These developments were accompanied by the trials of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem in 1961 and the Auschwitz Prozesse in Frankfurt starting in 1963 which sparked high public interest (Wolfrum, 2002). These developments were further spurred in the wake of the student movement in the late 1960s over the question of the involvement of the parental generations in Nazi crimes. Another caesura was brought about by the

broadcasting of the US-American series *Holocaust* on German television in 1979. It was the fictional depiction of the fate of the Jewish family Weiss that made it possible for many Germans to engage emotionally with the Holocaust and Jewish suffering for the very first time. Seven years later, the identity of the Federal Republic of Germany became the subject of the so-called 'historians' dispute' (Historikerstreit). The result of this dispute cemented the status quo, as the imperative of remembrance of National Socialism remained constitutive for the Federal German constitutional state and its ties to the West (Wolfrum, 2008).

In East Germany, the GDR was considered the outcome of the German communists' anti-fascist struggle. In that sense, the communist rulers refrained from debating the question of guilt in their own country, as National Socialism and fascism were clearly associated with the capitalist government in Bonn (Müller, 2008). Accordingly, the Soviet occupiers were considered liberators of the Germans from the fascist past. May 8 was declared a day of liberation and a national holiday. This interpretation did not tolerate any public criticism of the Soviet Union, which also included (post-)war crimes – such as the rape of German women by Red Army soldiers.

Both German states accused each other of letting the past live on and of standing in the tradition of the Third Reich. In the interpretation of the Bonn Republic, the GDR represented a totalitarian regime that was thus considered the second German dictatorship, whereas West Germany in the eyes of the communist rulers in the GDR was deemed a republic in which old Nazis – such as the head of the Chancellery, Hans Globke – were able to achieve new power. Against this background, the fall of the Wall and the liberation from the East-West ideological antagonism heralded a new phase in Germany's reappraisal of the past, leading to an unprecedented memory boom in reunified Germany (Augstein, 2002). Nevertheless, the theme of German victimhood remained a part of public discourse even after reunification. While the SED rulers had recognised the Oder-Neisse border in 1950, despite the secret wish of many expellees to return to their old homeland one day, it was only with the signing of the German-Polish border treaty on 14 November 1990 that the Oder-Neisse border was established as inviolable and final for all times. In the population, however, the question of expulsions and German victimhood still lingered on, as the controversy surrounding the establishment of a Centre against Expulsions of the Federation of Expellees in the late 1990s showed. Also the commemoration of the bombings of the city of Dresden in February 1945 continues to be a part of today's discussion how to deal with the troubled past and German victimhood.

Even though there have always been voices of resistance to the hegemonic position of National Socialism and the Holocaust in the official writing of Germany's post-WWII history, and conservative circles have repeatedly 'advocated normalization of the burdensome past in order for Germans to regain a needed sense of national pride' (Langenbacher, 2010: 29), Germany's Nazi past continues to be a major driving factor behind the country's pro-EU orientation. The BREXIT process, in particular, has increased pro-European sentiments and the European Union enjoys strong support among the German population. That said, it remains to be seen whether the imperative to remember will endure. Official narratives of Germany's troubled past are increasingly being questioned, renegotiated or dismantled—today, in a more subtle and effective way than ever—due to ongoing changes in the German political landscape, demographic and generational

shifts and the rapid transformation of media ecologies. The rise of the anti-EU party Alternative for Germany (AfD), the number of eyewitnesses dwindling every year, and a pluralization of perspectives in light of migration, Europeanization and globalization (Assmann, 2013), have considerably changed collective memory dynamics, just as the decline of the mass media's hegemony through the rise of participatory media technologies.

Boosted by the EU crisis and fears about the influx of refugees, the Alternative for Germany entered the German Bundestag in 2017 and since then, high-ranking party members have repeatedly advocated for a reorientation of Germany's commemorative culture. The AfD, known for its programmatic focus on anti-migration, anti-EU, anti-gender mainstreaming and other issues, attracts voters both in East and West Germany, but the party enjoys an increasing popularity in East Germany in particular. Germany's communist past and the ongoing 'East-West divide,' almost 30 years after reunification, are considered to be one reason for the rise of anti-EU populism in Germany today. Explanations about the reasons of East Germans' increased support for Euro-skepticism point to post-communist realities. Some researchers blame the authoritarian political system of the former GDR for failing to provide civic-democratic education for East Germans (Schroeder, 2015). For others the problem lies in how reunification was experienced as 'annexation' by many East Germans (Meyen, 2013). As socialism was demonized in the public discourse, East Germans struggled with the devaluation of their own biographies. This feeling of disappointment and contempt in light of a 'failed' reunification was passed down to the next generation: today more than half of East Germans feel like 'East Germans' rather than 'Germans' and one quarter disagrees with the statement 'I am a European citizen' (INSA, 2014). This is particularly interesting considering the fact that the German Democratic Republic, as a unique example in European history, joined the European Community without accession procedure unlike other Eastern European states – such as Poland, Hungary, Romania, Croatia – which had to undergo bureaucratic, democratic and economic accession exercises.

### 3.4 Greece

Public challenges to the dominant historical narratives are not rare in the Greek public sphere. They are partly a response to the excess of many kinds of official memories and commemoration of the past in Greek society. Desecration of civil war monuments, military graveyards or Jewish sites are common. A new iconoclastic trend has recently appeared in the shape of intense protests during school and military parades celebrating the two most significant moments of the Greek nation. Recent disruptive protests began during the economic crisis and involved harassing the authorities and politicians attending the ceremonies or even flash mob parading of the unemployed or trade unionists in front of the authorities. Such tensions undermined the unilateral meaning of the ceremonies and their symbolism of a united nation.

Indeed, the recent economic crisis has motivated people to move beyond the heroic hegemonic narrative of the last decades and to invent other narratives in order to explain their current situation. While the economic crisis overshadowed many aspects of the historical past, it has renewed certain of its aspects that were either ignored or misinterpreted. This has not always been

a fruitful experience. Public uses of a precarious past led many times to conspiracy theories or simplistic, populist approaches to complex phenomena, intermingled with the debate over the origins of the financial crisis which followed in the 2010s.

Many of the mainstream political parties made direct comparisons between the two Occupations and Chancellor Merkel with Hitler; while the most common derogatory term to describe the supporters of the current government is that of 'collaborators'. The matter of Nazi war retributions was one of the most discussed issues in the public sphere in recent years for many reasons, one of which was an attempt to regain self-esteem and national pride vis-a-vis the unpopular Germans who are perceived to have imposed on Greece a new type of – economic – occupation. Alexis Tsipras, soon to become Prime Minister in 2012, made a case about the crisis-hit Greece suffering a 'Social Holocaust'; other first-class members of political life claimed that Greeks are in the position Jews were during the late 1930s in Europe. Those views reflect a form of widespread sense of victimhood within the Greek people. As proved in multiple surveys, about 70% of Greeks seem to believe that they have suffered more than any other people in history (including the Jewish People).

This form of 'negative' or inversed reading of the past in public, however, is one of the past's few uses in the present encountered in Greek society. During the last 15 years public history and history in public sphere have increased in significance as major ways to introduce academic views in society. A major moment into the blend of politics, memory and history was the debate on historical 'revisionism' that has appeared in the public sphere since 2004. The debate of leftist violence and its repercussions during the 1940s proved crucial for explaining today's left identity and shifted from strictly academic to mostly public where the discussion turned from methodology (Left historians vs revisionist social scientists) to the alleged or real motivations and political aims of revisionists. The bone of contest became the ethical dimension. Which side of the civil war had the moral primacy then? Which political side should maintain it today? The latter was the real stake since revisionists attacked the moral capital of the Left and threatened the post-1974 left-oriented consensus. Given how political cleavage overshadowed other dimensions of the conflict's legacies, gender reflections of the 1940s have only penetrated the public sphere through a fringe but important corpus of artwork and limited academic approaches.

In this respect, countries such as Greece find themselves in a peculiar position. While history has played and continues to play an immense role in Greek political life and society in general – few would disagree that Greece is a past oriented society – there is little elaboration or processing of this past in terms of its public uses. In other words, there is a discrepancy between the public uses of the past in the Greek context and the need to elaborate on the perceptions of this past in contemporary Greek society. To put it simply, Greece is an extremely rich soil for the study of the presence of the past in today's life. But, outside academia, there is no culture of reflection and self-reflection on this role of the past.

Holocaust-wise the complexities of incorporating the commemoration of the deportations in the public sphere are well documented in the literature. The Holocaust was recognized by the Greek Parliament only in 2004 long after three other genocides preceded with their official recognition (Pontic Greeks, Armenians and Greeks of Asia Minor Genocides). Despite this delay in a 2015 survey

27% of Greeks believed it was time to leave the Greek Holocaust behind and discuss other issues. On another unpublished survey of 2017, 23% of Greeks responded that the deportations of Greek Jews had a rather positive effect in Greek society.

In 2013, under the pressure of neonazi Golden Dawn party's influence, the conservative Prime Minister of Greece Antonis Samaras paid homage to the extermination of the 96% of the Jewish community of Thessaloniki by being the first Prime Minister to ever visit a Synagogue. He gave a powerful speech against racism and neonazism, oddly by making a racial argument that "Greek genes and DNA" are resistant to antisemitism. Nothing summarized better the official Greek narrative of Greek Christians showing full solidarity to Jewish suffering during the Holocaust. This official narrative had been, until recently, part of the Jewish communities' public narrative as well as the academic one.

Only recently academic approaches have systematically revised this myth by stressing Christian responsibilities, elites' hidden agendas, social apathy and profiteering during the deportations. This is still a work in progress but the courageous attitudes of Jewish leadership (D. Saltiel and the late M. Konstantinis) as well as Thessaloniki's Mayor Y. Boutaris were equally if not important to academic projects to communicate this hard to digest message to the public. The 2018 Holocaust Remembrance Day speech given by Mayor Boutaris in Thessaloniki talked openly about those responsibilities and the lack of empathy the Christians showed, and went viral in Greece and internationally. It was widely acclaimed as a milestone in correcting that widespread belief that only Greek Christians who saved Jews ought to be commemorated at such events. The Mayor's arguments can be used as a roadmap for establishing a middle ground between academia and the public:

"Who mourned in 1945 their lost neighbors? What monuments were raised? Which ceremonies were held? Only the community, decimated and in rags fought to restore its existence and to mourn its dead. The city, the society, the entire country turned a blind eye. They hid behind their finger. They pretended that they did not know what had happened, who did it, who assisted, who protected when others, many tore down buildings, burned, looted, occupied the spaces and the goods of the many absent and the few present. Mourning in any case concerned individuals. It took almost twenty years, we reached 1962 before a memorial for the victims was created".

### [3.5 Ireland](#)

The post Good Friday Agreement (GFA) period has seen a different relationship to conflict for the people of Northern Ireland and Ireland. 22 years of peace since the GFA allowed for some healing to take place, but deep divisions and trauma have still not been resolved. The demands for social justice that were at the root of the conflict remain unmet. Questions of justice for the victims of the armed conflict are only partially addressed. Victimisation and trauma has affected both Republican and loyalist communities, but disproportionately, with the former having suffered more and without recognition and often shouldering the blame for the violence of The Troubles. Brexit and shifting regional politics seem to have reopened wounds. Trauma and the pursuit of truth, justice

and accountability from all parties are the driving force of contemporary conflict resolution. However, while the 'criminality' of the IRA and Republican movement was the focus of much attention, more recently this has shifted to addressing the actions of the unionist movement and British State Security Forces.

Both personal and collective trauma from The Troubles is widespread and inter-generational in Northern Ireland. Most acute is the personal trauma suffered by those who experienced direct violence and many of whom continue to seek further clarification on the causes, motivations and perpetrators of violence towards them or their loved ones. There remain a substantial number of unresolved murders in Northern Ireland from the Troubles, from assaults, shootings and bombings. Among the Catholic and Republican community, recognition of the harm caused by both Northern Irish and British State Security Forces as well as Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries is a central to trauma resolution. There have been several efforts to address some of the high profile murders but with little satisfaction. There are also cases of intra-community violence that remain unresolved. In the Protestant/Unionist communities accountability for the actions taken by the IRA, Dissidents and Provisional IRA are central to addressing personal trauma.

The widespread and extended nature of the conflict means that secondary trauma is widespread. Feelings of loss, guilt, shame and anger over the violence, and post-traumatic stress disorder are not uncommon. A study by Bunting et al. (2013) reports that about 60.6% of respondents in Northern Ireland had a lifetime traumatic event, and 39% experienced a presumed conflict-related event. Experiences and anniversaries of bombings, bomb scares, assassinations, shoot out and other acts of violence are still features of community life.

The lack of accountability and justice reinforces the opening and reopening of wounds. Victim and survivor justice groups continue to request inquiry and justice as well as engaging with the long-term psychological impact of loss. As time passes and those involved in the conflict grow older, pass away or move away, many have given up hope of knowing the truth or ensuring accountability for the violence they or their family experienced.

The institutions of the Northern Irish and Irish state have attempted to deal with the memories of conflict through two contradictory processes of 'forgetting' and the facilitating of commemorations and state memory of all sides of the conflict. Recent attempts by the Irish state to commemorate events by paying attention to 'both sides equally' have been proven controversial. On the other hand, the current commemorative practices tend to entrench community separation even further. The current memorialisation practices divide into separate Republican and Unionist events. While the latter commemorate the colonial era, such as the Orange Marches, the former commemorate more recent events during the Troubles such as the Hunger Strikers memorials. These practices are symbolic events of community building and are seen as lifelines of the traditions and identity of each of the communities. They inherently involve a process of in-grouping and out-grouping whereby the commemorations are represented as experiences suffered by 'our' community with separate commemoration processes. Through these separate commemorative traditions for each community, divisions become entrenched with little prospect of a united communal identity.

Space is a major marker of collective memories of conflict. Urban space is deeply contested in Northern Ireland. Flags are highly symbolic representations of community orientation and heavily contested when erected in neutral spaces such as public buildings. Irish Tricolours and Paramilitary flags mark Republican areas and British 'Union Jacks' and Loyalist Paramilitary flags mark unionist areas and British war memorials are spread out across the countryside. The public collective memorialisation of the Troubles is also seen in the murals painted on walls in communities associated with Unionism and Republicanism. Again, among the Unionist community memorials depict the history of colonizing the area. On the other hand, collective memories of Republican murals speak to more recent history with images of the central figures of the Troubles such as Bobby Sands. These murals are made by and for the respective communities and often stand in resistance to the official revisionist history prevalent in the education system and media, particularly in the South regarding Republicanism and the relationship with colonialism.

In contrast to these community constructions that reflect different experiences and engagements with historical events, official histories and state led initiatives both North and South tend to try and focus on the shared histories of both communities, such as the trauma from conflict, both personal and collectively experienced in both communities. However, whether the trauma and the responsibility for the conflict is shared equally on both sides is not debated. On the other hand, collective memory is not only about the past but also about the future and the peace building efforts and such cross-community initiatives also tend to focus on the shared future of both communities. This is the reason the issue of Brexit has disrupted the discussion on shared futures; it highlights the differences in shared alliances between the two communities.

The border, its physical presence in terms of customs and security checks, and the division and interaction between border communities is an important territorial marker. It was symbolic of division on the island and the forced separation of the Republican community from Ireland. Part of the Republican collective memory is that of separation from the Irish community in the South after the War of Independence (1919-1921) and isolation in a colonial state, where they were treated as second-class citizens. The dismantling of the physical barriers along 'the border' and the various checkpoints was symbolic of the reduction of community isolation and the reconnection of neighboring communities on both sides of the border. Again, Brexit and the potential for customs checks between two legal jurisdictions triggers collective memories of segregation and reignites concerns regarding separation from what Republicans view as part of their homeland.

The Northern Ireland peace process was celebrated for its inclusion of women, in particular the creation of the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition, an all-woman party elected to the peace talks. However, the signatories to the peace-agreement have done little to implement the pledges made to ensure a greater level of gender parity in public and political life. Women are under-represented across all major positions of political, economic, social and judicial power. Updates to the Gender Equality Strategy have not demonstrated significant change in the position of women in Northern Ireland over time. Women have consistently been heavily involved in community organising and development in Northern Ireland. Forums developed to discuss issues of community relations and peacebuilding have lacked female participation.

In addition to exclusion from mainstream peacebuilding, wider forms of gender-based violence including sexual, domestic, and reproductive violence remain invisible and lacking in priority for government. No prosecution was pursued in 83% of rape cases reported to police between 2010-2014. Abortion has been legalised in North and South in 2019 and 2018 but restricted access and the power of the Catholic and Presbyterian Churches remain. Many female migrants are exposed to particular gender-related vulnerabilities, such as reliance on a male partner for residency status, uncertainties regarding access to health care, racism compounded by gender discrimination, labour exploitation or human trafficking.

After almost 20 years, key parts of the peace agreement have not been implemented. These issues are heightened by the UK's withdrawal from the EU. Anger over the prospect of a harder border on the island of Ireland has already contributed to the collapse of Northern Ireland's power-sharing government. The UK's withdrawal from the EU poses many challenges for Northern Ireland. Because of its geographical location Brexit may turn out to be more problematic for Northern Ireland than it is for the rest of the UK.

Although there has been a decline in violence between the traditional conflict actors, hate crimes against immigrant communities have increased, often associated with Loyalist paramilitary subcultures. Since 2000, Belfast has frequently been labelled the 'race hate capital of Europe' by British and European media. Levels of negativity towards Muslims and Eastern Europeans are significantly higher in Northern Ireland than in Great Britain and have increased in recent years, particularly among young adults aged 18–24 years. Amnesty International highlights that Northern Ireland lacks race equality legislation. More than 80% of hate crimes result in no prosecution or even a warning for the offender.

### [3.6 Kosovo](#)

It has been a little more than 20 years since the war in 1999 and the Kosovo crisis is presently non-violent. The overall conflict is not violent but has potential to turn violent sporadically in more sensitive areas where ethnic tensions are present. However, overall, the whole region is pushing towards a European agenda that comprises of good neighborhood policies and integration conditions thus developing peaceful steps to normalize social and political life. The opposing sides of this normalization process are mainly the former guerrilla/former combatants from both sides. In the Kosovar side, the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) veterans played an important role in shaping public discourse in relation to the normalization until changes in the government on the October 2019 Elections where Vetëvendosje won the majority. As of February 2020, the government is of a coalition of Vetëvendosje and LDK parties, which means all political parties deriving from the KLA are in the opposition. This government lasted only 45 days due to deep ideological differences and other disagreements. The KLA veterans play a very important role in influencing Kosovo public opinion vis-à-vis Serbia through protests and through their channels of influence. Most of the veterans are still influential in their communities. The veterans are organized in the Association of War Veterans which inflated numbers of veterans in the last census of veterans. More than 49,000 veterans are now officially their members.

There are conflicting views in the way Kosovo deals with its past due to lack of institutional memory because most of Albanians have been expelled from jobs in early 1990s and practically lacking all of documentation prior to 1999 (taken to Serbia) including all files of employees in security sector. Many documents from the cadaster list, civil registry, museum artefacts and other items were taken away by Serbian forces upon their withdrawal in 1999. Despite this, there is a national consensus to avoid further internal conflict and move towards the future as an independent state despite challenges in one side and to end the conflict with Serbia once and forever in the other side. The Kosovo and Serbia conflict is still very vivid in collective memories and many developments have the tendency to be framed as a reaction to the war-conflict narratives. One example is Kosovo Albanians recruited by the Nazi Germany and the "Skanderbeg" division numbered some 6,000 Kosovo Albanians. In the historic narratives and interpretation of the WWII from the conflict perspective, this plays a very important role in the relations between Albanians and Serbs. In Serbian history books, an inflated role is given to the Scanderbeg Division. This is where the division of narratives started, over the support for Partisans and Germans in the WWII in Kosovo and, undoubtedly, this unit committed crimes during the WWII in Kosovo including the handover of some 281 members of Jewish community living in Kosovo. The narrative of Kosovo Albanian history books is that Serb partisans attacked Albanian resistance members who were defending their houses. The controversy of historic narratives is evident because one of the main figures of partisan forces in Kosovo was Fadil Hoxha who was a Kosovar Albanian.

Kosovo has progressed in gender mainstreaming in overall institutions by introducing the quota for women participation in public institutions by minimum 30% that is part of the representation institutions in National Assembly and local institutions as well. Currently what shapes Kosovar politics in dealing with the past and gender issues is the Sexual Crimes related to Conflict. VasfijeKrasniqi Goodman, a woman who was raped during the war, was invited to deliver a speech at the Kosovo National Assembly recently. But she has testified in US Congress and Canadian Parliament along with many EU institutions before being able to do that in Kosovo. It is estimated that around 20,000 women had been subject to sexual crimes during the 1998-1999 conflict. Initiatives such as the former President's A. Jahjaga Foundation have become influential in seeking justice and influencing the process of normalization with Serbia by bringing survivors forward to speak out. A monument made up of 20,000 medallions called Heroines is erected in Prishtina to commemorate victims of sexual violence. It is estimated that most of victims of rape during the war will never be open about it. VasfijeKrasniqi Goodman is using her story to explain that there is stigmatization of women in Kosovo after the war for being raped. In terms of response from the Serbian side on the issue, there is no discussion whatsoever. In one hand, the narratives of sexual violence are challenged by men who tell their heroic stories of contributing for the cause and liberation of Kosovo which underplays stories of women who suffered during the war. Women still cannot express freely their stories due to stigma and shame of being a victim of war. On the other hand, overall the narrative of war in Kosovo is challenged by Serbia. The President of Serbia often uses a certain narrative to claim that events such as Racak have been faked and prepared by the internationals to use it as a pretext to bomb Serbia.

The whole region sees EU and Europeanisation in practical terms, in relation to better health services, employment possibilities and freedom of movement. Kosovo too is fully dedicated to the EU perspective and integration and is working hard to 'catch up' with the European agenda by strengthening the rule of law, human rights record, good neighborhood policy and minority-community integration. Overall, many in Kosovo, including Kosovo Serbs, are pro-European to the extent that they see EU as the only alternative for development and progress but also for dealing with the past despite the lack of actions of the EU in this regard. Because there is no clear link between EU and dealing with the troubled past, actions such as truth finding, reparations and retributions are very much part of the narrative in relation to EU but are not an integral part of the official narratives in relation to neither EULEX (EU Mission in Kosovo) nor the EU itself. This affects the level of trust to the EU by citizens of both communities and is reflecting a lack of bottom-up approaches in dealing with the past. Overall this is perceived as a weakness of the Europeanisation process in general.

Dealing with the past and advancing the European agenda at the same time proved to be a dead end despite Kosovo hopes to base its peaceful path and normalize relations with Serbia through the framework of EU. The main reason is that EU has failed to have a unitary position on Kosovo due to the five non recognizing EU countries and the well known lack of EU shared foreign policy aims and principles.

Despite regional initiatives such as RECOM, which is an intergovernmental Regional Commission Tasked with Establishing the Facts about All Victims of War Crimes and Other Serious Human Rights Violations Committed on the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia from 1 January 1991 to 31 December 2001, many war crimes, suffering and economic consequences of war have not been addressed. Because of this, lately in Kosovo, the President of Kosovo started an initiative on dealing with the past. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission is established to "document and establish facts on the human rights violations which occurred during the recent past, returning the dignity to the victims and survivors, to contribute to the social transformation to overcome the consequences of violations and abuses suffered and to prevent their recurrence". This initiative has been criticized as one-sided and too politicized. Without political endorsement, many of the crimes of the past are unresolved and the future remains ambiguous.

### 3.7 Poland

Conflicts over the shape of Polish memory or the historical narrative on the recent past, 20th century history, as well as the discussion on the shape of contemporary Polish society (and its identity based on historical experience and involvement) are crucial elements of the public sphere and the social conversation in Poland at the moment. History (troubled pasts) is an indispensable element of politics.

#### EU and Polish identity

The current (early 2020) anti-elitist political discourse is directed towards taking control over one's own history (the narrative on the past) and emancipating oneself from the oppressive framework of the 'western', the 'modern' and the 'liberal'. To a significant extent these conflicts shape Polish political as well as cultural spheres nowadays and influence the attitudes towards European integration, the so-called refugee crisis, and the abortion battle (strongly connected with the participation of the catholic church authorities in Polish politics). EU decisions and directives obliging states to take specific actions are met in Poland with conflicted reactions and attitudes towards European integration. The interest of the European Union in the rule of law is perceived as an attempt to control, and the allegations directed towards Poland as a lack of understanding of the Polish context. The most common reaction is an attempt to point to the hypocrisy of the European Union and to redirect attention to the internal problems of the Union or other member states. On the other hand, the Union is treated as an important instance that through external pressure can positively influence or even inhibit negative changes in the country.

Scholars (invigorated by the generational change) – historians, anthropologists, sociologists and others – revisit the archives and re-read the documents in order to revision the narrative about the past (these gestures come from left- and right-wing oriented actors alike). The establishment of the Institute of National Remembrance (in 1999) and the opening of previously unavailable archives began an intensive debate related to the PRL (Polish People's Republic). However, the debate about the previous system begins in 1989 – it is started by historians and sociologists. On the one hand, it concerned the role of historians after 1989, the issue of history writing, as well as ways of using archival materials. On the other hand, it was devoted to the attitude to the PRL – introducing questions about the settlement of people associated with the previous system and the issue of lustration. Materials from the archives of the Institute of National Remembrance for right-wing actors were an important source of 'discovering' the true identity of people cooperating with the state apparatus, the so-called agents – people who took important positions in social life after 1989 (politicians, academic teachers, researchers). With the opening of the archive, there has been a debate of historians focused, inter alia, on the notion of 'historical politics' and on the necessity of separating politics and science from many postulates (the postulate of writing history that does not serve political interests).

New research institutions are being launched devoted to memory studies, critical historiography, cultural studies of the Holocaust, class-oriented studies of postwar history of Poland, etc. with numerous academic conferences and publications. The subjects raised by these scientific institutions are often met with strong criticism of the right-wing community in Poland. An example would be The Center for Research on Prejudice – a research unit where social psychologists and sociologists work together on topics related to stereotypes, prejudice, racism, discrimination and other issues pertaining to intergroup relations. In recent years, the Center has described increasing negative moods in Poland, hate speech, the phenomenon of secondary anti-Semitism and general hostility towards others (materializing, among others, in the figure of an immigrant). The Center director, prof. Michał Bilewicz, is met with harsh criticism of rightist columnists, but also some politicians who undermine the truthfulness but also the legitimacy of research (asking whether they should still be financed by the state). The second example is the research of the Polish Center for

Holocaust Research, which meets with attacks by Polish right-wing communities. The attacks undermine the results of research related to, inter alia, Polish-Jewish relations in Poland during and after World War II. Scientists (including Prof. Jacek Leociak, Barbara Engelking, Joanna Tokarska-Bakir) are accused of slandering Poland and Poles (see e.g. events at a conference The New Polish School of Historical Research on the Holocaust that took place at the School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences [EHESS], Paris, in February 2019).

The conflicts over the shape of the past seem to be reenacted in the public space – as evidenced by some research made by academics and artists alike – by various, heterogenic acts of commemoration or interventions in the visual public space. Right-wing researchers and then publicists introduce 'repressed' figures from Polish history related to resistance to the communist authorities after World War II. In this way, they 'restore' the memory of the so called Cursed Soldiers (most often ignoring negative actions, and often also crimes against, for example, the Ukrainian population). Cursed Soldiers (in Polish *Żołnierzy Wyklęci*) are a new figure in Polish imaginary, officially acknowledged since 2011, when the National Day of Cursed Soldiers was included into the state's calendar. There were soldiers of the underground army, who were repressed by the Soviet regime, or refused to lay down arms in 1945 and fought the new communist regime. However, some of the leaders kept strong nationalist views, so Jews and representatives of other minorities also fell victim to some of them.

Cursed soldiers have become one of the important figures used by the right-wing government to emphasize the steadfast resistance against the communist authorities and the symbol of the struggle for Poland's independence i.e. the Day of Cursed Soldiers and two Museums of Cursed Soldiers, reporting to two different ministries. The first, subject to the Ministry of Culture, was opened in 2020 in Ostrołęka. The second is being created in Warsaw in a former detention prison. Both are supposed to restore the memory of the heroes deliberately denied from Polish history (during the PRL they were referred to as bandits). Such a presentation of a very diverse group of people, however, raises many protests and disputes. Among them are those accused of crimes against civilians motivated by ethnic and religious hatred.

The introduction of these figures into public discourse is also accompanied and actively supported by the production of popular products - gadgets and patriotic clothing. At the same time, the main party introduces the process known as "decommunization" (assuming the existence of earlier 'communization' of public sphere). As a result of these actions, the public sphere begins to be 'cleaned' of street names and communist symbols from squares.

Right-wing authorities believe that 'a new, greater cultural patronage of the state and modern historical policy are needed.' Thus, the main party begins to establish and subsidize new institutions dealing with history and memory i.e. the Institute of Solidarity and Bravery named after Witold Pilecki (2017), the Center for Research on Totalitarianisms, Witold Pilecki (2016), and recently the Institute of Heritage of National Thought, R. Dmowski and I. J. Paderewski (2020). The financing of the Institute of National Remembrance has also increased dramatically in recent years.

In April and May 1940, about 22,000 Polish officers were murdered and then buried in the village of Katyn near Smolensk. Among them were not only soldiers but also officials, teachers, scientists,

doctors, lawyers and engineers. The USSR carefully hid the Katyn massacre. Initially, it was attributed to Germany; the Russians long denied this crime. In the PRL it was taboo. As a secretly remembered event, it gained strength, symbolizing Poland's heroism and independence. Knowledge about the crime was passed down between generations. Protests against the falsification of history were expressed, among others, in the form of inscriptions on the walls in the public sphere. The topic of Katyn returned with the plane crash in Smolensk in April 2010, which killed, among others, the President of the Republic of Poland with his wife, parliamentarians, commanders of the armed forces, and representatives of ministries. The Federation of Katyn Families protested against the definition of the Smolensk catastrophe as the "second Katyn".

The need to publicize the history of the Warsaw Uprising '44 was to some degree grounded on the fact that it was unknown in the world and usually confused with the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising in April 1943. The fear of omitting the 'memory of Polish history' created a form of victim competition and was associated with plans to establish the Warsaw Ghetto Museum. Right-wing media argued that it should be close to the Warsaw Uprising Museum, otherwise foreign trips will ignore this fragment of Polish history and confound the Ghetto Uprising with the Warsaw Uprising. Despite the name, the government announced that the Warsaw Ghetto Museum would not only present the tragic history of the ghetto. Deputy Prime Minister Piotr Gliński announced it as a 'museum of 800 years of love between two nations', and a significant part was to be about the heroism of Poles who saved Jews.

In January 1994, *Gazeta Wyborcza* published the article by Michał Cichy 'Poles-Jews: black cards of the uprising'. The author wrote about 60 Jews killed by insurgents. The number of Jews killed was not very high compared to around 200,000 victims of the uprising, but the article caused widespread indignation.

### [3.8 Spain](#)

Since 2000 initiatives coming from the civil society to review the official narrative about the conflicts of the past and to rehabilitate the memory of the losers of the civil war have gained prominence. The generational change and the accession of the Popular Party (in which some prominent leaders had also held positions in Franco's regime), amongst others, have contributed to a polarization around this issue and to the questioning by some of the official narrative built during the transition to democracy. Demands against the perpetrators of crimes, both in Spain during the civil war and the dictatorship and in other countries, based on the principles of universal justice (Cases of Scilingo and Pinochet) have also played an important role.

One of the most crucial events in terms of political decisions about this issue has been the so-called Law of Historical Memory, passed in Congress in 2007 under the Socialist government of Rodríguez Zapatero creating great division amongst the political parties. This law paid homage, for the first time in the history of Spanish democracy, to the victims of the civil war on both sides. The Catalan and Basque autonomous Parliaments adopted their own laws, in many cases much less 'equidistant', as both regions alleged that an especially brutal repression of the Francoist regime had taken place where nationalist consciousness was stronger. But this law was abolished de facto

by the Mariano Rajoy's governments (2011-2018) under which no budget was allocated for its implementation.

There are still many pending issues in terms of memory, justice and reparation, as pointed by the UN Commission of Enforced Disappearances (2014) such as the lack of initiative and funding from the state in the search for truth and reparation, or the application of the 1977 Amnesty Law that, according to the Spanish Courts, does not allow the application of international norms.

It is expected that the new Socialist government that came to power after a vote of no confidence in June 2018 will follow a different approach, closer to the demands of those who claim that justice still has to be made with the losers of the civil war and those repressed under Franco's dictatorship. Open issues are, amongst others, the removal of the dictators' remains from the state-funded mausoleum of the Valley of the Fallen and its transformation into a Memory Center, investigations on the illegally stolen children, the removal of the names of streets and monuments praising the victory of the winners, or the removal of medals awarded to prior torturers.

As for how these memories are connected to European integration, already since the regenerationist movement (see above) Europe has been seen as 'the solution' for Spain, a country that 'cannot rule itself'. After 1959 the Francoist dictatorship tried, unsuccessfully, to be associated with the European Economic Community. But, ever since, the dictator started using the image of Europe as the model of economic well-being to which Spain should aspire. At the same time, for the democratic opposition, Europe was seen as the escape from the isolation lived under Franco, especially during the first two decades of the dictatorship. This is what lies behind an idealized image of Europe or, as some would put it, the strong but rather acritical Europeanism of Spaniards. It also explains the absence of Eurosceptic political parties in Spain.

At the same time, the EU has played an active role in asking the Spanish state to comply with the international treaties. More specifically, the European Parliament has joined the Council of Europe and the United Nations in their recommendations in asking the Spanish to investigate the crimes committed under the Franco dictatorship. This came as the result of the initiative of a group of Spanish EMPs, mainly Basque and Catalan.

The Catalan and Basque peripheral nationalist parties have also traditionally considered Europe as the most suitable context for vindicating their status as individual nations, since it was coherent with the project of constructing a 'Europe of Regions'.

However, there are also voices that have been/are critical of the EU with regard to its policies towards past conflicts in Spain. For example, it has been criticized for not paying the same attention to the victims of Franco's dictatorship as to those of Nazism and Communism. Also, since the events in Catalonia in Autumn 2018, EU leading figures and institutions have avoided to support the Catalanian government, leading to a more critical stance by the latter than the traditional 'pro-European' one.

The economic crisis has played a key role in the revival of the conflict in Catalonia. Pro-independence positions in the region intensified in the context of the economic crisis, as the Catalanian government accused the central government of the economic situation of Catalonia, and of not letting them find their own solutions adapted to the circumstances of the region.

Gender has drawn attention in the arts (novels, films): the neglected history of the military participation of women during the civil war, the women's role in Francoist Spain, the repression towards women, the examination of the transition to democracy from a gender perspective etc. The organization Women's Link has asked the Argentinian judge María Servini, in charge of the only process against crimes committed during the Franco regime, to research crimes committed against women. The women who participated in political activities in the republican front or as part of the opposition during the dictatorship, questioned the role assigned to women by the regime (good spouse, obedient, dedicated to taking care of the home and the children). Once they were arrested, they suffered the same kind of repression as many men, but also repression that was gender specific. In many cases their hair was cut, they were raped, hit in the stomach if they were pregnant, insulted, and in some cases their babies were stolen and given to families that ideologically supported the regime, 'in order to eliminate the Marxist seed'. It is estimated that 30,960 babies were stolen, mainly from hospitals, with the collaboration of religious nuns, between the beginnings of the Franco dictatorship until the 1980s. Some women were also repressed for being partners or relatives of men that opposed the regime.

The refugee crisis – in which Spain is only recently taking an active role with PM Sánchez inviting the Aquarius to bring the 600 passengers that were rejected by the Italian government and advocating for a European position – has not been connected to the troubled past. However, the crisis of the Popular Party (PP) may lead to a reconfiguration of the right-wing parties. As Sánchez has, during his first month in office, adopted positions in favor of balancing the recognition of the historical memory of the losers of the civil war, a more open position towards receiving refugees, and towards negotiating with the Catalanian government, these issues could potentially be contested from the right and some have pointed at the potential for a new party to the right of the PP, or for a turn of the PP in the direction of European populist right parties. So far, this has not materialized.

## 4. Timelines of Conflict and Post conflict - Milestone events

### 4.1 Bosnia

- 1992 Croat and Muslim nationalists form tactical alliance and outvote Serbs at independence referendum.
- 1992 The Bosnian Serbs, under Radovan Karadžić,<sup>1</sup> lay siege to Sarajevo. The latter is controlled by Muslims but they are unable to break the siege.

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<sup>1</sup> Radovan Karadžić enjoyed full support from Slobodan Milošević.

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- 1993 Conflict between Muslims and Croats breaks out, culminating in the destruction of much of Mostar, including its Old Bridge (which was built by the Ottomans and was a symbol of Bosnia and Herzegovina's cultural diversity).
  - 1993 Muslims and Serbs form an alliance against Croats in Herzegovina, rival Muslim forces fight each other in north-west Bosnia, Croats and Serbs fight against Muslims in central Bosnia and Herzegovina.
  - 1993 UN safe havens for Bosnian Muslim civilians are created (Sarajevo, Goražde and Srebrenica).
  - 1995 Safe haven of Srebrenica is overrun by Bosnian Serb forces under Ratko Mladić. 8000 Muslim men and boys are separated from their families and massacred.
  - 1995 Dayton peace accord signed. It creates two entities of roughly equal size, one for Bosnian Muslims and Croats, the other for Serbs, and legitimized the division between them.
  - 1996 The ICTY begins its operation in the Hague. Dražen Erdemović<sup>2</sup> (Croat) is the first person to be convicted.
  - 1997 International conference in Bonn extends powers of the Office of the High Representative (OHR).
  - 1998 Nationalistic politicians do well in elections. First Bosnian Muslims and Croats are convicted of war crimes in the Hague.
  - 2000 Moderate parties do well in elections in the Federation but nationalists gain the upper hand in the Serb entity. However, they formed a coalition headed by Mladen Ivanić<sup>3</sup> (moderate politician).
  - 2001 Ante Jelavić<sup>4</sup> is dismissed as his party threatens to declare independent Croat Republic.
  - 2001 Bosnian Serbs in Banja Luka<sup>5</sup> and Trebinje use force to break up ceremonies marking the reconstruction of mosques destroyed during the war. Several Muslim refugees injured.

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<sup>2</sup> Dražen Erdemović is an ethnic Bosnian Croat who fought during the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the Army of Republika Srpska (Civikov, 2009).

<sup>3</sup> Mladen Ivanić is a Bosnian Serb politician who has been a member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina since 2014. He is a founding member of the center-right Bosnian Serb Party of Democratic Progress (PDP) and was its President from 1999 to 2015. In October 2014, he was elected as the Serb member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and his victory marked the first time since the Dayton Agreement that the Serb member of the Presidency received the highest number of votes in country, out of the three members.

<sup>4</sup> Ante Jelavić is a Bosnian Croat politician and former Chairman of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He was removed from his position by decision of Wolfgang Petritsch, head of OHR, because he directly violated the constitutional order of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 22 January 2004, he was arrested on charges of corruption.

<sup>5</sup> The reconstruction of mosques in Banja Luka and Trebinje were financed by the Government.

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- 2001 Tribunal finds Bosnian Serb Radislav Krstić guilty of genocide for his role in Srebrenica. Krstić sentenced to 46 years in imprisonment. Three senior Muslim generals indicted to face war crimes charges.
- 2001 The main Bosnian Serb nationalist party (SDS) in Republika Srpska votes to expel all war crimes suspects, including Karadžić.
- 2002 Paddy Ashdown becomes the head of OHR.
- 2002 Nationalists win back power in Federation on presidential, parliamentary and local level. Biljana Plavšić, former Bosnian Serb President, is sentenced to 11 years in prison.
- 2003 A mass grave is discovered near Zvornik, close to the Serbian border.
- 2004 Celebrations mark the reopening of the rebuilt 16<sup>th</sup> century bridge at Mostar.<sup>6</sup>
- 2004 NATO hands over peacekeeping duties to EUFOR.
- 2005 Paddy Ashdown sacks Croat member of presidency Dragan Čović who faces corruption charges.
- 2005 EU foreign ministers give blessing to Stabilisation and Association Agreement talks.
- 2006 Christian Schwarz-Schilling takes over from Paddy Ashdown as the head of OHR.
- 2006 Court of Justice in the Hague begins with a hearing in genocide case brought by Bosnia and Herzegovina against Serbia and Montenegro.
- 2006 Largest war crimes opened at the UN tribunal in the Hague.
- 2006 General elections reflect ethnic divisions, with Serb entity voting to maintain the split from Muslim-Croat entity. Bosnian Serb leadership threatens to seek complete secession in event of moves to end the autonomy of Republika Srpska.
- 2006 Bosnia and Herzegovina joins NATO's Partnership for Peace pre-membership programme.
- 2007 Court of Justice rules that the 1995 Srebrenica massacre was constituted of genocide but clears Serbia of direct responsibility.
- 2007 Zdravko Tolimir<sup>7</sup> is arrested.
- 2007 Miroslav Lajčák takes over as the head of OHR.
- 2008 Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the EU and Bosnia and Herzegovina is signed.
- 2008 Celebrations on the streets of Sarajevo as Radovan Karadžić is arrested in Belgrade after 13 years on the run.

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<sup>6</sup> The renovation was financed by international financial institutions and governments of several countries. In 2002, the Croatian government joined with the donation of 500,000 USD.

<sup>7</sup> Zdravko Tolimir was a Bosnian Serb military commander and a war criminal, convicted of genocide.

- 2008 Nationalist parties do well among all three ethnic groups in local elections, leaving Bosnian politics divided firmly along ethnic lines.
- 2009 Valentin Inzko takes over as the head of OHR.
- 2009 Inzko says that Bosnian leaders are undermining state institutions.
- 2009 The process against Radovan Karadžić begins at UN tribunal in Hague. He faces 11 charges of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and other atrocities.
- 2010 Republika Srpska passes the law that makes holding referendums on national issues easier.
- 2010 Ejup Ganić<sup>8</sup> is arrested in London at the request of Serbia, which accused him of war crimes.
- 2010 Serb nationalist party led by Milorad Dodik (Bosnian Serb) and multi-ethnic party led by Zlatko Lagumdžija emerge as main winners in general election.
- 2011 Serbian authorities arrest Bosnian Serb Ratko Mladić.
- 2011 14 months after the general elections Croat, Serb and Muslim political leaders reach an agreement on formation of a new central government.
- 2012 Large crowds attend the mass funeral of some 500 newly-identified victims of the Srebrenica genocide.
- 2013 A huge mass grave is located in the village of Tomasica in north-Western Bosnia.
- 2014 Party of Democratic Action (Bakir Izetbegović) emerges as the largest party in general election.
- 2015 European foreign ministers and Bosnia and Herzegovina sign Stabilisation and Association Agreement that has been on hold since 2008 as they were not able to pursue structural reforms.
- 2015 Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić is forced to flee from Srebrenica Massacre Memorial as angry Bosniaks hurled stoned and bottles at him.
- 2016 Bosnia and Herzegovina submits formal application to join the EU.
- 2016 UN tribunal in the Hague finds former Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić guilty of genocide and war crimes.
- 2016 Bosnian Serbs vote overwhelmingly to keep 9 January as a national holiday, despite the opposition of Bosnia and Herzegovina's constitutional court.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Ejup Ganić was born in Novi Pazar (Sandžak) and he is the founder and current president of Sarajevo School of Science and Technology. He was arrested at Heathrow Airport in London after Serbian judicial authorities issued an extradition warrant. He was accused of conspiracy to murder 40 YPA soldier in the Dobrovoljačka Street attack in May 1992. He was released as Judge John Laws remarked that the arrest warrant by Serbia was politically motivated (Transconflict, 2010).

2017 Ratko Mladić found guilty of genocide and crimes against humanity during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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<sup>9</sup> Since the declaration of Republika Srpska on 9 January 1992, the national day in the entity has been celebrated on that date. On 26 November 2015 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina ruled against the constitutionality of the National Day, deeming it discriminatory against non-Serbs.

4.2 Cyprus

1955-59, EOKA guerrilla fight:	On 1 April 1955 the four-year guerrilla fight of EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Combatants) began. The British casualties were considerable. They reacted by arming a paramilitary police force made up of Turkish Cypriots. EOKA was a nationalistic organization based almost exclusively on the Right spectrum of political life of the Greek Cypriot community that opted for <i>enosis</i> . Its struggle, against the British and Turkish Cypriots (there are also allegations that it was also opposed to Greek Cypriots of the Left) render the struggle as an important part of historical discourse in both communities.
1960, Independence:	Cyprus gains independence after Greek and Turkish communities reach agreement on a constitution. Treaty of Guarantee gives Britain, Greece and Turkey the right for military intervention. Britain retains sovereignty over two military bases.
1963, Makarios' 'Thirteen Amendments' Proposal:	Makarios raises Turkish fears by proposing constitutional changes which would abrogate power-sharing arrangements. Inter-communal violence erupts. Turkish side withdraws from power-sharing.
1963-1964, Inter-communal violence:	From the end of December 1963 until the summer of 1964 a number of inter communal clashes occurred. Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots were wounded and killed. As a result, Cypriot Turkish enclaves were formed, United Nations Forces (UNFICYP) were sent to the Island and Turkey began military operations for an invasion to the island. A warning from US President Lyndon Johnson caused the Turks to call off the invasion. During this period the infamous 'Green Line' was created that plays an important role in the historical discourse of the two communities. It is important to note that during the period 1963-1970, 25.000 Turkish Cypriots and 500 Greek Cypriots became refugees in their own country.
July-August 1974, Turkish invasion of Cyprus:	Turkey invades Cyprus. The invasion ('Operation Attila') was launched on 20 July. Turkish forces captured 3% of the island before a ceasefire was declared. After collapse of negotiations on 14 August, a second Turkish invasion was launched capturing approximately 40% of the island. The Turkish Cypriot community viewed the invasion as a 'happy peace operation' whereas Greek Cypriots perceived it as 'barbaric Turkish invasion'.

<p>August 1996, Increased tension and violence along buffer zone:</p>	<p>Following Greek Cypriots' refugees demonstration, two Greek Cypriots (Tassos Isaac and Solomos Solomou) were killed, while two British soldiers were also shot by Turkish forces.</p>
<p>April 2003:</p>	<p>Turkish and Greek Cypriots cross island's dividing 'green line' for first time in 30 years after Turkish Cypriot authorities ease border restrictions.</p>
<p>April 2004: Referendum on 'Annan Plan':</p>	<p>Twin referendums on whether to accept UN reunification plan in last-minute bid to achieve united EU entry. Plan is endorsed by Turkish Cypriots but overwhelmingly rejected by Greek Cypriots.</p>
<p>1 May 2004, EU accession:</p>	<p>The Republic of Cyprus is one of 10 new states to join the European Union.</p>
<p>July 2006:</p>	<p>UN-sponsored talks between President Tassos Papadopoulos and Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat agree a series of confidence-building measures and contacts between the two communities.</p>
<p>January-March 2006:</p>	<p>Greek and Turkish Cypriots demolish barriers dividing the old city of Nicosia.</p>
<p>April 2008:</p>	<p>Symbolic Ledra Street crossing between the Turkish and Greek sectors of Nicosia reopened for the first time since 1964.</p>
<p>April 2012:</p>	<p>Turkey's Turkish Petroleum Corporation begins drilling for oil and gas onshore in northern Cyprus despite protests from the Cypriot government that the action is illegal according to international law.</p>
<p>October 2014:</p>	<p>Cyprus suspends peace talks in protest against what it calls efforts by Turkey to prevent it from exploring gas fields south of the island. The EU and US express concern over the tension.</p>
<p>May 2015:</p>	<p>The Republic of Cyprus and Turkish Cypriot negotiators resume talks, holding 20 rounds of UN-sponsored in the course of the year.</p>
<p>January 2017:</p>	<p>Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders meet at UN in Geneva for direct talks on reunification under a federal arrangement.</p>

### 4.3 Germany

- 1933 Hitler is appointed chancellor, establishment of first concentration camps
- 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact / Invasion of Poland: beginning of WWII
- 1940 German Blitzkrieg: Belgium, Netherlands and France, Battle of Britain
- 1941 Operation Barbarossa: invasion of Soviet Union, Pearl Harbor attack, USA enters the war
- 1942 Stalingrad battle, Wannsee Conference (Final Solution to the Jewish Question)
- 1943 Germans surrender at Stalingrad, surrender of Italy to the Allies
- 1944 Allied troops landing in Normandy
- 1945 Liberation of Auschwitz, Soviets reach Berlin, suicide of Hitler, German capitulation on 8 May, Potsdam Agreement (military occupation of Germany, demilitarization, reparations, prosecution of war criminals)
- 1946 Founding party conference of the SED
- 1948 Beginning of Berlin Blockade
- 1949 Founding of the FRG and GDR
- 1952 Strengthening of border protection regime along Inner German border, proclamation of the construction of socialism in the GDR, Reparations Agreement between Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany
- 1953 Uprising in the GDR
- 1955 West Germany joins NATO, East Germany joins Warsaw Treaty organization
- 1961 Construction of Berlin Wall, Eichmann trial
- 1962 Spiegel affair
- 1966 First grand coalition CDU/SPD, formation of the extra-parliamentary opposition APO
- 1967 Student Benno Ohnesorg shot dead, beginning of student protests
- 1970 Willy Brandt in the Eastern city of Erfurt, founding of the Red Army Fraction in FRG
- 1972 Basic Treaty between East and West Germany, mutual recognition of sovereignty
- 1973 FRG and GDR become members of the United Nations
- 1979 NATO Double-Track Decision
- 1987 Erich Honecker in Bonn
- 1989 Protest in the GDR, opening of the Berlin Wall
- 1990 Two-Plus-Four Agreement, German reunification

- 1990 East German parliament apologizes formally for Holocaust crimes, Kohl equivocates on final recognition of Oder-Neisse border, German-Polish Border Treaty, Berlin becomes the federal capital of the Federal Republic of Germany
- 1991 Treaty of Good Neighbourship and Friendly Cooperation between Germany and Poland, Hoyerswerda riots
- 1992 Friendly cooperation pact between Germany and the Czech Republic issued, Rostock-Lichtenhagen riots
- 1993 Solingen arson attack
- 1995 Review of the validity of the Beneš decrees by the Czech Constitutional Court, Commemoration of the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the end of WWII
- 1996 Establishment of official Gedenktag (commemoration day) of liberation of Auschwitz
- 1997 Czech-German Declaration on the Mutual Relations and their Future Development
- 1998 Walser Bubis debate, beginning of Leitkultur debate
- 2000 Nazi labor compensation agreed (slave-labours), controversies over Berlinka archival collection with Poland
- 2002 Legal assessment of Beneš decrees by European Parliament, Möllemann affair
- 2003 Hohmann affair
- 2004 Right-wing extremist party NPD enters a regional parliament after elections in Saxony for the first time since 1968
- 2009 Public debate as to whether the GDR was a 'Unrechtsstaat' (state of injustice), International reactions to 2009 Spiegel cover story looking at European collaborators in the Holocaust; Jarosław Kaczyński asserted that 'the Germans are attempting to shake off their guilt for a giant crime,' beginning of trial against John Demjanjuk in Munich
- 2013 founding of Alternative of Germany (AfD), in German federal elections the party misses the 5% election threshold
- 2014 European parliament elections (AfD: 7.1%)
- 2015 Refugee crisis, xenophobic attacks against asylum-seekers, Alexis Tsipras demands Germany to pay WWII reparations to Greece
- 2017 German federal elections, AfD enters German parliament as biggest opposition party, Björn Höcke, AfD's state leader in Thuringia, attacks Holocaust memorial and demands 180-degree turnaround in policy of memory, protestors built a replica of Berlin's Holocaust memorial near the home of Höcke
- 2018 AfD chief Alexander Gauland dismisses Nazi era as a 'speck of bird poop' in German history

#### 4.4 Greece

1941-1944	Triple Axis Occupation
1943-1944	Civil war between resistance organizations and against collaborato
1944	Dekemvriana battle in Athens. Communists lost.
1945	Varkiza agreement for disarmament and general amnesty. Fails
1946-1949	Open civil strife. Communists lost
1949-1974	Political refugees live in eastern bloc
1959	Max Merten trial fiasco. Merten was a basic instigator of Thessaloniki Holocaust
1961	Theodorakis composes Mauthausen
1962	First Holocaust monument in Thessaloniki
1967-1974	Right wing military dictatorship
1974	Third Greek Republic of Metapolitefsi begins
1981	Socialist PASOK rise to power
1982-1984	Law for National Resistance recognition and pension to veterans
1989	Communist Party and conservative party form a coalition. Law for Civil war reconciliation is voted. 16 million of police files are destroyed.
1991	The Republic of Macedonia becomes an independent state
1994	Parliament recognizes the Pontic Genocide
1996	Parliament recognizes the Pontic Genocide
1996	New Holocaust Memorial in Thessaloniki
1998	Parliament recognizes the Asia Minor Genocide
2004	Parliament recognizes the Jewish Genocide. Holocaust Remembrance day introduced.
2009	Economic crisis provokes discussion about the prospect of a new civil war.
2015	Radican Syriza party becomes government. They introduce a rhetoric about 'new resistance' against the new 'German occupation'
2013	Yannis Boutaris becomes Thessaloniki Mayor. He introduces a pro-jewish and pro-ottoman remembrance policy in Thessaloniki.
2015	Memory march to commemorate first deportation is introduced to Thessaloniki
2018	Mayor Boutaris gets brutally beaten in the Pontic Genocide commemoration event
2018	SYRIZA signs an agreement concerning the 'name dispute' with FYROM. Reactions mainly refer to historical arguments

#### 4.5 Ireland

- 1919-1921 Anglo-Irish War/Irish War of Independence
- 1922 Ireland is divided into a Catholic-majority Irish Free State (later Republic of Ireland) and a Protestant-majority Northern Irish state.
- 1920s-1960s The Unionist government of Northern Ireland exercise widespread discrimination against the Nationalist minority.
- 1960s Nationalists begin a peaceful, civil rights campaign. The Irish Republican Army is revived to contest British rule in Northern Ireland.
- 1969 Large-scale rioting in Catholic-majority Derry/Londonderry [Battle of the Bogside]
- 1969-1971 British troops are sent to Northern Ireland. They are initially welcomed by Catholic nationalists, but the Irish Republican Army (IRA) is revived to opposed British rule by force.
- 1971-1975 New laws allow terror suspects to be imprisoned without a trial.
- 1972 British forces open-fire on a civil-rights march in Derry/Londonderry killing 14 people. Support for the paramilitary IRA swells among nationalists. [Bloody Sunday]
- 1972 The Northern Irish government is suspended by the UK Prime Minister who rules the region from London.
- 1970s-1990s The IRA conduct a bombing campaign in Northern Ireland and the UK. Nationalist and Unionist paramilitaries commit atrocities including 'punishment beatings' and kneecappings to members of their own communities.
- 1981 Imprisoned IRA members launch a hunger-strike in opposition to UK Prime Minister's Margaret Thatcher's policy in Northern Ireland; 10 prisoners starve to death and one, Bobby Sands, is elected to parliament while on hunger strike.
- 1993 The UK government enter into secret negotiations with the IRA.
- 1994-1996 The IRA and Loyalist paramilitaries announce a ceasefire, which ends with a new bombing campaign
- 1997-1998 US-led talks are successful in establishing a power-sharing agreement between Nationalists and Unionists – The Good Friday Agreement. The IRA disarms, but a break-away group kills 29 people (Omagh bomb).
- 1998- Sporadic violence continues. The Northern Irish government struggles to reach agreement and is frequently suspended.
- 2016 The UK votes to leave the European Union, but Northern Ireland voted to remain in the EU. The EU and the Republic of Ireland oppose the creation of a 'hard' border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland.

#### 4.6 Kosovo

June 1878	The League of Prizren (Kosovo) is founded to protect the right of the Albanian Nation.
November 1912	Albania declares independence from the Ottoman Empire and Kosovo <i>vilayet</i> remains outside its borders. At the same year, Serbia regains control of Kosovo from the Turks, recognized by 1913 Treaty of London.
1941	Kosovo becomes part of Italian controlled Albania
December 1943	Conference of Bujan confirms Kosovar Albanian aspiration to join Albania
January 1946	Kosovo is included in the Yugoslav Federation
November 1968	Demonstrations for equality break in Kosovo to be suppressed and leadership imprisoned.
February 1974	Yugoslav constitution recognizes the autonomous status of Kosovo, giving the province de facto self-government.
March 1981	Students start a spontaneous demonstration demanding 'Republic' and 'Democracy'. Most of the leadership is imprisoned or expelled abroad.
June 1989	Milosevic rallies in Kosovo commemorating the 600 years of the 'Battle of Kosovo' and announcing his plans for 'armed battles'. Same year, Serbia strips rights of autonomy of Kosovo by the 1974 Constitution and annexes Kosovo.
July 1990	Kosovo Albanians declare independence from Serbia and Belgrade dissolves the government and parliament of Kosovo.
July 1992	First elections of the parallel state of Kosovo. Ibrahim Rugova gets elected as President of Kosovo.
November 1997	KLA appears openly for the first time in a funeral of a killed teacher by the Serbian forces.
March 1998	Attack on Jashari Family where Jashari Family was killed which triggered mass mobilization in KLA and turned the sporadic violence in systematic war. Actors: KLA, Yugoslav Army and Police
March-June 1999	NATO campaign. NATO bombing of Yugoslavia: for narratives and commemoration please see: <a href="http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/how-belgraders-remember-the-nato-bombings">http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/how-belgraders-remember-the-nato-bombings</a> . Actors: NATO, KLA, Serbian State etc.
10 June 1999	End of war. Signing of the technical military agreement of Kumanovo. Actors: NATO, Yugoslav Army
March 2004	Violence incited by the media which led to civil disobedience and displacement of many Serbians from Kosovo. 19 killed and many injured.

	Mostly Albanian by KFOR. Dozens of orthodox churches burned and damaged. Actors: KFOR, Albanians and Serbs
Feb 2008	Declaration of Independence of Kosovo. Actors: Kosovo, Serbia, US, EU
From 2011-	Ongoing Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue. Kosovo and Serbia are negotiating and conducting 'peace-talks' in order to normalize relations. Actors: EU, Kosovo and Serbia

#### 4.7 Poland

- 1989 In his first speech as Prime Minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, announces the policy of the so-called 'thick line' which has been interpreted as unjustified lack of punishment for crimes committed by the communist regime of pre-1989 Poland.
- 1993 An Act on Family Planning penalizes abortion unless there is a serious threat to the life or health of the pregnant woman, there is a case of rape or incest or the fetus is seriously and irreversibly damaged. This law remains in place today.
- 1996 Introduction of the lustration law, i.e. the policy limiting the participation of former communists, and especially informants of the communist secret police in public life
- 1997 The first post-communist constitution of Poland was passed which redefined the concept of the Polish nation in civic rather than ethnic terms. Article 35 guaranteed the rights of national and ethnic minorities, while other provisions prohibited discrimination and political organizations that spread racial hatred.
- 1998 Establishment (by force of legal act) of the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN), research institute with lustration prerogatives, specializing in the legal and historical examination of the 20<sup>th</sup> century history of Poland (especially Nazi and Communist crimes committed in Poland between 1939 and 1989)
- 1999 Poland joins NATO
- 2000-2002 Jan Tomasz Gross' *Neighbours* are being published and the Institute of National Remembrance launched an investigation into the crime in Jedwabne: mass murder of the Jewish population of the town perpetrated by local Poles. *Wokół Jedwabnego* (Around Jedwabne) P. Machcewicz, K. Persak eds. - 1500 page publication following the investigation confirmed Gross' thesis as well as revealed several other pogroms in the region. Major public discussion on the crimes committed by the Poles against the Jews and the Polish-Jewish relations takes place in Poland (with films by Agnieszka Arnold, and a book by Anna Bikont). In July 2001 President Aleksander Kwasniewski, in the presence of an international audience, including relatives and countrymen murdered, apologized 'on behalf of those whose conscience had been touched by this crime'.
- 2004 Poland becomes a member state of the European Union in 2004, both the President and the government were vocal in support for the integration.
- 2004 The Warsaw Uprising Museum opens in Warsaw.
- 2010 Polish Air Force Tu-154 aircraft crashed near the city of Smolensk, Russia, killing all 96 people on board, including the President of Poland Lech Kaczyński and his wife. (The flight's purpose was taking many high-ranking Polish officials to ceremonies marking the 70th anniversary of the Katyń massacre) Various conspiracy theories about the crash have since been in circulation, including that the crash was a political assassination. Polish and international investigations did not find any evidence

supporting this version. (there have been numerous conflicts over forms of memorization - monuments, demonstrations, works of art devoted to the event as well as exhumations against the will of the families)

- 2013/14      Opening of the Polin: Museum of the History of Polish Jews on the site of the former Warsaw Ghetto.
- 2016          Parliament passes the resolution on honoring the victims of the genocide committed by Ukrainian nationalists against Poles and the president of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko paid tribute to the victims of this event in front of the Volyn Massacre Monument in Warsaw, by kneeling in front of it.
- 2017          Opening of the Museum of the Second World War in Gdańsk, and controversies that follow
- 2017          Opening of the Markowa Ulma-Family Museum of Poles Who Saved Jews in World War II
- 2018          Passing by the parliament the amendment to the Act on the Institute of National Remembrance introducing changes, including the addition of Article 55a, which defines the following crime: 'ascribing Nazi crimes to the Polish Nation or to the Polish State'; and Article 2a, concerning crimes perpetrated against Poland or Poles by Ukrainian nationalists. The amendment has caused major international controversy.

## 4.8 Spain

18th century	The War of the Spanish Succession loses Spain its European possessions outside the Iberian Peninsula. Bourbon dynasty, originally from France, centralises the Spanish state, shutting down many regional autonomous assemblies and modernising government and the military.
1714	<p>Diada Nacional de Catalunya [di'aðə nəsiu'naɫ də kətə'ʎujə]) is a day-long festival in Catalonia and one of its official national symbols. It commemorates the fall of Barcelona during the War of the Spanish Succession.[2] The Army of Catalonia that initially fought in support of the Habsburg dynasty's claim to the Spanish throne were finally defeated at the Siege of Barcelona by the army of the Bourbon king Philip V of Spain on 11 September 1714 after 14 months of siege. That meant the loss of the Catalan constitutions under the aegis of the Nueva Planta decrees. The holiday was first celebrated on 11 September 1886, was suppressed by Francoist Spain in 1939, was celebrated publicly for the first time again on 11 September 1977 by a huge demonstration in Barcelona, and reinstated officially in 1980 by the autonomous government of Catalonia, the Generalitat de Catalunya, upon its restoration after the Francoist State.[3]</p> <p>Nationalist organizations and political parties traditionally lay floral offerings at monuments of those who led the defence of the city such as Rafael Casanova and General Moragues, marking their stand against the king Philip V of Spain. Typically, Catalan nationalists organize demonstrations and meet at the Fossar de les Moreres in Barcelona, where they pay homage to the defenders of city who died during the siege and were buried there. Throughout the day, there are patriotic demonstrations and cultural events in many Catalan villages and many citizens wave senyeres and estelades. The event has become more explicitly political and particularly focused on independence rallies in the 2010s.[4]</p>
1807-1814	Napoleon's France occupies Spain, which has been a French satellite since 1795. Fierce nationalist resistance and British intervention in the Peninsular War gradually force French troops out.
19th century	Napoleonic legacy of political division and economic dislocation leaves Spain weak and unstable, with frequent changes of government and a low-level insurgency by Carlist supporters of a rival branch of the royal family. All Latin American colonies win their independence, with Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines in Asia lost during a disastrous war with the United States in 1898.
1931	The Second Republic is declared. Radical policies of land reform, labour rights, educational expansion and anti-Church legislation deepen the political divide. Francesc Macià declares the Independence of Catalonia.

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1934	October Revolution. Unsuccessful revolt of the forces of the left against the right-wing Government that had won the elections of 1933. Brutal repression in Asturias directed by General Franco. Lluís Companys, declares the independence of Catalonia.
1936	After two years of right-wing government, a Popular Front coalition of left-wing and liberal parties narrowly wins parliamentary elections and seeks to reintroduce the radical policies of 1931. A coup by right-wing military leaders captures only part of the country, leading to three years of civil war.
1939	General Francisco Franco leads the Nationalists to victory in the Civil War.
1959	The Eta armed separatist group is founded with the aim of fighting for an independent homeland in the Basque region of Spain and France.
1968	West African colony of Spanish Guinea gains independence as Equatorial Guinea.
1973	Eta kills Prime Minister Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco in retaliation for the government's execution of Basque fighters. Subsequent attempts to liberalise the Franco government founder on internal divisions.
1975	Franco dies. Succeeded as head of state by King Juan Carlos. Spain withdraws from the Spanish Sahara, ending its colonial empire.
1976	Massacre of Atocha. The extreme right-wing terrorist organization Apostolic Anticomunist Alliance killed 5 labor layers and injured 4. July – Adolfo Suárez became Prime Minister. December – Law of Political Reform.
1977	Legalization of Communist Party. June – First free elections in four decades. Ex-Francoist Adolfo Suarez's Union of the Democratic Centre manages a relatively smooth transition to stable democracy. Amnesty Law that freed political prisoners, but guaranteed impunity for those who participated in crimes under the Francoist regime. September – The Spanish Government agreed upon the provisional restoration of the Generalitat of Catalonia.
1978	New constitution confirms Spain as a parliamentary monarchy.
1979	The Basque Statute is approved. First private attempts to discover and exhume mass graves and identify the victims of the Civil War
1980	118 people are killed in Eta's bloodiest year so far.
1981	Coup attempt; rebels seize parliament and tanks take to the streets of Valencia in an attempt to prevent the appointment of a new Union of the Democratic Centre government. Plotters surrender after King Juan Carlos makes a televised address demanding an end to the coup. September. Return of Guernica, the famous painting of Picasso, in Spain
1982	Socialists win large majority and form a government. Spain joins NATO.

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1984	Adoption of measures of material restitution for the military who participated in the Republican Army
1986	Spain joins the European Economic Community. Socialists win elections with large majority. July. First formal communication of the Government of PSOE regarding the 50 <sup>th</sup> commemoration of the beginning of the Civil War. 50 <sup>th</sup> commemoration of Valencia as the capital of the Second Republic during the Civil War. December. The Government of PSOE promoted a law that restituted the military who participated in the clandestine organization Democratic Military Union (UMD)
1987	The Catholic Church began to beatify martyrs of the Spanish Civil War
1989	Socialists win elections with majority.
1990	Adoption of measures of compensation for those who were in prison during the Francoist dictatorship
1992	Summer Olympic Games held in Barcelona. Seville hosts Expo 92. Celebrations mark the 500th anniversary of Columbus's first voyage to America.
1996	Jose Maria Aznar becomes PM following a stability deal with moderate Catalan and Basque nationalists.
1997	Eta, demanding that Basque prisoners be transferred closer to home, kidnaps and kills Basque councilor Miguel Angel Blanco. Killing sparks national outrage and brings an estimated 6 million Spaniards onto the streets in protest. Adolfo Scilingo, a former Argentine naval officer, was charged with genocide under universal jurisdiction laws by investigating magistrate Baltasar Garzón
1998	Augusto Pinochet, the dictator of Chile, was charged with genocide under universal jurisdiction laws by investigating magistrate Baltasar Garzón
1999	First failed attempt to condemn unanimously the Francoist dictatorship in the Parliament  March Aznar's Popular Party (PP) wins landslide in general elections.
2001	Second failed attempt to condemn unanimously the Francoist dictatorship in the Parliament
2002	Peseta replaced by Euro. Third failed attempt to condemn unanimously the Francoist dictatorship in the Parliament
2003	Indefinite ban imposed on Basque separatist Batasuna party.
2004	191 people killed in explosions on packed rush-hour trains in Madrid in near-simultaneous pre-election attacks by an Islamic group with links to al-Qaeda. Socialists under Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero win a general election. April –

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- Prime Minister Zapatero orders Spanish troops withdrawn from Iraq in May. The Generalitat commemorated Lluís Companys, president of Catalonia during the Second Republic, executed by Franco in 1940.
- 2005 Parliament defies Roman Catholic Church by legalising gay marriage and granting homosexual couples same adoption and inheritance rights as heterosexual ones. The government approves the polemic restitution of part of the Catalanian Archive that had been taken to Salamanca during the 2<sup>nd</sup> Republic.
- 2006 First official commemoration in the Spanish Parliament of the 75<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the proclamation of the Second Republic. In the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the beginning of the Civil War the Council of Europe and the European Parliament condemned officially for the first time the Francoist dictatorship. March – Eta declares a ceasefire, but government withdraws offer to hold peace talks after a car bombing at Madrid airport in December. June – Voters in Catalonia back proposals to give the region greater autonomy as well as the status of a nation within Spain.
- 2007 Eta calls off ceasefire. November – Parliament passes a bill formally denouncing Franco's rule and ordering the removal of all Franco-era statues and symbols from streets and buildings. Adoption of the law of the Memorial Democratic in Catalonia. The Catholic Church reacted to the law of Historical Memory by commemorating its most massive beatification
- 2008 The Socialists win re-election, but short of an absolute majority. First clear signs of economic crisis. October. Garzón formally declared the acts of repression committed by the Franco regime to be crimes against humanity. Finally he dropped the investigation against Franco, after state prosecutors questioned his jurisdiction over crimes committed 70 years ago by people who are now dead and whose crimes were covered by the Amnesty Law of 1977
- 2009 Spanish economy enters recession for first time since 1993.
- 2010 Thousands of workers demonstrate against government spending cuts and plans to raise the retirement age. May – Unemployment rate climbs to over 20% for first time in nearly 13 years. Parliament approves austerity package.
- 2011 Indignados protests (15M movement). The movement questions the functioning of the institutional system designed during the transition to democracy and agreed upon between the Franco and the democratic elites (monarchy, preeminence of certain parties, territorial uniformity). Commemoration of the 75<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the beginning of the Civil War in the Spanish Parliament. November – Conservative Popular Party wins resounding victory in parliamentary election and announces new round of austerity measures. The edition of the first 25 volumes of the Biographic

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	Dictionary of the Spanish Royal Academy met fierce opposition from historians and left-wing political parties.
2012	The Supreme Court of Spain decides that the international norms about severe violations of human rights and against impunity of the crimes against humanity cannot be applied to the crimes of the civil war and dictatorship. November – The Basque armed group Eta issues a statement that it is ready to disband, disarm and enter talks with the French and Spanish governments. The government cuts funding related to the 2007 Law of Historical Memory.
2013	Spain's unemployment rate soars to new record of 27.2%. Questioning of the 'regime of 78' (institutional system that came out of the transitional pacts between the elites).
2014	King Juan Carlos abdicates, succeeded by the crown prince as Felipe VI. September – illegal referendum of independence in Catalonia. Spanish government dismisses the result. UN Mission to Spain. The Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence pointed at the several limitations of the attempts for truth, justice, reparation and memory of the enforced disappearances during the civil war and the dictatorship.
2015	Popular Party wins but loses majority in general election that sees populist anti-austerity movement Podemos and new liberal Ciudadanos movement perform well. Main opposition Socialist Party declines to join Prime Minister Rajoy in a coalition.
2016	Acting Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy falls short of a majority in a repeat general election. October – Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy to form a minority government.
2017	Former Catalan president Artur Mas is convicted of civil disobedience and banned from holding office for two years, for organising an illegal independence referendum in 2014. August – Two Islamic State terror attacks kill 16 people in Barcelona and the nearby resort of Cambrils. October – The Spanish government represses Catalanian citizens wanting to vote in a new referendum, and imposes direct rule in Catalonia.
2018	Basque separatist former armed group Eta announces it is ceasing all political activities. June – Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy loses a vote of confidence. Opposition leader Pedro Sanchez takes over as premier. Collective memory becomes a political issue again. June – First trial for a 'stolen baby'.

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